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REPORT
SHOWING THE RELATIONS OF
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
WITH THE TRIBES
ON THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF THE PUNJAB,
FROM ANNEXATION IN 1849 TO THE CLOSE OF 1855 :
AND CONTINUATION OF THE SAME
TO AUGUST 1864.

MEMORANDUM
ON THE
DERA ISHMAEL KHAN DISTRICT

~~~~~  
PUNJAB GOVERNMENT PRESS.

LAHORE, MDCCCLXV.



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REPORT

SHOWING THE RELATIONS OF THE

BRITISH GOVERNMENT

WITH THE

TRIBES INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT ON THE

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF THE PANJAB,

FROM ANNEXATION IN 1849 TO THE CLOSE OF 1855.

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1. The intent and purport of this paper will be to  
 narrate the past history, objects,  
 Objects of this paper. and effects of the policy pursued  
 by the British Government, in its relation to the tribes of barbarous, warlike, and predatory habits on the north-west frontier of the Punjab. From the map hereto prefixed, it will be seen that this frontier line commences from the top of the Kaghán glen (a dependency of Hazára) near Chilass on the north-west corner of Maharajah Golab Sing's territory, and then passes round the north-west boundary of Hazára on east side the Indus to Torbeila ; then crossing that river, it winds round the north and north-west boundary of the Peshawar valley to the Khaibar Pass ; then round the Afrídí hills to Kohat ; then round the western boundary of the Kohat district along the Míranzai valley, and touching the confines of the Kabul dominions ; then round the Wazírí hills to Bunnù line and to the head of Súlímání range ; and then, lastly, right down the base of Súlímání range to its terminate on the upper confines of Sindh, and of the Khílát kingdom. The extent of this frontier is very vast, and its length is full 800 miles. It is also as arduous in its nature as it is extensive. Along the outer side of this frontier line, and

therefore beyond British jurisdiction, there dwell a series of independent tribes, and it is to these that the present memorandum will chiefly refer. On the inner side of this frontier, up to the right bank of the Indus, there also dwell various tribes, in many respects resembling the first-named tribes, but who are British subjects. These latter will be adverted to, though with less prominency than the former.

2. The topographical position of each tribe, both without and within the frontier, is marked on the map. They may be enumerated in their local order as follows :—

Illustrated sketch map.

3. Independent tribes dwelling along the outer face of the north-west Punjab frontier and inhabiting hills.

|                                                             |     |   |                          |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---|--------------------------|
| Adjoining frontier of Hazára district,                      | ... | { | <i>Hassanzais.</i>       |
|                                                             |     | { | <i>Judíns.</i>           |
|                                                             |     | { | <i>Bonairwals.</i>       |
| Adjoining frontier of Peshawar district,                    | ... | { | <i>Swatís.</i>           |
|                                                             |     | { | <i>Ranízáis.</i>         |
|                                                             |     | { | <i>Osmankheylís.</i>     |
|                                                             |     | { | <i>Upper Momands.</i>    |
| Adjoining frontier of Peshawar and Kohat districts,         | ..  | { | <i>Afrídís.</i>          |
|                                                             |     | { | <i>Buzotís.</i>          |
| Adjoining frontier of Kohat district,                       | ... | { | <i>Sepahs.</i>           |
|                                                             |     | { | <i>Orakzais.</i>         |
|                                                             |     | { | <i>Zaimúsht Afghans.</i> |
|                                                             |     | { | <i>Turís.</i>            |
| Adjoining frontier of Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan districts, | ... | { | <i>Wazírís.</i>          |

Adjoining frontier of Dera  
Ismail Khan district, ... {

*Sheoranís.*  
*Oshteranís.*  
*Kusranís.*  
*Bozdars.*

Adjoining frontier of Dera  
Ghazee Khan district, .. {

*Khutrans.*  
*Kosahs.*  
*Lugharís.*  
*Gúrchanís.*  
*Murrís.*  
*Búgtís.*

British tribes.

4. Tribes within the frontier, and British subjects, inhabiting partly hills and partly plains.

Hazára district,

{  
*Turnoulís.*  
*Gukkurs.*  
*Dúnds and Suttís.*  
*Kaghàn Syads and other tribes of Hazára.*

Peshawar district,

{  
*Elúsúfzais.*  
*Khukís.*  
*Momands of the plains.*

Peshawar and Kohat districts, ..

*Khuttuks.*

Kohat district,

.. *Bungushes.*

Dera Ismail Khan district, .. {

*Bunnúchís.*  
*Murcutís.*  
*Bútanís.*  
*Chiefs of Tánk.*  
*Chiefs of Kolachí.*  
*Chiefs of Dera Ismail Khan.*  
*Nátkanís.*  
*Lúnds.*

5. By a comparison of the list of independent tribes with the map, it will be found that no tribe has been omitted, and that all our frontier neighbours have been included. The circumstances of British connexion or relations with each will now be stated.

7. First on the list of important tribes stand the Hassanzais. Between the extreme northern frontier of the Hazára district and the Indus there lies a somewhat narrow strip of rugged and mountainous territory ; this is inhabited by the Hassanzais, who, therefore, dwell Cis-Indus, that is, on the left bank of the river. They could number, perhaps, 2,000 fighting men. The principal hill Black Mountain. is known as the “ Black Mountain” from its dark and gloomy aspect. In the adjoining tract, within the Hazára border, lies Western Turnoulí, the fief of Jehándád Khan, a chief politically dependent on the British.

after annexation a preventive line was established along the left bank of the Indus, as far as British jurisdiction extended, to preclude Trans-Indus salt from crossing into the Panjáb. In 1851, this line extended five miles beyond Torbeila to a point on the Indus where Jehándád's Cis-Indus lands commence. During the autumn of that year, Mr. Carne, Uncovenanted Head of the Customs department, desired to visit this border with a view to an eventual extension of the line. The Board of Administration, however, objected to the measure, and warned him not to go there.

9. During November, however, Mr. Carne, accompanied by one of his patrols, Mr. Tapp, Messrs. Carne and Tapp visit the border. proceeded, against the advice of the District Officer, Major Abbott, to reconnoitre the border. Having marched up the border, and returning back towards Torbeila, Mr. Carne dismissed all attendants, except a few horsemen belonging to his own department. Shortly afterwards the two gentlemen, near the Hassanzai limits, but still within Jehándád's bounds, were murdered by a band of armed Hassanzais. These Hassanzais had no concern whatever in Mr. Carne's views. Even if the line had been extended, it would not have affected them. Afterwards, when called to account for the deed, they never pretended that they ever entertained any apprehension in regard to the Salt line. The Hassanzais may have entertained some unjust suspicions regarding Mr. Carne's intention, but neither their bounds nor their rights were infringed; and they crossed into British territory for the purpose of murdering British officers in cold blood, because they were Englishmen, infidels, defenceless travellers, with a little property about them.

10. As the murder happened in his fief, Jehándád was called to account. He delivered up such Hassanzai people as he could find in his territory as hostages to the British authorities. Immediate Affair between the Hassanzais and Jehándád Khan.

ately the Hassanzais made war upon him, and laid waste his border villages, stirred up his subjects to rebel, and at last reduced him to considerable straits. It was evident that the whole tribe approved of the murder and sheltered the murderers. British interference became at last necessary, both to vindicate ourselves and to support Jehándád. During the following year, that is, December 1852 and January 1853, an expeditionary force, accompanied by Colonel Mackeson, the Commissioner, marched to the border. Before proceeding to work, Colonel Mackeson sent a message, setting forth the British demands and inviting negotiation. This failing, the British force scaled the Black Mountain, surmounted its crest, burned the villages, and destroyed the grain stored there; the Hassanzais flying before them. The hostages in the hands of the British were then sent back to their friends.

11. From that time the Hassanzais have committed no overt act of offence against the British. In April 1855, they had a dispute with the people of Agrore, Hazára, relative to a marriage, and threatened to ravage that tract; but a message was sent reminding them of the lesson of 1853, and they desisted.

12. Next in order appear the Judúns, who inhabit a tract below the Hassanzai country, and on the right bank of the Indus opposite the British town of Torbeila, and thence stretching westward. In this tract the most notable place is Mount Mahábun, of classical celebrity. The Judúns have never molested our subjects or lands, and we have had no relations with them.

13. Near the base of Mahábun, and on the bank of the Indus, is the fanatic colony of Sittana. The Syads of this place are the remnant of the followers of that extraordinary adventurer, Syad Ahmad, who, gathering the handful of "Ghazís" (warlike devotees) from various parts of India, raised a formidable rebellion in

Peshawar. After winning and losing Peshawar and Eúsúfzai, the Syad was eventually slain at the mouth of the Kaghán glen by Shír Sing, the son of Maharajah Runjít Sing. Most of his adherents, chiefly foreigners to the Panjab, dispersed, and the remainder settled at Sittana. These Sittana people are evil-intentioned and ill-conditioned, but their power of mischief has as yet proved insignificant. They endeavour to rouse the bigotry of the surrounding Mahomedan tribes, and especially of the Swatís. The King of Swat, indeed, was elected to his present position from among these very people. They endeavour to intrigue with Wahábís and such like fanatic religionists among the Mahomedan population in various parts of India. More than once correspondence relating to them has been intercepted, but nothing tangible has been elicited. In 1852, they co-operated with the Hassanzais against Jehándád, and actually seized a small fort belonging to that chief, but evacuated it on the approach of a British force with Colonel Mackeson. They harbour murderers

and bad characters of all kinds ;  
 Their bad character and conduct. some of their number have been apprehended in the commission of crimes in the British territory, and have been hanged. In 1854, a band of reformed thugs were working on the road near Peshawar and fled to Sittana. The ferry over the Indus close to Sittana is frequently harassed by the fanatics. It were needless to describe further their attempts at petty annoyance. The necessity for chastising them by force may not arise ; if it should, then this nest of bigotry and disaffection might be destroyed without difficulty ; but afterwards the scattered and fugitive fanatics would wander among the hill tribes, and, perhaps, give some trouble.

14. Beyond the Judún country on the north-west is Bonair or Bunúr. It is a rugged country, extending from the lower range of the Hindú Kúsh downwards to hills which command the Chumla valley and the central plain of Eúsúfzai. On its western frontier again lies the Swat territory. The Bonair people are strong ; they could



muster a force of some thousands. They appear to be on good terms with their neighbours, the Swatís. In 1849 they aided some British subjects at Lúndkhor, in Eúsúfzai, who refused to pay revenue; but they have generally abstained from molesting our subjects, and we have had no concern with them. On a recent occasion, however, they aided the Swatís in punishing the people of Pulí, a large independent village close to the Eúsúfzai border. This combined force expelled the Pulí people and their chief, who fled for refuge to a British village in Eúsúfzai. The force then approached this village, but did not cross our border. They then threatened that if the Pulí refugees were not surrendered, the village should be burnt. Hearing of this movement, two British officers, with a detachment of the Guide Corps, proceeded to the spot, but found that the hostile force had decamped. The dispute was, however, amicably settled by the British officers. The Pulí people were sent back to their homes, and our villagers were enjoined to stand aloof from all such affairs, and to avoid the giving of any just provocation to their neighbours beyond the border.

15. The tribes next on the list are those of Swat, Ranízai and Lower Osman Kheyl, the two latter being subordinate to the former.

16. The Swat country consists of a long valley, running downwards generally in a south-westerly direction, but turning half round from east to west as it nears the British frontier, from which it is separated by a lofty range. It is difficult of access to a force moving from British territory. The Lúndai, or Swat river, flows right through and fertilizes the valley, and then debouching through a gorge in the hills, enters the Peshawar valley, and joins the Kabul river near Charsudda. The Swat valley is fertile, chiefly growing rice; it contains 300 villages and upwards, and its inhabitants may number 1,00,000 souls, of whom 20,000 might be fighting-men. As soldiers, the Swatís rank below several of the most martial tribes. Politically, the Swatís consist of various clans, united under a loose federal

Government, at the head of which is an elective chief, styled Pádsháh or King. The present King is a Syad, named Akbar, from the fanatic colony of Sittana. The high priest is called the "Akhúnd" (equivalent to the term doctor or reader) and is held in great veneration. The King and the priest are sometimes said to be well-disposed persons. However this may be, they have never restrained their people from mischief.

17. Towards its lower extremity, a formidable range of hills bounding the valley runs for many miles from east to west, nearly parallel to the British frontier; and at the eastern extremity of this range stands the Mora Mountain. Between this range and the frontier, however, intervene two tracts, named Ranízai and Lower Osman Kheyl, both *quasi* dependencies of Swat. The best of the passes leading into Swat is one named Mullakund, which opens from Ranízai. A little further to the eastward of Ranízai also there are some passes, leading into the Lúndkhor valley, which belongs to British Eúsúfzai. These latter passes are not available for passage from Swat to our territory, because, leading into Lúndkhor, they can be stopped by any party holding that valley. The passes *viû* Ranízai and Osman Kheyl, *if the people of those tracts accord a passage*, lead straight on to the British plains of Hashtnaggar. Above the Lúndkhor valley, just beyond our frontier, is the strong village of *Pulli*, to which allusion has already been made.

18. The sub-divisions of the Peshawar district adjoining the tribes above described are Lúndkhor or north-west corner of Eúsúfzai, and then Háshtnaggar.

19. For some years the Swatís uniformly proved themselves bad neighbours to the British. They seem to have regarded the plains of Peshawar, and especially the Háshtnaggar tract, as a hunter does his hunting grounds. Plunderers and marauders, sometimes in bands, sometimes in twos and threes, sometimes on foot, and sometimes mounted,

issued forth from Swat, passed through Ranízai, and . . . to the plains of Háshtnaggar or Eúsúfzai. They would not usually make regular raids, and they would refrain from molesting Pathans, their fellow-clansmen; but they would attack persons of all other classes, cultivators, petty traders, cattle-grazers, wayfarers, and the like. They would carry off Hindús in particular, for the purpose of putting them to ransom. Again, the Swatís harboured renegades, refugee criminals, internal malcontents, and external enemies, the names of whom might be specified were not the list too long. For years the valley was a rendezvous for any and every person hostile to the British Government; and among them were several persons who had been dismissed from British service, and one man, named Mokurru Khan, formerly a police officer in the Peshawar district, in particular, who was received with great favor, and enjoyed a large landed grant in Swat. Not only did Swat receive and support enemies of the British, *but it encouraged them to commit depredations in*

#### Hostility of Swat.

*British territory.* Further, the Swatís took every opportunity of inciting British villages to set authority at naught. They invited their fellow Pathans to throw off British yoke and acknowledge a nominal allegiance to Swat. For this purpose they would not only assemble troops in Ranízai or Osman Kheyl, but they would even send horsemen into British villages, partly as emissaries and partly as representatives of authority. Immediately after annexation in the autumn of 1849, they incited the Lúndkhor people to refuse payment of revenue. When an expedition under Colonel Bradshaw marched into that valley, the Swatís appeared in arms against our troops. Towards the end of 1851 they moved bodies of troops, several thousands strong, to the foot of the Mora Mountain and into Ranízai, for purpose of creating disaffection on our border.

20. On the night of the 6th March 1852, a party of 180

Attack on a detachment  
of Guides.

horsemen, under the leadership of Mokurru Khan, assailed a detachment consisting of forty-

three men of the Guide Corps stationed at the British village of Gújur Gurhí in Eúsúfzai as a personal guard to a party of the Great Trigonometrical Survey. The detachment gallantly repelled their assailants, and suffered but slight loss themselves. This outrage being clearly traced to the Ranízai people, a fine of Rs. 5,000 (a sum about equal to one year's revenue had Ranízai been a British tract, and therefore not more than the offending tribe could pay) was imposed upon them, and a force under Sir Colin Campbell was despatched into the valley. The spring harvest was standing ripe for the sickle; the crops and villages were, however, spared. Some Swat troops presented themselves before our troops, but speedily disappeared. The Ranízai chiefs seemed overawed, and tendered submission, undertook the payment of the fine, and gave hostages as security. The force then withdrew across the frontier. A conciliatory message was sent to the Swat Governor, but no reply was received. This affair was so far concluded by the end of March.

Ranízai people promise reparation.

21. On the night of the 20th April, the native Tahsildar, or Revenue Collector, of the British tract of Hashtnagar, resident at Charsudda, was murdered in his bed: two of his subordinate employés and one servant were also killed. The attack was made by a party of 400 men, without meeting any opposition from the people of Charsudda, a circumstance which argued disaffection on their part; and it soon became apparent that a bad feeling had been excited throughout Hashtnagar. Inquiry brought the murder home to a chief named Arjún Khan, who belonged to Túngí in Hashtnagar, and had fled into the Swat territories, and on this occasion had emerged from Osman Khèyl. It was ascertained that this man was well received by the Swatís, and had been presented with a fief; and, in short, that the Swat Government, if it had not instigated him to the deed, had encouraged and abetted him after its commission. He took up his

quarters at Prangurh and Nowadund, Osman Kheyl villages, and placed himself in an attitude of overt hostility. A force

Successful expedition  
against Osman Kheyl.

accordingly, under Sir C. Campbell, moved into Osman Kheyl and destroyed Prangurh and Nowadund.

On this occasion some letters, believed to be genuine, were taken, which proved the complicity of Swat. One letter, from the King to Arjún, authorized him to destroy all Europeans and Hindús in the Peshawar valley, and all Mahomedans in the British service; but enjoined him to spare all other Mahomedans!

22. In the meantime the Ranízai people withheld

Successful expedition  
against Ranízai.

payment of their fine. They repudiated the hostages and expelled their families from the territory. They declared their reliance on support from Swat. Coercion, therefore, became necessary. On the 18th of May, a force under Sir C. Campbell, marched against Ishk-ka-kote, one of the largest villages in Ranízai, and found themselves opposed to about 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, all from Swat, in addition to the armed villagers. The King and the Akhúnd had stationed themselves on the crest of the Mullakund Pass overlooking the valley to view the fight. After a slight resistance, the Swat troops broke and fled in a dastardly manner, leaving about a hundred of their number dead on the field. The village and its granaries were then destroyed. On the 20th some eleven more villages were destroyed, the enemy offering little or no resistance; on 22nd, the last and strongest place in Ranízai was destroyed. The troops then withdrew.

23. During the following month (June) the Ranízai

Submission of Ranízai.

people, finding themselves houseless and unable to re-settle in or to re-build their dismantled villages, made overtures for peace. Shortly afterwards they tendered unconditional submission, offered to pay revenue to the British, and to suffer a fortified post to be erected in their valley. The

Supreme Government declined to accept any tribute or revenue from them; they were only required to behave as friendly and peaceable neighbours. They were accordingly excused from payment of the original fine, and they bound themselves to permit no marauders from Swat or elsewhere to pass through their lands across the British frontier, and to live at amity with neighbouring British villages, Lúndkhor and others. These arrangements were completed in September 1852.

24. Since this period the Ranízai people have fulfilled their engagements. Our border has been molested with no more marauders from that direction, nor has any cause for dissatisfaction on our part arisen. Indeed, so anxious have the Ranízai people been to maintain peace with us, that afterwards, when some of the leading men who had brought about the submission were killed in an internal feud, a deputation came from Ranízai to the British authorities, expressly to explain that, although these men were dead, the tribe still adhered to the agreements. Such is the moral effect of a well-directed expedition. The Osman Kheyl people have also profited by the lesson impressed upon them. Arjún, the renegade and murderer, has never re-appeared, nor have any such men been subsequently harboured in Osman Kheyl.

25. That Swat had been the head and front of all this offending is evident; we had never interfered with them, but they chose to make war upon us. Our chief fault in their eyes was that we were infidels by religion, and that we were the lords of a fair and fertile valley within reach of plunder. It was at one time thought that after the Osman Kheyl and Ranízai affairs a good opportunity presented itself of dashing up the Mullakund Pass and down into the Swat valley. A separate expedition, on a considerable scale, was also being organized during the summer of 1852. The military authorities at that time, however, con-

Postponement of expedition against Swat.

sidered that various difficulties existed in the execution of the plan, and the Government consented to postpone the expedition until the cold season of 1852-53; but the day of retribution to Swat never arrived. The Swat Government seem to have taken to heart the punishment inflicted on Ranízai and Osman Kheyl, and to have dreaded similar operations in their own valley. Since 1852, they have abstained from all annoyance or hostility against the British. The Peshawar valley has enjoyed immunity from the incursions of Swatí freebooters. The Swat Government cannot be relied upon with anything like friendly confidence, but of late it has given us no tangible cause of dissatisfaction.

26. The Upper or Hill Momands follow next in order. Their country extends from the south-western Swat border to a little beyond the Kabul river. Both banks of this river are in their possession, and their capital, Lalpúra, where Sádut Khan, the head of their tribe, resides, is situated near the left bank. They own allegiance to the Kabul Government, though subject to an almost nominal control; and, at the late treaty, the Amír Dost Mahomed Khan undertook to restrain them from hostilities against British subjects. Their militia can muster about 12,000 fighting-men. They are tolerably good soldiers, though not equal to the men of the most martial tribes. Their hills overhang the fertile strip of British territory, enclosed between the Swat and Kabul rivers near their confluence, known as Doába, and this portion of the border is not more than twenty-five miles distant from Peshawar.

27. The three sections of the tribe that have come in contact with the British are the Piní Alí Momands, the Alumzai Momands, and the Michní Momands.

28. The Michní Momands, after annexation, were allowed to hold a fief, or jaghír, in Doába, the fertile triangle near the junction of the Swat and Kabul

Michní, Panjpáo, and  
Piní Alí Momands.

rivers, from the British Government, of which they collected the revenue. A portion of the lands they cultivated themselves, the remainder they farmed out to other tribes of the plains as tenants. Many of their clansmen dwelt in the plains of Michní and some in the neighbouring hills. They traded in the Peshawar valley. The Alumzai Momands, whose head quarters are at Gundáo, in the hills, also had a fief of Panjpáo in British Doába, chiefly cultivated by tenants. A few of their men lived in the plains and the majority in the hills. These also traded in the valley. The Pindí Alí Momands, at a former period, had held a similar jaghír in Doába; but not since British rule. These have few relations either with the Government or the people of the Peshawar valley. They inhabit a very strong locality in the hills. The fiefs were originally granted by preceding Governments to the Momands as black mail to buy off depredation; but molestation was not to be thus warded off; and despite all that has yet been done, the Doába border is not free from Momand marauders. The misdeeds of the Momands have always been supported and encouraged by Sádut Khan, who is said to bear an ancient grudge against the British for having been parties to his temporary deposition from power during the Afghán war.

29. Besides the petty raids and robberies, which may be called the normal and chronic troubles of the Momand frontier, there occurred, during the years 1850-51, several audacious outrages. Various attacks were made at different dates (on six principal occasions) upon British detachments and posts and British villages in Doába, and many tracts of cultivation were ravaged by the Pindí Alí, Alumzai, and Michní, and even Lalpúra Momands, one after the other. Sometimes the inroad would be made without even an assignable cause; sometimes an excuse more or less invalid would exist, such as a dispute with some British subjects about irrigation or landed tenure, or the marriage of a woman, and the like. On one occasion, in particular, a question arose between a Momand and a resident of the British village regarding the usufruct of mortgage. The Momand had probably the right on



his side according to the peculiar custom of the valley. The case was brought before the Peshawar court; but while the matter was pending, the Momands took up arms and stopped the irrigation channels of their adversaries. It became evident that their incursions were prompted partly by hostility, partly lust of plunder, and partly by the hope of concessions, and could only be checked by punitive force.

30. At length, in the autumn of 1851, the Supreme Government deemed it necessary to direct that the Momand fiefs in Doába should be confiscated, that the defensive posts should be strengthened, and that British troops should operate against the offending Momands. These directions were carried out during the cold season of 1851-52. Several Momand villages were destroyed by the troops, some additional forts and posts were constructed, and the enemy were driven into their hills. Once they attacked one of our positions (named Shub Kuddur) and were repelled, and once they threatened an attack in large numbers (about 6,000), but were easily dispersed. But in the following July the Michní and Panjpáo Momands, exiled from house and lands, and cut off from trade and such like relations in the plains, tendered submission and prayed for restoration to their fiefs. They were restored on condition of paying a yearly tribute of Rs. 600 for Michní and Rs. 200 for Panjpáo. The amounts fixed were early nominal; but, for example's sake, it was necessary to demand some payment, lest immunity in this respect should encourage our own subjects to misbehave in the hope of avoiding the just dues of Government, or embolden our neighbours to harass us in hope of extorting landed grants. On this, as on other occasions connected with the independent tribes, the Government declared that revenue was not wanted, but only a quiet frontier.

31. The Alumzai or Panjpáo Momands have not subsequently given cause for dissatisfaction, and have remained in enjoyment of their fief. This tract, however, is just within range of the guns at the Shub Kuddur post.

32. The Michní Momands did not again overtly misbehave as a tribe until the autumn of 1854; but towards the close of 1852, some men of this tribe shot Lieutenant Bullnois, of the Engineers, who had for amusement ridden for a very short distance into their lower hills, and sent his head as a trophy up to Lalpúra. This atrocity, perfectly unprovoked as it was, indicated the worst possible spirit. By that time two years' tribute was due. Payment was withheld. The Chief, Ruhímdad fled from Peshawar, whither he had been summoned, and under such circumstances flight was tantamount to rebellion.

Further misconduct of Michní Momands. A British force was at once moved to Michní. It was found that some Momands had fled with Ruhímdad, and that some stood by their lands and were willing to pay their share of the tribute, and professed allegiance. It also appeared that Ruhímdad's party held three important villages on the neighbouring range of hills which commanded the Kabul river, and dominated over the inhabitants and the plain of Michní. From these places, moreover, the Momands fired on the troops as they moved along the open ground. These villages were then destroyed. A settlement of the Michní fief was then made.

Settlement of Michní. The faithful Momands who stood by their lands continue to pay their quota of the tribute. The lands of the Momands who fled were farmed out and assessed with revenue. Ruhímdad has not since been restored. He occasionally commits raids on that portion of our border. Towards the close of 1854 he appeared at Peshawar under a safe conduct to pray for restoration to the fief, but he did not, and indeed could not offer any security for good conduct. He was sent back across the frontier and forbidden to re-enter British territory.

33. The Pindí Alí Momands have continued to misbehave up to the present time. Within the last nine months they have committed nine raids in our territory. It is to be feared that until their strongholds shall

have been penetrated by British troops, they will not refrain from molesting us. Their Chief, Nawab Khan, unites with Ruhímdad, and both are encouraged by Sádut Khan. These three worthies hope that the British Government will at last be driven, by perpetual annoyances on its border, to grant some rich fiefs to them all. In fact, it appears that Sádut Khan presumes on the supposition that Lalpúra is too distant to be approached by an avenging British force—a supposition in which he may one day find himself undeceived.

34. After the Momands come the Afrídís. This tribe is the most important of all on this frontier. Their territory, commencing in the hills between the Kabul river and the Khaibar pass, forms the western boundary of the Peshawar valley; then it stretches round the south-western corner and skirts a portion of the southern boundary of the Peshawar district till it approaches the Khuttuk lands. It thus projects abruptly into the British frontier, separates the Peshawar district from that of Kohat, and forms the northern boundary of the latter district. The Afrídí hills, intervening between the Kohat and Peshawar districts, are crossed by two principal passes, communicating from one district to the other, the best of which is the well-known Kohat pass or gullí, and the other the Jewakí pass. Thus the frontage of the Afrídí hills towards British jurisdiction extends over a total length of 80 miles, and this territory stretches far back in a westerly direction towards Kabul. Thus the Afrídís hold a large geographical area, and have a long border conterminous with ours. The Afrídís are entirely independent. Their hills are lofty, steep, and rugged, most arduous for military operations. The villages are strongly posted and difficult of access. The Afrídís are fierce by nature. They are not destitute of rude virtues, but they are notoriously faithless to public engagements. They are split up into factions. The subdivisions of this tribe are numerous. They can muster 15,000 or 20,000 fighting-men. As soldiers they are among the best on the frontier. They are good shots. Their tactics resemble

Character and power of the Afrídís.

those of the other tribes. They retreat before the foe as he advances and press upon as he retires. From the size of their country, and the strength of their numbers, the Afrídís, if united, might prove formidable opponents; but they rarely or never combine. If their independence were threatened, or if some peculiar opportunity offered, they might act together, otherwise they will usually be found at war with each other. We have to deal with one or two sections only at a time. If one be hostile, another will be friendly, and *cice versá*. While operating against some Afrídís, we can always induce other Afrídís to be our allies; consequently the tribe is not so formidable as it might at first appear.

35. The Afrídís of the Khaiber pass, among faithless Khaibar Pass Afrídís. tribes, are considered the most faithless. Thieves and robbers from this vicinity, despite all precautions, continue to infest nightly the Peshawar cantonment. A section of these Afrídís, named the Kúki Kheyl, have manifested symptoms of a friendly spirit towards us. The Afrídís on the south-western corner of the Peshawar border have not signalized themselves.

36. The British Government has been concerned chiefly with the Afrídís of the two The Passes of Kohat. passes (*i. e.* the Kohat pass or gulí, and the Jewakí pass). For the guardianship of these passes the Afrídís have received some kind of consideration from successive dynasties, Ghiznivides, Moguls, Dúranís, Barakzais, Sikhs, British; and have broken faith with each and all. These mountaineers are great traders and carriers. They convey salt from mines in the Kohat district to the Peshawar market. They also cut and sell the fire-wood of their hills. By these means they procure a comfortable subsistence, which cultivation on their rugged hill-sides would not alone suffice to afford. This is a fortunate circumstance, inasmuch as the British authorities can, by blockading the mouths of the passes, stop the trade and reduce the Afrídís to sore straits.

Policy of blockading the passes.

Still such a blockade is not an easy remedy, and is not lightly to be resorted to. From the nature of the ground, the border may be difficult to guard; the blockade may be evaded, unless several sections of the tribe co-operate to punish one offending section; otherwise the besieged would make over their beasts of burden to a friendly section of the tribe, who would then take the animals into the valley or the market, and thus carry on the trade. Again, the effect, though complete perhaps in the end, is yet slow, and the besieged can frequently descend from the hills and harry the nearest British villages. In fact, it may happen that a blockade is nearly as troublesome as an expedition into the hills, without being equally prompt.

37. The Gulí or Kohat Pass is the direct and best route from Kohat to Peshawar. Arrangements for the The Government post between Kohat Pass. these two important stations runs usually by this route. Immediately after annexation, the British Government, following the example of all its predecessors, concluded an arrangement with the Afrídís in respect to this pass, and agreed to pay them Rs. 5,700 per annum, for which they were to protect the road through the defile. This was effected in April 1849. In February 1850 a party of Sappers and Miners working on a road in British territory were cut to pieces by these very Afrídís.

38. The chief causes of this outrage were probably the innate ferocity of the Afrídís, Causes of Afrídí outrages. their distrust of a civilized Government, and the machinations of a noted freebooter, who had previously to annexation forfeited for his crimes a jaghír in the Peshawar district, and who hoped, by disturbing the passage of the defile, to induce the British to conclude terms with him. But other causes were at the time attributed. It was by some supposed that the increased taxation of salt, the construction of a road through the pass, and the non-receipt of the stipulated allowances by the Afrídís, were circumstances

of provocation. But each of the three points admit of explanation. In the first place, the British tax on Trans-Indus salt did not injuriously affect the Afrídís.

Moderate taxation of Trans-Indus salt. The duty leviable at the mines was, indeed, higher than the former

taxes, but this was the only duty ; while town and transit market duties to which the salt had been previously liable were remitted. The aggregate of the three kinds of previous taxes exceeded the single duty of the British at least two-fold in all cases, and even four-fold in some cases. But the rate of duty, while it might affect the western tribes or the consumers of the plains, in Peshawar or elsewhere, *would not injure the Afrídís*, who are great carriers and not great consumers. If the price of salt were high, the consumer might suffer ; but the carrier would realize his full dues. Moreover, experience shews that when the price of Trans-Indus salt is increased, the profits of the carrier rise to a still greater degree. This fact has been repeatedly admitted by the Afrídís themselves at conferences, so that some have thought that if the present duties were to be enhanced, the

The Afrídís had no grievance in regard to salt. Afrídís at least would be actual gainers. But the duties have never been raised from the rate originally fixed (2, 3, and 4 annas per

maund), while in the Punjab the duty amounts to Rs. 2 per maund, and has always been cheerfully paid. Furthermore, if the duties had been vexatious to the Afrídís, which they were ~~not~~, still they had not come into operation when the party of Sappers and Miners were murdered. The temporary closing of the mines pending inquiry might, perhaps, have created some mistrust ; but they had been re-opened *just before* the outrage took place. As for the road, no such work was being carried on within Afrídí limits, nor through any part of the pass. The unfortunate Sappers were working within *our* territory, near Kohat, at a place where a regular road has been since constructed. 'As for the allowances being paid, not to the Afrídís, but to another party who failed to pass it on to the proper recipients, the

British officer at Kohat deposed that the money was disbursed to the Afrídí mulliks *in his own presence*.

39. An expeditionary force, under Sir Charles Napier, consequently proceeded to the Peshawar end of the pass, and demanded the surrender of the murderers.

Expedition to the Kohat pass under Sir C. Napier.

This was refused. The force then marched through the pass to Kohat. The four Afrídí villages in the pass were destroyed. The force then fought its way back to Peshawar. No further arrangement with the Afrídís was at that time effected. They seized a tower erected on the crest of the hill near Kohat; they closed the defile; they remained overtly hostile, and even planned the murder of British officers. An agreement was brought about in June, but was immediately broken. They were then debarred from entering either the Pehawar or Kohat valleys, and were thus deprived of their trade. In a short time the Afrídís were quietly reduced to submission. Willing to treat them considerately, the British Government consented to renew their old allowances on condition of their being responsible for the security of the pass. In order to strengthen the arrangement, Rehmut Khan, a chief of the neighbouring Orakzais, was admitted to a share of the responsibility, and was granted a personal allowance of Rs. 2,000 per annum, and Rs. 6,000

Further arrangements for Kohat pass.

as the pay of a mounted guard to be maintained on the Kothul, or crest of the ridge near Kohat. As then revised (November 1850) the payments aggregated Rs. 13,700 per annum. Rehmut Khan and the Afrídís were at constant feud, but the pass remained open (occasional robberies only being committed) until the middle of 1853.

40. About the same time that these events occurred in the Kohat pass, the Afrídís of Jewakí Afrídís, the Jewakí pass proved troublesome. Their mountains are very strong. Even among the Afrídí clans they were considered particularly daring and ferocious. When the Afrídís of the Kohat pass misbehaved,

the Jewakí Afrídís offered to engage for that pass, or to conduct the communication through their own pass. The Jewakí pass was actually used for a short time, but the Jewakí Afrídís soon proved themselves to be worse even than their neighbours. They committed numerous raids and murders in the Peshawar and Kohat districts, and even

robbed boats on the Indus. They  
 Murder of Dr. Healey. also murdered a British officer, named Dr. Healey, who was travelling towards Kohat, for no other reason than that he was a defenceless infidel, with a little property about him. Proceedings were taken against them. Preparations were made for their castigation. At last those belonging to the Kohat or southern end of the pass tendered submission, and agreed to respect life and property, and to make good all property that might be carried off to their country. This engagement was made in 1851, and from that time these villages have behaved remarkably well. But the Afrídís at the northern or Peshawar end did not behave so well, and among these villages one in particular rendered itself afterwards conspicuous for crime.

41. During 1853 the feud between the Gulí Afrídís and Rehmut Khan reached its  
 Disturbances in the Kohat pass. climax. In October of that year the Afrídís attacked and seized Rehmut Khan's post on the Kothul, which was defended by only 20 men instead of 100. The pass became virtually closed, and no security was maintained; postal communication was suspended, and even British officers were fired upon. In November the Afrídís of the pass were summoned to Peshawar, in order that matters might be considered. Rehmut Khan was out of the question, he had failed to keep up the stipulated force, and had exasperated the Afrídís, his colleagues. The Afrídís refused to undertake the management, unless they received Rehmut Khan's late allowances in addition to their own. This additional amount could not be conceded, as they had been the very men to break the peace.



42. The Bungush tribe of the Kohat valley, and British subjects, offered to guard the forward. Kothul, and asserted that they had an hereditary claim stronger than that of the Afrídís to occupy the ridge. The Kothul was then made over to them; and, as the Afrídís refused to open the pass, it was resolved to establish a blockade; so again the Afrídís were debarred from entering the Kohat and Peshawar valleys. It had long been contemplated to build a fort on the Peshawar side of the pass, near its mouth, so a force was moved out to that point and the work commenced. This post is called Fort Mackeson; it commands the mouth of the Kohat pass and is connected with a post near the mouth of the Jewakí pass.

43. While these arrangements were progressing, the Gullí Afrídís suddenly attacked the Bungush people on the Kothul, and seized that post. Several Bungush chiefs were killed in the encounter, and Major Coke, who was present, was slightly wounded. Upon this check, the Bungush people obtained the alliance of two small, though warlike, tribes, named Buzotís and Sepahs. These were independent, and dwelt in the hills near the pass. The southern section of the Jewakí Afrídís also joined the league.

44. In the meantime the Gulí Afrídís were suffering from the blockade. The British authorities had acted on the principle that if the Afrídís will not keep the pass open, the doors of the pass must be shut upon the Afrídís; so the Gulí Afrídís rendered submission and offered to re-open their part of the pass. This offer was accepted. Another set of Afrídís, called Busí Kheyl, who dwell near the Peshawar end of the pass, were also admitted. The aggregate allowances of the pass were divided as follows :—

|                 |    |    |      |     |       |
|-----------------|----|----|------|-----|-------|
| Bungush,        | .. | .. | .... | Rs. | 3,200 |
| Buzotís,        | .. | .. | ..   | „   | 2,000 |
| Jewakí Afrídís, | .. | .. | .... | „   | 2,000 |
| Sepahs,         | .. | .. | ..   | „   | 500   |

|                      |    |    |    |     |        |
|----------------------|----|----|----|-----|--------|
| Gullí Afrídís,       | .. | .. | .. | „   | 5,400  |
| Bussí Kheyl Afrídís, | .. | .. | .. | „   | 600    |
|                      |    |    |    |     | <hr/>  |
| Total,               | .. | .. | .. | Rs. | 13,700 |
|                      |    |    |    |     | <hr/>  |

This arrangement was concluded by the close of 1853. At the same time, also, Rs. 6,000 were paid in cash by the British Government to those friendly clans who had furnished our troops with supplies. From that time the pass has remained open, with the exception of one brief interval of twenty-six days. This interregnum was occasioned by a feud among the Afrídís of the pass, during which some robberies were committed. The heads of the confederacy traced the perpetrators to one of the villages in the pass, by name Bústí Kheyl, destroyed the offending village, and compelled the inhabitants to make good the value of plundered property, and to pay a fine besides.

45. In the previous account of the Jewakí Afrídís, it was remarked that all the villages at the southern Kohat end of the pass had behaved well since 1851. At the close of 1853, the other Jewakí Afrídís at the northern or Peshawar end, seeing a force in the field, and having lands at the foot of the hills exposed to operations, executed satisfactory agreements, with one exception. This exception was the Borí clan, inhabiting a cluster of strong and defensible villages in the interior of the hills. The Borí people had always continued to rob and murder, for which purpose they employed a set of horsemen, who followed robbery as a profession. During 1852-53 they had committed ten serious raids in the Peshawar district, some of which were attended with loss of life. They also kept prisoners (British subjects) captive to extort ransom. At the close of 1853, as a force was lying off the mouth of the Kohat pass, where the fort was being constructed, and a good opportunity offered of bringing the Borí people to their senses, they were required to release their prisoners, make good the plundered property, and to give up the horses of their mounted robbers. They refus-

Punishment of the Borí ed, and the next day the troops Afrídís. marched against the place and destroyed it. Many of their noted desperados were killed. The destruction of so strong a place, and the loss of its prestige as being believed impregnable, have had the best effect, and there have been no subsequent troubles in the Borí quarter. During this operation the neighbouring Afrídís shewed the best possible spirit, and even supplied water to the troops. Their chiefs received presents and written acknowledgments of their good conduct on that occasion.

46. There remains but one more affair with the Afrídís to record. In February 1855, Bussí Kheyl Afrídís. a murder with robbery was committed near the Peshawar end of the Kohat Pass. After some inquiry this was traced by the heads of the confederacy to the Bussí Kheyl. These Bussí Kheyl people, probably apprehending punishment from their clansmen, resolved to break the peace. At that time the camp of Lieutenant Hamilton, Assistant Civil Engineer, together with his office and treasure-chest, happened to be pitched near the foot of their hills. One night they descended on this camp to kill and rob. Lieutenant Hamilton fought bravely for his life and escaped with some wounds; but several of his people were killed and wounded. The assailants made off with some Rs. 10,000 of Government treasure and property, besides some private effects. Since that time the Bussí Kheyl have been excluded from British territory, and reprisals have been made to the value of about Rs. 6,000. Peace has not yet been made with them; but ere long they will probably find that a state of hostility with the British entails so much inconvenience, that they must seek forgiveness.

47. The Sepahs and Buzotís have been already alluded to in the foregoing para.

Sepahs and Buzotís. They are small, but very brave tribes, numbering—

|          |    |    |     |                 |
|----------|----|----|-----|-----------------|
| Buzotís, | .. | .. | 500 | } fighting-men. |
| Sepahs,  | .. | .. | 300 |                 |

They live in tolerably close connexion with their more powerful neighbours, the Afrídís, and manage to hold their own. They have acted up to their word in regard to the pass, and have generally behaved well towards us.

48. The next tribe is that of the Orakzais. Their country extends from the Sepah tract (which adjoins the Afrídí hills) round the north-western corner of the Kohat district, and then nearly onward to the top of the Míranzai valley (which belongs to Kohat) till it joins the country of the Zaimúsht Afghans. The tribe is one of the largest on the frontier, and numbers 20,000 or 25,000 fighting-men, most of whom are good hill soldiers. The Orakzai hills stretch a long distance to the west. In the interior of these hills, there is the coal table-land of Terah, where the clansmen resort in the summer with their cattle, and in the winter return to the pasturage grounds of the lower ranges near the British frontier. The sections of the tribe that have come in contact with us are the Shekhan, the Mishtí, and the Rábeuh Kheyl. The portions of the Kohat district adjoining the Orakzai hills are the sub-divisions of Samilzai, Hungú and Míranzai. Up to the year 1855, this tribe, though occasionally committing petty depredations, and known to be capable of mischief, if so inclined, gave no positive trouble.

49. In April 1855, a British expedition was sent from Kohat to overawe the dependency of Míranzai. One day, while the force was encamped in the valley, a large body of Ghazís or fanatics from the Afrídís, Orakzais, and Zaimúsht Afghans appeared on the hills. They threatened an attack, but were easily dispersed.

50. During the spring of the same year the Orakzais commenced depredations upon the Misconduct of the Orakzais. Bungush people of the Kohat district. About this time some fifteen raids were committed, several hundred head of cattle were carried off, and some British subjects were killed. In these the Shekhan and the

Mishtí sections were concerned, but the Rábeuh Kheyl were conspicuous. Then a feud commenced between the Orakzais and the Hungú people. The chief of Hungú was murdered by one of his own relations, and the murderer fled to the Orakzais. Major Coke, the District Officer of Kohat, first moved to Hungú with a small force to check these raids. The Mishtí section half submitted, but not the others. There soon arose reason to apprehend a general combination among all sections of the tribe to attack our border; so a larger force moved out from Kohat to Hungú under Brigadier Chamberlain in September 1855. Perceiving this, the Orakzais made no general attack, and whatever league had begun was apparently dissolving. But the Orakzais were seen in armed bodies on the hills ready to pour down on the British villages as soon as the troops should withdraw; so the troops marched from their camp up the Rábeuh Kheyl hill during one moonlight

Punishment of the Rá-beuh Kheyl Orakzais. night, a distance of seventeen miles, and in the morning took the Rábeuh Kheyl villages by surprise. The villages were destroyed, the crops cut, and the cattle carried off by the troops, who then returned to camp the same day. Within a few days, the Rábeuh Kheyl tendered submission, made good all plundered property; they were also willing to pay grazing tax for the pasturage grounds near our frontier; but the Government declined to receive any revenue from them. The Shekhan and the Mishtí sections also came to terms. Good effects may be hoped for from the Rábeuh Kheyl expedition, which was one of the most successful affairs yet conducted on this frontier.

51. After the Orakzais are the Zamúsht Afghans. They are a small, but brave tribe, numbering about 5,000 fighting-men, some of whom are well mounted. They inhabit a valley leading from western Míranzai onward, towards the crest of a range called the "Powár Kothul." Their country of right belongs to the Kabul kingdom. They are usually ready to combine for mischief with Túrís, and to threaten Míranzai; but they have seen the expedition pass through that val-

ley, and they hold some land in the plains, which holding affords some pledge for their good behaviour.

52. The Túrís are a warlike tribe, occupying a portion of the valley of the river Khúram; they can muster 5,500 fighting-men. They are nominally subjects of Kabul, and belonged to the jaghír of Sirdar Azim Khan one of the Amír's sons; but they are under no real control. They have repeatedly leagued with other tribes to harass the Míranzai valley. They would sow among the Míranzai people—they would harbour fugitives from either party —they would encourage all to resist the British—they would attack some villages in force. They frequently committed raids on the Bungush and Khuttuk villages of the Kohat district. In August 1853, Captain Coke seized a Túrí caravan on its way to the salt mines, taking the property as security for re-payment of value of plundered property, and the men as hostages for their tribe. This measure was soon followed by an embassy from the tribe. Their petition ran thus :—

*After Compliments.*—"Our caravan, cattle, and many of our tribe have been seized.

"This is the just punishment of evil-doers.

"Before the British Government came to this country, we had evil intent against Khuttuk and Bungush, and carried off their cattle.

"Since the arrival of the British Government, we have, through evil counsels, done the same.

"But since we find there is a British officer who protects his subjects, both Bungush and Khuttuk, and has retaliated on us —

"We beg that our caravan may be released, and we bind ourselves to abstain in future from raids on British territory, and the Túrí will trade with the Khuttuk and Bungush."

53 An agreement was concluded with the tribe from the commencement of 1854. The Agreement broken by the Túrís. value of plundered property was made good, the prisoners were released, and five Túrís were made over to the British as hostages; but within one month the tribe again gave way to "evil counsels," and in the following March (1854) a serious attack was made by the Túrís, with 2,000 men (foot and horse) on a Míranzai village. Lives were lost on both sides. The Túrí hostages were then incarcerated in the Lahore jail. This instance of misconduct was followed up by other raids. When, during the autumn of 1854, the expedition against the refractory British territory of Míranzai was designed, it was considered whether the opportunity should not be taken of punishing the Túrís; but as they were subjects of Kabul, and negotiations with the Amír were shortly expected, the Government decided on first arranging with His Highness on the subject. During the negotiations for the treaty at Peshawar, in March 1854, it was explained to the Afghán representative, that either the Kabul Government must restrain the Túrís from incursions on British territory, or else the British Government would itself undertake to chastise them. It was resolved that another trial should be given to the Túrís before further measures were taken. The expedition to Míranzai was effected in May of the same year. The Túrís having seen that display of force, desired to make peace with us. Another agreement was shortly afterwards concluded with them, and their hostages were released from confinement. No subsequent misbehaviour on the part of the Túrís has been reported.

54. The Wazírís are one of the largest and most important tribes. They hold the rugged and lofty hills adjoining the south-west portion of the Kohat district (that is, the western part of the Míranzai valley and hills round Báhádur Kheyl), and north-western border of the Dehra Ismail Khan, that is the valley of Bunnú, and plains of Murwut and Tánk.

These hills run down to the point where the great Sulímání range commences; near this point the Gúmúl range debouches from the hills almost opposite Tánk. The valley of the Gúmúl forms the Galerí pass. This is the well-known pass through which a large portion of the traffic to and from Afghánistán and Central Asia enters into India, and scarcely inferior to the Khaibar pass of Peshawar or the Bolán pass of Sindh. The hills on either side of this pass are held by Wazírís. It will also be seen that the Wazírí hills form the western limit of the Júrduk pass, which is the main line of communication between Bunnú and Kohat. Just to the east of this pass lies Báhádúr Kheyl and also the villages of Khar-rah and Lutumur, at which three places the Trans-Indus mines are situated. The Wazírí hills also command the outlets of the Kúrám and Gúmbelí rivers into the Bunnú valley.

55. The Wazírís are a numerous tribe, sub-divided into various sections, which could be particularized were it necessary. Character and habits of the Wazírís. The birth-place of this race would seem to be the snowy range, which runs to the south-east of Jelallabád and Kabul. From this range they appear to have moved downwards towards the Derájat border. They are noble savages of pure blood, pastoral habits, fierce disposition, and wild aspect. They can muster probably (were the whole tribe united) as many as 20,000 or 30,000 fighting-men; and, if combined, might make themselves formidable. But though they are less addicted to internecine contests than other hill tribes, and are so far united, they are yet not apt to join all these forces together against an external foe. They are bold and ferocious; but as soldiers not equal to most martial tribes.

Many of them live in tents, or in temporary dwellings resembling tents; in the winter frequenting the more genial clime of the lower ranges, and in summer retreating to feed their flocks in higher altitudes. Some of them have engaged in cultivation and have encroached on the weaker tribes of the plains; of these, again, many will only cultivate Pastoral and agricultural pursuits.



during the cold months, and as the heat approaches will reap their crops and retire to the mountains. But the tendency to extend their cultivation, and even to settle in the plains, has of late years been increasing among the Wazírís. The tribe generally is quite independent, both of the Kabul and the British Governments; but some members of the clan who have taken up their abode as cultivators in the Bunnú valley have become British subjects.

56. Many sections of the tribe have, ever since British connexion with the frontier, maintained peaceable relations with us. These people, driving the aborigines of Bunnú before them, have occupied pasturage grounds on the western border of the valley, and have taken possession of cultivated lands in the same vicinity, amounting to about one-third of the culturable area of the valley. Under the Sikh regime there were constant disputes between these Wazírís and the Government (inasmuch as revenue could in those days only be collected by force of arms), and also between them and the Bunnú people, who asserted claims they could not enforce, to a patrimony which had been gradually usurped. In 1848, Major Edwardes effected a settlement with these Wazírís and with all the inhabitants of the valley on behalf of the Sikh Government; he confirmed them in their possessions and arranged with them for the regular payment of their dues to the ruling power. These Wazírís, under the guidance of one of their chiefs, Swahá Khan, an excellent man, have for the most part (with one unfortunate exception) continued as valued agriculturists and tax-payers. The revenue was first collected in kind, and then money settlements were made. Every effort is made to conciliate these Wazírís, to detach them from the wilder portion of the tribe, and to give them a permanent interest in the soil. If some members offend, even then reprisals on the other members of the clan are abstained from, so that no cause of offence may be given to the cultivating Wazírís, and that nothing may shake their confidence in the British. The con-

dition of these people is satisfactory to themselves and creditable to British rule.

57. But there are three sections of the tribe who have misbehaved, namely, the Kabul Hostile sections of Wazírí tribe. Kheyl, the Muhsúd Wazírís, (both of which entirely dwell in the hills and have no possessions in the plains,) and the Omerzai Wazírís, which latter clan originally cultivated in Bunnú and afterwards rebelled.

58. The Kabul Kheyl inhabit the northern portion of the Kabul Kheyl Wazírís. Wazírí hills, not far from the right bank of the Kúrram. They are near neighbours of the Túrís. They overlook the western portion of Míranzai, and they adjoin the Bahadúr Kheyl sub-divisions of the Kohat district. They are a wild, lawless set. They are always ready to join with the Túrís, Zaimúsht Afghans, and Orakzais, in any mischief or devilry, if the term may be used, such as raids on the Bungush and Khuttuk villages of the Kohat district. In the autumn of 1850 they signalized themselves by an audacious attack on

Attack on Bahadúr Kheyl Bahadúr Kheyl and its salt mines. salt mines.

For this purpose they assembled in considerable force, and induced many of the Khuttuk villages round Bahadúr Kheyl itself to league with them. At that time this important place was held by only a detachment, which retired as the enemy approached in large bodies. Troops were, however, promptly brought up to the scene of action, and the Wazírís dispersed without effecting much mischief. This attempt does not appear to have been prompted by any particular motive. There was no grievance at that period in regard to salt. Any doubts which they might have felt as to the intentions of the British Government had long since been removed, when the mines were opened at the beginning of 1850, and a very low rate demanded. Being, like the Afrídís, largely engaged in the salt-carrying trade, they doubtless had perceived the political importance of the mines, and the great influence which accrued to the British Government from the possession

of them. For the same reasons the Khuttuks envied their masters the command of these valuable resources, and would have been glad, if, in co-operation with the Wazírís, they could have secured the possession. It is probable, however, that no fixed idea existed in the minds of these savages on that occasion. There certainly had been no provocation whatever given.

59. After this occurrence, the British Government resolved to hold Bahádúr Kheyl in force and to construct a fort. During the construction of this fort, the Wazírís gave all opposition in their power, and constantly harassed the working parties. On one occasion, in November 1851, they attacked the village of Buhádúr Kheyl, but were roughly handled by the villagers themselves, and sustained more loss than they inflicted.

60. The Kabul Kheyl also were, up to the year 1854, Successful reprisals on in the habit of committing raids Kabul Kheyl Wazírís. in the Kohat district, and more especially in the Khuttuk hills. No less than twenty of these affairs happened in the years 1852 and 1853. The practice being on the increase, Captain Coke, the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, took decisive steps. The Kabul Kheyl were interdicted from trading at the salt mines. Two parties of these people, together with their cattle, were seized; and, by the medium of one of their men, a message was sent to the headquarters of the tribe, to the effect that, unless satisfaction were given, the cattle should be sold, the proceeds applied to the re-imbursement of the sufferers by the raids, and the men detained as hostages. The tribe then lost no time in making terms; the value of the stolen property was realized; the chief of another section of the tribe came forward as security for the future conduct of the Kabul Kheyl, and the prisoners were released. The Kabul Kheyl have since been more careful in their behaviour.

61. The affairs with the Omerzais have been serious. Like other Wazírís, they at first cultivated in the Bunnú Omerzai Wazírís.

valley lands which had been wrested from the Bunnúchís of the neighbourhood. The head of these Bunnúchís was a local chief named Bazíd Khan. The Omerzais used to pay their revenue through this man, who was responsible for the collection. Some of the Omerzais used to reap the harvest, go off to the hills, deserting their land, and leaving Bazíd Khan to pay instead of them. Bazíd Khan would then pay the revenue and occupy the lands of the defaulters. These defaults being repeated, some of the Omerzais were seized as a last resource. Shortly afterwards two of the hostages were sent to ask the Omerzais to come into Bunnú and settle accounts. The day they came in there happened to be no European officer at Bunnú, the District Officer and the assistants being in the interior of the district ; so that the Omerzais met Bazíd Khan. Some conversation ensued about the accounts with him, at which the Omerzais were dissatisfied.

Misconduct of Omerzai      Forgetting that there were British  
Wazírís.      officers near, who were anxious to

settle everything, the Omerzai resolved to wreak their hatred upon the Bunnúchís ; so that very night they attacked Bazíd Khan's villages in force 3,000 strong, killed several people, among whom was Bazíd Khan's son, and sacked fourteen villages. This happened on the 3rd December 1849. Soon afterwards a body of 500 come down through the Gúrmutí pass, but were gallantly repulsed by a party, horse and foot, under Mr. McMahon. Another attack happened in February. In November of the same year, the Omerzais having induced the Mahsúd Wazírís to join them, made a formidable demonstration with several thousand men. They intended to attack the capital of Bunnú itself, had they not found a strong force ready for them. They assailed some border villages, but were repulsed. In December of the same year, they carried off a caravan of supplies-proceeding to a British camp. In 1851 they induced the Kabul Kheyl to join them, and appeared with 2,000 men, but retreated before our out-post. Within the same year once they attacked a police post and once a baggage party. They had now been for three years in open hostility to the British. Efforts had been twice made to settle some terms with them, but they continued not only to

threaten overt attacks, but also to rob and murder by stealth ;

Successful expedition against Omerzai Wazírís. so, in 1852, an expedition was undertaken against them with a force of 1,500 men. The affair was planned by Major Nicholson, and was successfully executed. The Omerzais were surprised in the fastnesses near the well-known hill of Kapi Kót ; three of their principal villages and one encampment were destroyed. Thoroughly humbled, they sued for peace and re-admission to their lands in the valley. An interval was allowed to elapse, in order that their penitence might be tested. Their conduct being quite satisfactory, they were re-admitted during 1853, and are now as good cultivators as any section of the Wazírí tribe.

62. The Mahsúd section is strong and mischievous.

Mahsúd Wazírís. They inhabit the most southern of the Wazírí hills. It is this section which occupy both sides of the Golerí pass. Even they are hardly strong enough to attack the caravans of hardy, well-armed traders from Central Asia ; but they plunder any travellers they can, and they perpetually carry off the herds of camels, chiefly belonging to merchants, that graze near the foot of the hills. In this they have been too long successful. Upon several occasions they have been stoutly resisted by the men at British posts, and more than once they have suffered loss. On one occasion, a native police officer, with twelve men, attacked a large band of plundering Wazírís, and were all killed to a man. Numerous raids have been reported against them during the past year. Five raids have occurred even in the rear of the protective posts ; and this circumstance alone shows that the marauders are increasing in boldness.

63. Surrounded by the Wazírí hills, and adjoining

Valley of Dour. the western border of Bunnú, is the small valley of Dour, inhabited by a distinct race, and containing about 8,000 inhabitants. This valley originally belonged to the Dúraní kingdom. It was, together with other outlying tracts, formally

ceded to Runjeet Singh by the tripartite treaty of 1838 ; but afterwards, in 1847, the British relinquished all claim to it on behalf of the Sikhs. The people of Dour more than once expressed a wish to come under British jurisdiction, but the offer was not accepted. During the treaty negotiations of 1855, the Amír's representative urged that the valley once formed an integral portion of the Dúraní empire, and that His Highness now wished to take it, provided that the British did not claim any title. The Government replied that the British did not desire to assert any claim, nor to interfere with the Amír, if he chose to re-annex it to his kingdom. The Amír is thus left free to occupy Dour if he can.

64. Below the Wazírí limits, a little south of the Gúmúl river, are the Sheoraní hills, stretching from the latitude of Dera Ismail Khan downwards to nearly the latitude of Dera Futteh Khan, a distance of fifty miles. In these hills is the lofty square-shaped mountain called "Solomon's Throne," (Tukht-i-Sulíman,) which gives its name to the Sulímaní Range, running parallel for 300 miles to the Indus and forming our western frontier. At the base of this mountain runs the important Zerkunní pass, the high road for caravans to and from Kándáhár. The Sheoranís are of Pathan lineage, of inferior stature to the Wazírís ; they are warlike and predatory, and quite independent. The number of their fighting-men has been set down at 10,000 ; but this is found to be high. They can muster 1,000 men within a day's notice ; in the course of three or four days they will muster 3,000 more. They adjoin the British tracts of Táak (partially) in the north, then Kolachí, then Durrabund, and, lastly, Choudwan—all in the Dera Ismail Khan district, and forming the border plains of the Upper Deraját. With all the above tracts the Sheoranís have been at feud. They would be the aggressors, attacking towns, burning villages, carrying off prisoners and cattle. The plain-men would make reprisals and retaliation, and thus the feud would be inflamed. The Sheoranís, however, were so much feared,

that the arable lands skirting the base of the hills were all left untilled, and the neighbouring plain villages paid them regularly one-fourth of their produce to buy off depredation. Such was the state of things up to annexation, the Sikh Government being unable to restrain them. After annexation, efforts were made by Major Reynell Taylor to conciliate them to peace; but from the first they made war on our subjects. In 1849 they attacked a place on the Kolachí border, and one of their leaders was slain. Again, in 1851, they came down to rob near Durrabund, but were gallantly resisted by a British native police officer, who lost his own life, while the Sheoraní leader (named Kutál Khan, who was molesting British territory in the hope of being bought off by a fief) and two sons were slain. The third remaining son applied for service in the military police. The application was granted, but the man after all preferred to remain with his tribe and to plunder in British territory. In 1852 the Sheoranís

Their misconduct.

attacked a British post opposite Dera Ismail Khan, but were repulsed; they also made several unsuccessful attempts on Durrabund, probably in revenge for the death of Kutál Khan. Besides these more important cases, the minor raids perpetrated were numerous. Major Nicholson, who being Deputy Commissioner of the Dera Ismail Khan, was cognizant of all their acts, testified, in 1853—"That the Sheoranís have regularly plundered and taken black mail from this border since it came into our possession." About the commencement of 1853, the Sheoranís plundered and burnt a village of the Dera Ismail Khan district. In February 1853 they again plundered and burnt a village near Durrabund. These attacks becoming intolerable, troops were assembled. On the 10th and 14th March there were two affairs between the troops and the Sheoranís in the plains; the hillmen attacking our troops in force. It was then resolved to follow the Sheoranís into their own hills, so a force of 2,500 strong,

Expedition against them.

under Brigadier Hodgson, moved against their stronghold on the 30th March, and destroyed thirteen of their principal villages. The enemy offered but little opposition, but they succeeded

in carrying off their cattle and property. But the destruction of their dwellings and rude fortifications inflicted serious damage and injured their prestige. On this occasion a body of some 200 men from the Bábar tribe, British subjects, dwelling near Dera Ismail Khan, accompanied Major Nicholson, and rendered good service by their co-operation. The punishment has been in a great measure effectual. The depredations have become greatly diminished, and since April 1853 no raid of consequence has been reported.

65. South of the Sheoraní hills, on the conterminous of the Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazí Khan districts, there dwell the small Pathan tribe of Oshteranís, mustering about 1,000 fighting-men. They are brave and pugnacious, but not predatory. They dwell chiefly in the hills, and are so far independent; but many of their tribe possess and cultivate lands in the plain at the foot of the hills, and consequently within British territory. Before annexation they used to be quite as violent as their neighbours, especially during the continuance of a deadly feud with the Kusranís. The quarrel was, however, composed by Major Edwardes before annexation. But subsequently they have never signalized themselves by attacks on our subjects, or raids on property, and have evinced a good and friendly disposition.

66. On the border of the Oshteraní hills, and nearly opposite to Dera Futteh Khan, is the Vúch or Korah pass, faced by the British out-posts of Doulawalla and Vehoa. This point is of some topographical importance, as constituting the boundary line between the *Pathan* and *Beloch* tribes. It will have been observed, that the tribes previously adverted to are all *Pathans*, those that will follow are all (with one trifling exception) *Beloch*. The *Beloch* tribes extend along the lower half of the Deraját frontier, and affairs with them are conducted through the authorities of the Dera Ghazí Khan district. These *Beloch* tribes are less warlike and interesting, but even more predatory. The *Pathans* are almost entirely inde-



pendent ; very few of these people are British subjects. The

Beloch tribes. head-quarters of the Beloch tribes

and the majority of the clansmen will generally be in the independent hills, beyond the British territory, the boundary line of which runs along the base ; but a large number of each tribe also hold lands in the plain and are British subjects. Some of the chiefs will also be found residing there. The Belochís of the plains have for the most part since annexation behaved as well-disposed subjects ; but the Belochís of the hills have continued their old habits of plundering. All the tribes are at feud with each other ; they not only fight in the hills, but they carry their contests into the plains ; they attack all villages in the plains, except those belonging to their own tribe. The men of the plains usually resist the attacks with spirit at the time, but they are not allowed to retaliate *afterwards*, as they used to do under the Sikh rule, and as they would do still were they not prevented by the British Government. It is to guard our villages and people from their constant aggression that the strong cordon of military posts has been fixed along the base of the Sulímání Range. Raids and forays are not, however, entirely repressed, and even the posts are sometimes attacked.

67. The marauding parties are 50, 100, 300, occasion-

Plundering parties. ally even 500 strong. They are often mounted, and will fly, if hotly

pursued, for 15, 20, and even 30 miles. Many of the villages and much of the cultivation is close to the hills and *in front* of the posts, so that the plunderers can, in the shortest time, carry off their booty to the hills before the detachment comes up. If they plunder in the rear of the posts, and towards the valley of the Indus, there is a central waste which favours their coming and their flight, in many places affording cover to them, and opposing obstacles to the movements of cavalry.

68. Also, as a preventive measure, an embargo is laid

Interdict and embargo on offending tribes. upon offending tribes of the hills, and it is proclaimed that any per-

son of such tribe found in the British territory will be seized and imprisoned for a given period. Four tribes were thus proscribed in 1853.

69. Furthermore, as almost every independent hill  
 Service allowances to the Beloch tribe has its representatives  
 chiefs. in the British plain, who have a  
 chief of their own, advantage is taken of the circumstance to  
 enlist the plain people and their chief on the side of the border and to guard the passes. The front range of hills is parallel from north to south along the plain frontier, but is intersected at right angles by numerous little passes, which from the interior of the hills run straight into the plain. The hill-men may range through the interior and through the passes, but if they emerge from the outlets of the passes into the plain, they violate British territory. It is, therefore, an object to watch the outlets to prevent parties from issuing forth for purposes of mischief. To each Beloch chief in the plain, certain limits and certain passes are assigned, through which all ingress into the plains, by hostile parties, is to be prevented by him. He is, of course, to use all his influence with his own tribe to repress outrages. In return for this he enjoys certain privileges and receives a cash allowance from the British Government, which is liable to forfeiture in the event of outrages occurring from without.

70. After the above prefatory remarks, each tribe will be adverted to in its topographical order.

First, then, the Kusraní tribe are to be noticed. Their  
 Kusranís. hills extend from the Korah pass  
 above-mentioned downwards for a  
 distance of about 50 miles. About half the tribe own lands and villages in the plain, a portion lead a wandering life in the front range of hills nearest the plain and the half desert tract and its base, and the remainder live in the hills. The hill Kusranís can muster some 1,200 fighting-men, of whom 50 are horsemen. They are very thievish, and in the habit of proceeding through the lands of their brethren in the plain

to plunder in the villages near Dera Ismail Khan. The free-booters received support from some of their plain brethren and collusion and connivance from all. The country round Dera Futteh Khan was also harassed by them, and many hundred head of stolen cattle were conveyed through their passes into the interior. In 1852 they signalized themselves by an audacious act. One of these chiefs, named Yúsuf Khan, held a village in the British territory. From this

Their misconduct. village a subordinate a fiscal employé disappeared under suspicious

circumstances. Yúsuf was summoned to answer, but did not appear. His brother was, however, found and sent in to the civil officer. This brother, in trying to escape from custody, fell from a wall and received injuries by the fall, of which he died. Yúsuf then organized an expedition against Dera Futteh Khan, about 20 miles from the hills—a measure which had been once before adopted in the Sikh time. He attacked the

Their attack on Dehra place with 400 men before troops Futteh Khan. could arrive. The police, however,

defended the town, and the assailants did not inflict much damage. But the police followed them as they retired, and were joined by a party of cavalry, 50 strong, from the neighbouring posts. After a pursuit of more than 20 miles, they came up with the Kusranís, who, 400 in number, had stationed themselves behind an embankment. The little band of cavalry gallantly charged them, but were repulsed with some loss. The Kusranís then made good their escape to the hills, having plundered a British post, and killed several men in the British service. The posts and detachments near Dera Futteh Khan were reinforced and some additional troops ordered up. The Kusranís again assembled for an attack, and the troops were ready to fall upon them as soon as they should emerge from the hills; but they dispersed of their own accord. They, however, continued their depredations, and it became necessary to declare that any hill Kusraní found within British territory would be seized and placed in confinement. In the spring of 1853, when the Sheoraní expedition was effected, opportunity was taken to chastise the Kusranís. Accordingly a force, 800 strong, under Brigadier Hodgson

Expedition against the penetrated their hills through the  
Kusranís. principal pass (named Batí).

The enemy posted themselves behind a breast-work, but were easily dispersed. Their two principal villages, regarded as the head-quarters of the tribe, were then destroyed; but the houses of some individuals known to be well disposed were spared. A quantity of their hoarded plunder, the spoil of many years, was seized. Several of the plain or British villages of the Kusranís joined the hill-people as the troops approached; so these villages were fired. Near these was the village of Yúsuf himself; but, as the inhabitants remained peaceably at home, it was spared. After this affair, raids for the most part ceased, and before the end of the year (1853) the chief of the plain Kusranís, Mutteh Khan, who had formerly been lukewarm, and who, when called to account, had urged that he could not be responsible for the prevention of the hill neighbours, unless the lost right of retaliations were restored to him, now engaged to guard the passes of the Kus-

raní hills, seven in number.  
Subsequent good conduct of Kusranís.

He had formerly enjoyed perquisites and privileges under Sikh rule, worth about Rs. 500 per annum. These had been continued since annexation. He was now to receive Rs. 500 more in cash from the British territory in return for the responsibility undertaken. This arrangement has been so far successful, that the authorities were enabled in 1854 to remove the prohibition against hill Kusranís entering the British territory. During 1854 and 1855 no raids of consequence have been reported.

71. From the Kusraní limits the hills of the Bozdars

The Bozdars. tribe extend along the British  
frontier for about 15 or 20 miles.

The range is intersected by some nine passes leading into the plains, the chief of which is the Sungurh pass, through which there is a considerable traffic with Kandahár and the Panjab. Opposite these hills lies the Sungurh low-land (forming the upper portion of the Dera Ghazí Khan district, and cultivated by several peaceful tribes), and very much at the mercy of the Bozdars. There is only one Bozdar village

in the plains, but there is much scattered cultivation belonging to the tribe. Almost the whole tribe and their chiefs live in the hills. They can muster 3,000 or 4,000 fighting-men, some portion of whom are horsemen. They are probably the most formidable robbers in this part of the frontier. Under the Sikh regime they repeatedly carried fire and

Their misconduct. sword into the Dera Ghazí Khan district. The Sikh ruler, Sawun

Mull, of Mooltan, in vain endeavoured to repel them by force; so he built a fort at Mungrotah and granted a handsome cash allowance to the Bozdar chief. In return for this the chief was to guard his passes and to re-imburse sufferers for plunder conveyed by those routes. Such conditions could not be rigidly enforced under Sikh rule. After annexation the allowances were continued by the British Government; but, by way of evading the conditions, the Bozdar chief arranged that his followers should plunder in places distant as well as near, and should carry their booty into the hills by passes other than their own.

72. In 1850 they committed one raid on Omerkote, below Mithunkote, far away to the south, the marauders being chiefly mounted; and another raid on the Kosah village of Yarú to the north of Dera Ghazí Khan. In 1851 a party, 200 strong, carried off a large drove of camels belonging to merchants from Sungurh. Towards the close of the same year, a party of 120, strongly armed, attacked Vidore, a frontier place of some importance opposite Dera Ghazí Khan, and were stoutly resisted by the villagers. In 1852 one raid was reported, and in 1853 three forays. Two of these incursions were successful as regards spoil, but no life was lost. On one occasion, however, though well mounted, they were pursued for many miles by the cavalry, and forced to disgorge their booty at the mouth of the Mungrotah pass. In 1853, it became necessary to prohibit any hill Bozdar from visiting the plains, under pain of imprisonment if seized.

Arrangement with the Bozdars. At the beginning of 1854, the Bozdar chief was confirmed in the

grant of his old allowances, amounting to Rupees 4,332 per annum, and the proceeds of some rent-free lands amounting to Rupees 2,000 more, and he renewed his engagement to prevent plundering. For a time these pledges were kept. One of the Bozdar chiefs visited the camp of the Chief Commissioner in the winter of 1854. During 1854 no raids were reported; but unfortunately, during 1855, the Bozdars returned to their bad habits. Several raids have occurred, even villages have been plundered, and a large number of minor thefts, no less than seventy-four in six months. In order to partially re-imburse the sufferers, some Rupees 2,500 have been escheated from the allowances of the chief. There is also a long catalogue of robbers and murderers, refugees from British territory, and sheltered in the Bozdar hills. They crowned the list of their misdeeds of 1855 by a serious raid on the 1st December, carrying off spoil, chiefly cattle, valued at Rupees 1,200, and murdering one man. The marauders were 200 strong. The chiefs have been summoned, under safe conduct, to answer for the grievous misconduct of their tribe, and to offer such explanation as they can. The course to be pursued for restraining the offenders will afford matter for deliberation.

73. Behind the Bozdar hills live the Khutrans, a Pathan tribe, numbering 3,000 fighting-men, of whom 200 are mounted, The Khutrans. in the midst of the Beloch tribes, with whom they are frequently at feud. They are special enemies of the Bozdars and the Murrís; their hills scarcely touch the British frontier. They have not given much trouble, but occasionally these people have engaged in raids. Once they sought our alliance against the Murrís, and also offered their support, if an expedition were undertaken against that tribe; but the Government refused to have any relations of this nature with them, in order to avoid being implicated in the feuds of the hill tribes.

74. Next in order are the *Kosahs*, who extend from the Bozdar southern border to a point somewhat below the latitude of The Kosahs.

Dera Ghazí Khan, a distance of 30 miles. The tribe dwells partly in the hills and partly in the plains, and can muster about 1,200 fighting-men. They are at enmity with the Bozdars above them and the Lugharís below them ; but are on good terms with the Khutranís, who are situated behind them. In 1848 the Lugharís sided with the officials of the rebel Múlraj ; but the Kosahs rose on the side of the Government, under their chief Kowrah Khan, and his son Gho-

Their Chief Kowrah lam Hydar. Kowrah Khan and his son then joined Major Edwardes's

irregular force in the Mooltan province with a contingent of 400 horse. Kowrah Khan was confirmed in the possession of a jaghír of Rupees 1,000 per annum for his own life and for that of his son ; he himself was granted a life pension of Rupees 1,000, and a garden at the native place of the family was confirmed rent-free in perpetuity. This chief has always remained loyal, but he is now becoming infirm. His tribe has on the whole behaved fairly ; some of them have, however, occasionally joined in forays made by other tribes. Cause for dissatisfaction has, however, arisen from plunder having been conveyed through the Kosah passes into the hills by other tribes. Kowrah Khan was called to account for this, and was offered an extra allowance if he would undertake to protect the passes ; but he urged that as retaliation, which formerly constituted his chief means of prevention, was forbidden under British rule, he could not keep the defiles clear of marauders. Subsequently, however, in 1854, he did enter into engagements to this effect for some of the passes, and the other chiefs of the tribe engaged for the remainder. There are twenty-four passes under charge of the Kosahs, for which responsibility they receive cash allowances from Government, aggregating Rupees 2,000 per annum. Among these is the pass of Vidore (opposite Dera Ghazí Khan), the most important of them all. This pass is in the separate charge of the head-men of the villages at

Their good conduct. its mouth, who receive on that account Rupees 300 per annum from Government. The general conduct of the Kosahs as a tribe has been by no means discreditable.

75. Next after the Kosahs come the loyal and well-affected tribe of Lugharís. They live partly in the hills and partly in the plains. Their country extends from Vidore southwards about 30 miles. In these hills is situated the town of Sukkí Lurwar, a place of some sanctity, and venerated by both Hindús and Mahomedans. An annual fair is held here. The pass which runs by this point is one of the chief thoroughfares to Kandahár, and the route traverses the Khutran country to the westward. The enmity of the Khutrans with the Kosahs has been already mentioned. They were greatly favoured by the Government of Sawun Mull, who desired to use them as a counterpoise against other tribes. For this purpose he sowed dissension between them and their neighbours, the Gúrchanís, and the feud thus engendered, though not so openly manifested, exists still. The part they took in support of Múlraj's officers during the rebellion has been already adverted to. Thus they were originally opposed to British interests, but since annexation they have inclined to side with the powers that be, and their influence has been in favor of peace. They have been considerately treated, and receive all, and more than all, that they received before. The chief, Jelal Khan is allowed Rupees 700 per annum personally, besides the Rupees 1,000 per annum now allowed to the heads of the tribe for protecting the passes, eleven in number, several of which are tolerably well frequented.

76. The tribe next in order are the Gúrchanís. They can muster about 2,000 fighting-men. Many of their men were wounded, many of them live in the hills and some in the plains. They are a thoroughly debased and thievish set, and contemptible even as savages. They have no respectable chiefs. Their last chief was put to death by Sawun Mull. There is, however, one respectable Gúrchaní still living, but he holds himself aloof from his tribe, and is in the British service. Their hill frontage is not more than 20 miles long, but it is intersected by numerous passes, about 30 in number. To-



wardstheir southern limit stands the fort of Hurrund, a strong masonry structure, erected by Sawun Mull for restraining them. Near Hurrund is an important pass leading towards Kandahár. Being addicted to petty depredations, they do

Their petty depredations. not make daring forays. In 1850, one raid of theirs was reported ; in 1852, two ; in 1853, it was proclaimed that any of their hill-men found in the British territory would be seized and placed in confinement ; in 1854, their head-man entered into engagements to protect the passes, on which account they now receive an allowance of Rupees 1,000 per annum. Since 1854 their conduct has not been marked by any flagrant misdeeds, and the embargo upon them has been removed.

77. In the midst of the Gúrchaní passes are four passes in the separate charge of one Kosah chief, and two chiefs of the Rind tribe, for which they receive Rupees 300 per mensem.

78. A section of the Gúrchaní tribe are termed The Lisharís. Lisharís. The Lisharí is a more degraded creature even than the Gúrchaní ; his ideas do not extend much beyond robbing. Being in the constant habit of harassing their neighbours, they do not commit many eminent crimes. They are always ready to join in forays with the Murrís, a more powerful tribe. In 1850, however, one raid was reported against them ; Raids by them. in 1852, one ; in 1853, four ; and in 1854, four. These raids were not, however, successful. Once they were encountered at the mouth of the Chachwa pass by a party of cavalry ; once near Asní the plunder was recovered and the marauders severely handled by the cavalry ; once again near Digrí, the booty was recovered by our horsemen ; once they were hotly pursued, and lost their arms ; once, again, the booty was recovered.

79. In front of the Gúrchaní and Lisharí hills, and between Hurrund and Mithunkote, are plains inhabited by the Dreshuks, British subjects.

80. Near Hurrund the great Súlímání range having run in almost a straight line parallel to the Indus for 300 miles, approaches its termination and joins the Mára Mount, which leads on to the Murrí hills, behind which lies the table-land, where Kahun, the capital of the Murrí tribe, is situated. But in front of these Murrí ranges, there rise a series of sterile rocky hills, which run towards the Indus, and form themselves into an apex near the Gundherí peak, approaching to within a few miles of the river's bank. It is at this point (Shawulla) that the conterminous boundary of Sindh and the Punjab has been marked off. These last-named hills, projecting into the Lower Derajat, opposite the cantonment of Asní, are very thinly peopled. They are crossed by passes leading towards the Murrí hills, and are claimed partly by the Murrí tribe and partly by the Búgtí tribe, whose hills lie further to the south ; but in fact they are not held in strength by any tribe. It is seen, therefore, that the Murrí and Búgtí hills, properly so called, are not conterminous with the Punjab frontier. The head-quarters of both these tribes are situated within the political circle of the Sindh authorities, and the relations with both are generally carried on through that medium.

81. The Murrís are a strong tribe, numbering 3,000 or 4,000 fighting-men. They occasionally commit raid in our territory, in the lower extremity of the Derajat. In 1850, one case was reported against them ; in 1853, two ; in 1854, one ; in 1855, one. They once threatened Rojhan and Kusmore, but dispersed, seeing that preparations were made to receive them. They once attacked a forager's guard from a cavalry regiment at Asní, and killed several men. Living at some distance in the interior, they cannot well make inroads upon our territory without guides ; but the classes who could furnish them such aid can generally be brought under the influence or fear of the British authorities.

82. The Búgtís do not now give us any cause of offence. Some of their men are serving in the Punjab cavalry and many are in the Sindh service. They are subjects of the Khan of Kelát.

83. Our relations with the independent tribes beyond the frontier having been described, it remains briefly to touch upon the treatment shown to certain chiefs, tribes, or classes of political importance in the British districts immediately adjoining the frontier. The following remarks will, of course, only relate to proceedings of political importance, and will not touch on any points connected with the ordinary administration.

84. The first in order of these districts is that of Huzára. The most important political personage in this district is Jehándad Khan of Western Turnoulí. This petty principality, with a geographical area of 250 miles south-east, and a revenue of rupees 28,000 per annum, is held as a fief from the Government, and the chief possesses independent internal jurisdiction. As already described, the tract chiefly lies on the left bank of the Indus, a portion only being on the right bank, and confronts the Hussunzai country. It is inhabited chiefly by the Turnoulís, a tribe of martial Pathans. The father of the present chief, Payuda Khan, is a wild and energetic man, and was never subjugated by the Sikhs or by the Jummú Rajahs. The son, Jehándad, though loyal and respectable, is wanting in moral and physical force. He behaved well to Golab Sing at a time when that chief had no friends in Huzára, and was confirmed in his fief and received some additional landed grants. These were continued by the Regency and then by the British Government. Personally he has been faithful to the British, always evinced a predilection for European officers. He has so much confidence in our intentions, that he wishes a road to be made

under Government supervision through his territory. This circumstance is remarkable, as native chiefs are usually jealous of roads being constructed by us, which they regard as a means of our political ascendancy. His fief conveniently intervenes between us and the Hussunzais, and the brunt of that tribe's aggressions generally falls upon him. He possesses a small but well-equipped militia, some 200 horse and 1,200 foot. His internal administration is bad. He had two thoroughly vicious Ministers, Bostán Khan and Zímán Khan ; their oppressions and intrigues were a great source of weakness to him. At length he incarcerated them ; but the British authorities obtained their release from the rigours of that confinement, and arranged for their safe custody at Lahore.

85. The Syuds of Kaghán claim a brief notice. This  
 The Syuds of Kághán. long narrow glen, stretching up-  
 wards till it nearly reaches Chelas,  
 the latter out-post of Maharajah Golab Sing's kingdom, is a barren dependency of Huzára. It is inhabited by pastoral and aboriginal races, and was given by our predecessors in fiefdom to a family of Syuds who were confirmed by the British. These Syuds exercised internal jurisdiction, and kept certain members of the family in attendance on the Deputy Commissioner of Huzára, virtually as hostages for good behaviour. The Syuds were summoned to answer numerous complaints preferred by the people of Kaghán ; they came, but afterwards fled, and assumed an attitude of resistance and intrigued with the Sittana fanatics and with the Hussunzais, then hostile to the British. This occurred  
 Revolt of Syuds put down. towards the close of 1852 ; but troops being moved up from the British territory, the militia of Huzára and two regiments of Maharajah Golab Sing's being set in motion, the Syuds surrendered. They were exiled for three years, and an easy settlement was made with the people direct. The exiles have lately been restored to their homes and to the lands which were their private property, and are allowed a pension from Government ; but they have ceased to exercise jurisdiction. No public establishments are

maintained there, but the head-men of villages receive petty grants on condition of keeping the peace. Quiet now reigns in Kaghán.

86. It is not necessary to particularize the other chiefs of Hazára. The name "Hazára," Other tribes of Huzára. or thousands, indicates that the tribes are numerous. The principal tribes are the Turnoulís, Gukkurs, Swatís, Dúnds, Suttís. The petty chieftains are equally numerous. To all are granted jaghírs, some for life, some for two or more generations, and some in perpetuity. Their interests have been zealously advocated by Major J. Abbott, who owed his life to their good offices during the Sikh insurrection of 1848, and who was the friend and admirer of the Hazára people. Additional grants have been given to many for their fidelity at that trying time. The following is the abstract of the grants :—

|                                                                     |            |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| For lives of grantees, .. .. .                                      | Rs. 28,080 |
| For life, subject to recommendation on<br>death of grantee, .. .. . | „ 22,931   |
| In perpetuity, .. .. .                                              | „ 22,532   |
| <hr/>                                                               |            |
| Total, ..                                                           | Rs. 73,543 |

The liberality of the British Government has been very great in Hazára : the landed grants are in the proportion of one-third of the revenues of the district, which amount to less than two lakhs of rupees per annum. Each chief is bound to turn out his contingent of militia, if required ; some 40,000 armed men could in an emergency be presented. The principal chieftains are the Gukkur chief of Khanpúr, the Turnoulí chief of Durwazai, the Swatí chiefs of Agrore, Mansera, Gurhí Hubibúllah. Under British rule nothing can exceed the loyalty of the Hazára people, who, under the Sikhs, represented by Hurrí Sing Nulwa, and Maharajah Golab Sing, resisted cruelty and oppression with the most stubborn contumacy.

87. In the Peshawar district, the Yusufzais may claim political importance. As soldiers, Yusufzais. they are not inferior to any of the independent tribes. They are the most martial of all the British subjects on the frontier, and the history of many generations attests their military exploits. Participators in every war that has convulsed the Peshawar valley, and always the recusant subjects of the Sikhs, they have now literally turned their swords into ploughshares, and are right good lieges of the British. Their customs have been respected, the allowances of the chiefs and their village headmen have been confirmed. Though constantly tampered with by the Swat Government to rebel, they only once yielded to temptation. That single instance occurred just after annexation in 1849. Recently, in 1854, an officer of the Guide Corps was assailed murderously by a wandering fanatic. A mistaken suspicion of being an instigator fell upon one of the Good conduct of Yu- Yusufzai chiefs, and he was put on sufzais. his trial ; but afterwards his innocence being discovered, a public durbar was held to proclaim his acquittal, a dress of honor was presented to him, and his allowances was doubled. There is a class of Pathans named *Khulils*, dwelling in a portion of the Peshawar valley opposite to the Momand hills. Their chiefs held jaghirs on condition of service. During the disturbances they permitted a number of hostile Momands to escape through their fief. For this misfeasance their jaghirs were reduced, and they were temporarily exiled, but have been since allowed to return to their homes.

88. A section of the Momand tribe have colonized in Momands of the plains. the south-western portion of the Peshawar district. They are now respectable cultivators. They maintain friendly relations with their neighbours, the Afridis. Their chiefs hold jaghirs, but the support they give to Government in return is lukewarm. They have not fraternized with their fellow Momands of the hills ; but they have not cordially co-operated

against the Afrídís, of whose vengeance they are, perhaps, apprehensive. On a recent occasion, when measures were taken against the Bussí Kheyl Afrídís, the conduct of one of these Momand chiefs was so unsatisfactory, that confiscation of his jaghír was threatened. Generally, however, the behaviour of the tribe has been peaceable.

89. In the Kohat district, the principal tribe are the Bungush Pathans. They are a large tribe, can muster 15,000 fighting-men, and are fairly good soldiers. They highly appreciate our light money assessments, after what has been long termed the "robber rule" of Súltan Mahomed Barukzai. Up to 1848, he held Kohat as a fief from the Kabul Government. It was then taken possession of by the British on account of hostility to us during the second Sikh war. The conduct of the Bungushes in reference to the Kohat pass has been already described. The late Khan of Hungú in the Bungush country, was in the British service as Revenue Collector; he was recently murdered by one of his own relatives. The Khanship has descended to his son. The Bungushes have suffered much from the raids of their hill neighbours, Orakzais, Turís, Kabul Kheyl Wazírís. The inhabitants of the Míranzai valley are also Bungush. This valley belonged to the fief of Súltan Mahomed; but, being an outlying locality, was overlooked when Kohat was taken possession of. The Kabul Government then lost no time in arranging for the occupation of Míranzai, which appeared to have been vacated; so Sirdar Azim Khan, Governor of the Kúrum Province, in 1851, summoned the Míranzais to surrender; but they petitioned the British to include them in Kohat. Under the circumstances this request was acceded to. They were in their hearts hostile to the British Government, as, indeed, they were to any Government whatever. Shortly afterwards, Captain Coke moved into the valley with a force of 2,050 men, and they tendered a nominal submission. But from that time they paid no revenue, set our authority at nought, and had nothing to say to us, except when they

wanted redress against their assailants from the hills. They maintained a state of anarchy among themselves, and were a source of trouble to their neighbours of the Kohat

Expedition to Míranzai. district ; so an expedition of 4,000

men proceeded against them in April and May 1855, commanded by Brigadier Chamberlain and accompanied by Major Edwardes. The troops marched from village to village, composing feuds, taking security for future conduct, and settling accounts. The Míranzai people offered no resistance ; they were overawed without being exasperated, and the affair was almost bloodless. The troops were entirely restrained from plunder, while the revenue was paid in ; nor were there any thefts in camp ; two camels were lost while grazing, and one camel-driver, who had wandered against order, was killed by a Zaimúsht Afghan ; so entirely pacified had this troublesome valley become for the nonce. A party from the hills made a futile attack, as already explained in para. 49.

90. The remainder of the Kohat district consists of the Khuttuk country. This had belonged to the Sikh dominions, and had been farmed out to Khwaja Mahomed Khan, a local chief, who still holds a lease of the revenues for life and exercises internal jurisdiction, receiving a sum of rupees 46,500 per annum, out of which he maintains a contingent of 120 horsemen and others at a cost of rupees 14,666 and pays rupees 20,000 to Government. His profits on the lease are probably not less than rupees 11,834 per annum. He is quite faithful, and has rendered service on all occasions, in the affairs with the Afrídís, in the Rábeuh Kheyl and Míranzai expeditions. There are also other jaghírs similarly situated, belonging to other Khuttuk chiefs ; but in two of these it was found that the chiefs failed to prevent Afrídí marauders from passing through their lands, to cross the Indus, and then to plunder and murder in the Rawal Pindí district. This evil becoming serious, jurisdiction and collection of the revenue was assumed by Government ; in one of these jaghírs, money compensation allowed to the disfranchised



chief; in the other the chief was deprived of jurisdiction, but was allowed to retain the collection of the revenue.

91. In the southern Khuttuk hills are the salt-mines which have been more than once alluded to in the foregoing paragraphs. These mines are situated near the villages of Bahadúr Kheyl, Kurruck and Lutumur. There is also a separate mine at Malgín, a place lying east of Kohat. The head-men of these villages receive a fixed per-centage on the collections at the mines to obtain their good-will. The Sikhs never managed these mines at all. They farmed them out to some local chief, and left him to collect what he could. Under British rule, the control and working of the mines is in the hands of Government officers; the salt is excavated and sold at the mine at a fixed duty of two, three, and four annas per maund of 80 lbs., covering all expenses. This rate was meant to be very moderate, and was fixed not so much with a view to obtaining revenue as to asserting our sovereign rights in this respect, which had descended to us from our predecessors at annexation. That the tax does not actually press upon the hill-people, nor affect their comfort, is shown by the yearly consumption, and proceeds as seen below :—

|       |         |    |    |     |        |    |    |
|-------|---------|----|----|-----|--------|----|----|
| Years | 1849-50 | .  | .. | Rs. | 28,289 | 7  | 3  |
| „     | 1850-51 | .. | .. | „   | 82,470 | 4  | 0* |
| „     | 1851-52 | .. | .. | „   | 52,522 | 14 | 6  |
| „     | 1852-53 | .. | .. | „   | 69,849 | 7  | 0  |
| „     | 1853-54 | .. | .. | „   | 66,125 | 10 | 3  |
| „     | 1854-55 | .. | .. | „   | 74,925 | 14 | 3  |

92. The circumstances under which the Bahadúr Kheyl fort was undertaken have been described in para. 59. During the first attack by the Wazírís, the Khuttuks of the neighbourhood behaved badly. They also evinced a spirit of opposition for some time after the fort had been commenced, and

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\* Including arrears of 1849-50\*

seemed to dislike the measure which gave the Government such a permanent control over the mines, but their chief behaved well, and repressed disaffection.

93. On the whole, the Khuttuks have been loyal subjects. They are good soldiers, and can muster 12,000 fighting-men. Many of them are in the British service. They are considered the best-conducted and most respectable tribe on this frontier.

94. It will be seen from the map, that the Dehra Tribes in the Dehra Ishmael district is divided into two halves by a range of hills running at nearly right angles from the Súlímání Range to the Indus. The passage from one part of the district to the other is through the Peyzú and Mulezai passes, which intersect the range. Above the pass there is the valley of Bunnú. The Bunnú Wazírís have been already described. The Bunnúchís themselves were, and are still, to a certain extent, a vicious race. They cultivate with some industry; and are well affected to the Government. Below the valley, and immediately above the range is Murwut. The Murwutís are a fine race, of striking appearance, loyal to Government, and both willing and able to check the depredations of their hill neighbours. In Murwut stands the fort of Lukkí. In the hills near the Peyzú Pass dwell the Buttanís. They were once a robber tribe, but have reformed since annexation. Their co-operation against the Mahsúd Wazírís could be reckoned upon.

95. Below these are two important families, namely, the Gundapúrs of Kolachí, and the chiefs of Tánk. These two tracts are exposed to attack from the Sheoranís and Wazírís. The revenues of Kolachí amount to between rupees 8,000 and 10,000. Of this the Gundapúrs receive 25 per cent. on condition of good service in defending the tract. The Tánk chief holds a lease of the revenues of that tract;

he makes the collections, which amount to rupees 65,000 per annum, and receives one-third for himself and the establishment he maintains. This lease is conditional on good service in defence of the fief. The chief, Shah Nawaz, is a Pathan of good family; he was ejected by the Sikhs; and, after many vicissitudes of fortune, he was restored in 1848, at the instance of Major Edwardes. There is also the Nawab of Dehra Ishmael Khan; he belongs to the princely race of Suddúzais, and was formerly the Lieutenant of the Dúraní Government in the Upper Derajat and Lower Sindh Sagur Doab. He was deprived of his power by the Sikhs, when they annexed these parts of the Punjab to their kingdom. He now enjoys a large jaghír from the British Government.

96. In the Dehra Ghazí Khan district the principal Tribes in the Dehra Ghazí Khan district. chiefs are those already mentioned in connexion with the hill tribes. Those sections of the hill tribes who reside in the plains have usually behaved well, even at times when their brethren of the hills were in a state of hostility against British subjects. The plain tribes are the Nútkanís, Lúnds, and Dreshuks, all of them well conducted; they can muster a certain number of fighting-men, but they are unable to resist effectually the marauding aggressions of the hill-men, and are victimized by such tribes as the Bozdárs and Gúrchanís.

97. The last tribes is that of the Mazarís; they formerly dwelt in the hills, and The Mazarís. emigrated to the plains, where they have since remained, and have been a thorn in the side of successive Governments. They can muster 4,000 fighting-men, and more than a hundred horsemen. Their headquarters are now at Rojhán, below Mithunkote, and near the confines of Sindh. When Mithunkote was conquered by the Sikhs, they harassed the new-comers and laid waste the acquisition. The vicinity of Mithunkote still bears traces of desolation. A strong Sikh force moved against them, and thus the lower extremity of the Derajat, down to Shahwullí, was then added to the Sikh dominions, and at annexation

became included in British territory. Maharajah Ranjít Sing subsequently received the Mazarí chief at Lahore. The Mazarís are not disloyal subjects, and aid in keeping the Murrís in check, against whom they are bitterly opposed ; but they are unfortunately addicted to cattle-lifting. In fact they carry on more or less an organized system of theft, not only in our territory on both sides the Indus, but also in Bahawulpúr territory. To prevent this, the formation of a river police has been commenced, and their depredations have begun to diminish.

98. The independent and dependent tribes having been thus described in detail, it may be well to give a summary of their respective forces :—

Strength of the independent tribes.  
thus estimated :—

99. The numbers of fighting-men of the independent tribes may be

|                                                                          | Fighting-men. |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| Tribes on Hazara frontier and near the Indus, north of Peshawar, .. .. } | 8,000         |
| Swat and its dependencies, .. ..                                         | 20,000        |
| Momands, .. ..                                                           | 12,000        |
| Afrídís, .. ..                                                           | 20,000        |
| Orakzais and other tribes on Kohat frontier,                             | 30,000        |
| Wazírís, .. ..                                                           | 20,000        |
| Sheoranís and others in Dehra Ishmael Khan district, .. ..               | 5,000         |
| Beloch tribes on Dehra Ghazí Khan border, ..                             | 20,000        |
|                                                                          | <hr/>         |
| Total, ...                                                               | 1,35,000      |
|                                                                          | <hr/>         |

100. Besides the above, there are other warlike tribes within British territory, with the following numbers of fighting-men :—

Strength of the dependent tribes.

|                                            | Fighting-men. |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------|
| Turnoulís (including Jehándad's,) ... ..   | 8,000         |
| Other tribes of Hazára, .. ..              | 10,000        |
| Eúsúfzai, .. ..                            | 25,000        |
| Khuttuks, .. ..                            | 12,000        |
| Bungushes, ... ..                          | 15,000        |
| Deráját tribes in British territory, .. .. | 10,000        |
| Total, ..                                  | 80,000        |

101. The aggregate may appear large, but it is to be remembered that only a very small portion of these forces would ever be arrayed against at one time and in one place—it is but rarely that even two or three tribes can combine against us. When one tribe, or section of tribe, is hostile, it generally happens that another tribe or section is friendly. Situated as we now are, the support of some tribes could be always counted upon in the event of hostilities. Anything approaching to a general combination is a contingency quite beyond the range of probability.

102. In the five frontier districts, the British Government at present maintains troops at the following strength of all arms:—

|                        | Regular.  | Irregular. | Total. |
|------------------------|-----------|------------|--------|
| Hazára, ... ..         | 0 ..      | 1,884 ..   | 1,884  |
| Peshawar, .. ..        | 10,754 .. | 2,538 ..   | 13,292 |
| Kohat, .. ..           | 67 ..     | 3,559 ..   | 3,626  |
| Dehra Ishmael Khan, .. | 0 ..      | 3,204 ..   | 3,204  |
| Dehra Ghazí Khan, ..   | 0 ...     | 1,615 ...  | 1,615  |
| Total, .. ..           | 10,821    | 12,800     | 23,621 |

103. The following is the resumé of expeditions that

Summary of expeditions. have been undertaken from annexation to the present time :—

| No. | Year in which operations undertaken. | Tribe against which undertaken. | Independent or British. | Number of troops employed. |
|-----|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1   | 1849                                 | Eúsúfzai, ..                    | British ..              | 1,500                      |
| 2   | 1850                                 | Afrídís, ..                     | Independent, ..         | 3,200                      |
| 3   | 1851                                 | Míranzai, ..                    | British. ..             | 2,050                      |
| 4   | 1852                                 | Momands, ..                     | Independent, ..         | 700                        |
| 5   | 1852                                 | Ranízai, ..                     | Ditto, ..               | 2,000                      |
| 6   | 1852                                 | Osman Kheyl, ..                 | Ditto, ..               | 2,000                      |
| 7   | 1852                                 | Kaghán, ..                      | British, ..             | 850                        |
| 8   | 1852                                 | Umerzai Wazírís, ..             | Independent, ..         | 1,500                      |
| 9   | 1853                                 | Hussunzais, ..                  | Ditto, ..               | 850                        |
| 10  | 1853                                 | Sheoranís, ..                   | Ditto. ..               | 2,800                      |
| 11  | 1853                                 | Kusranís, ..                    | Ditto, ..               | 600                        |
| 12  | 1853                                 | Borí Afrídís, ..                | Ditto, ..               | 1,500                      |
| 13  | 1854                                 | Michní Momands, ..              | Ditto, ..               | 1,600                      |
| 14  | 1855                                 | Míranzai, ..                    | British, ..             | 3,700                      |
| 15  | 1855                                 | Rabeuh Kheyl Orakzais, ..       | Independent, ..         | 2,300                      |

It appears, then, that military operations have been decisively carried out on fifteen occasions during six years : of these eleven were against independent tribes, and four against British subjects.

#### GENERAL REMARKS.

104. The political relations of the British Government with each and every tribe or chief on the frontier have now been stated. Endeavour has been made to mention all material facts briefly, yet fairly, so as to illustrate the conduct of both parties and to explain the particular causes of disturbance where any such existed ; but the narrative has not been encumbered by any comment or digression. It were,

therefore, perhaps not amiss now to offer a few general remarks on certain point of importance which arise out of the matters which have been set forth.

105. In the first place, it were well to consider what is the character and conduct of the independent tribes beyond the frontier.

106. Now, *these tribes are savages*, noble savages perhaps, and not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but still absolutely barbarians nevertheless. They have nothing approaching to government or civil institutions. They have for the most part no education. They have nominally a religion, but Mahomedanism, as understood by them, is no better, or perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the wildest races on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire and sword for all infidels, that is, for all people not Mahomedans. They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests (Múllas) are as ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their influence simply for preaching crusades against unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless people of the plain. The hill-men are sensitive in regard to their women, but their customs in regard to marriage and betrothal are very prejudicial to social advancement. At the same time they are a sensual race. They are very avaricious; for gold they will do almost anything, except betray a guest. They are thievish and predatory to the last degree. The Pathan mother often prays that her son may be a successful robber. They are utterly faithless to public engagements; it would never even occur to their minds that an oath on the Koran was binding if against their interests. It must be added that they are fierce and blood-thirsty. They are never without weapons: when grazing their cattle,

Their fierceness.

when driving beasts of burden, when tilling the soil, they are still armed. They are perpetually at war with each other. Every tribe and section of a tribe has its internecine wars, every family its hereditary blood feuds, and every individual his personal foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Each person counts up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with its neighbours, life for life. Reckless of the lives of others, they are not sparing of their own. They consider retaliation and revenge to be strongest

Their courage.

of all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others. Men of the same party will stand by one another in danger. To their minds hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer, he may be robbed or killed. They are charitable to the indigent of their own tribe. They possess the pride of birth and regard ancestral associations. They are not averse to civilization whenever they have felt its benefits; they

Their merits.

are fond of trading and also of cultivating; but they are too fickle and excitable to be industrious in agriculture or anything else. They will take military service, and though impatient of discipline will prove faithful, unless excited by fanaticism. Such briefly is their character, replete with the unaccountable inconsistencies, with that mixture of opposite vices and virtues, belonging to savages.

107. Such being the character, what has been their conduct towards us? They have kept up old quarrels, or picked new ones, with our subjects in the plains, and valleys near the frontier; they have descended

Their conduct towards the British Government.

from the hills and fought these battles out in our territory; they have plundered and burnt our villages and slain our subjects; they have committed minor robberies and isolated murders



without number ; they have often levied black mail from our villages ; they have intrigued with the disaffected everywhere, and tempted our loyal subjects to rebel ; and they have for ages regarded the plain as their preserve, and its inhabitants as their game. When inclined for cruel sport, they sally forth to rob and murder, and occasionally to take prisoners into captivity for ransom. They have fired upon our own troops, and even killed our own officers in our own territories. They give an asylum to every malcontent or proclaimed criminal, who can escape from British justice. They traverse at will our territories, enter our villages, trade in our markets ; but few British subjects, and no servant of the British Government, would dare to enter their country on any account whatever.

108. In return for this, what has been the conduct of the British Government towards them ? It has recognized their independence ; it has asserted *no* jurisdiction in regard to them ; it has claimed *no* revenue from them, and *no* tribute, except in one case, and that as a punishment. But it has confirmed whatever fiefs they held within its territory ; it has uniformly declared that it seeks *no* fiscal or territorial aggrandizement ; and that it *only* wants, and is resolved to have, tranquillity on the frontier. It has never extended its jurisdiction one yard beyond the old limits of the Sikh dominions. Nothing has been annexed that was not a portion of the Punjab as we found it. Whatever revenue has been paid to the British Government was equally paid to its predecessors, only at a higher rate. In one solitary case has it accepted tribute in satisfaction for offences ; in all other cases of misconduct, it has avoided making any pecuniary demand on its own behalf. It has claimed no feudal or political ascendancy over the independent hill tribes ; it has abstained from any interference in, or connexion with, their affairs ; it has taken no part in their contests, and has never assisted either party ; it has striven to prevent its own subjects from entering into disputes with them. Though permitting

and encouraging its subjects to defend themselves at the time of attack, it has prevented them from retaliating *afterwards* and from making reprisals. Though granting refuge to men flying for their lives, it has never allowed armed bodies to seek protection in its territory, nor to organize resistance or attack. It has freely permitted hill-people to settle, to cultivate, to graze their herds, and to trade in its territories. It has accord-

ed to such the same protection, Its friendly demeanour. rights, privileges, and conditions as to its own subjects. Its courts have been available and its officers accessible to them. Its markets have been thrown open to them; all restrictions on trade and transit, all duties (except one) which would be imposed under any Native Government, have been removed and remitted for them. It has freely admitted them to its hospitals and dispensaries; its medical officers have tended scores of them in sickness, and sent them back to their mountain homes cured. The ranks of its service are open to them, and they may eat our salt and draw our pay, if so inclined. What more *can* a civilized Government legitimately do for its rude neighbours than the above?

109. There is, perhaps, one method to which the Government *might* resort more extensively Impolicy of black mail. than it does at present, and that is the payment of black mail. It does, indeed, purchase the good offices of the tribes round the Kohat pass. It does permit a section of the Momands to hold a fief, and more unworthy feudatories could not be found. It does also make payments to certain Deraját chiefs, such as the Bozdars. But the other chiefs who receive money are British subjects, and really perform responsible police duties in return. In the case of the Afrídís, Momands, and Bozdars, however, the Government only continued a concession originally granted by its predecessors. It has originated no new grants of black mail, though it enhanced one grant. There is reason to believe that such grants would embolden rather than ward off depredation; once bought off, the hill people would molest us with greater zest than ever in order to be bought off again. They would actually resort to plundering as a means of extorting black mail.

The appetite once gratified would become sharpened. Such concession would be regarded by the tribes as a confession, of weakness, and would absolutely operate as an incitement to mischief. Certain chiefs are known to commit depredations in the hope of being bought off by fiefs, and one mode of avoiding annoyance is to let it be known, that under no circumstances will the Government be induced to compromise by grants of black mail.

110. But when kindness, conciliation, and confidence, all fail; when outrages, from their  
 Coercive measures. serious character, or from their constant repetition, exceed the bounds of toleration; when the blood of our subjects cries from the ground; when our territory has been invaded and our sovereign rights flagrantly violated, and all this in the utter absence of provocation; then we either make reprisals from, or lay an embargo upon, or use military force against, the offending tribe or section of tribe.

111. When reprisals are made, cattle and men are  
 Reprisals. seized, and a message is sent to the head-quarters of the tribe. Pending a settlement of the Government claim for the reimbursement of its subjects who have suffered, the property is detained as security, and the men as hostages. Usually the tribe do come to terms; if they do not, the property is sold in liquidation, and as soon as the account is cleared, reprisals cease. In such cases the Government seeks to realize no fine, but merely to reimburse its own subjects.

112. When an embargo is declared, the mouths of the  
 Embargo and interdict. passes belonging to the tribe are closed and watched as far as practicable. All Government officials are required to seize all persons and property of the tribe wheresoever found in British territory, and all places of mercantile resort, such as salt mines, markets, &c., are closed against the offenders. This process is continued till the tribe comes to terms. The

persons and property seized are released as soon as satisfaction has been obtained.

113. In this paper it is not necessary to describe the usual course of expeditions into the interior of the hills ;—suffice it to say, that they are found to be quite practicable and successful, in a military point of view. Good troops and good commanders are required, and the Government fortunately can find both. Experience proves beyond doubt that the hills can be penetrated, and that the hill-people can be punished in this manner. The same measure of success may not have attended every expedition ; but no expedition has ever yet failed, and in no case have the enemy escaped serious damage. Several expeditions have been brilliantly successful, and have been proudly acknowledged by the Government.

114. It can be readily seen that the policy of these expeditions is reasonable and just. If murder and robbery still go on, in spite of patience, of abstinence from provocation and of conciliation, then what but force remains ? Is the loss of life and property and the consequent demoralization to continue, or to be stopped ? If it can only be stopped by force, then is not force to be applied ? If reprisals and embargo prove insufficient, or cannot be adopted in a particular case, as may sometimes happen, then what but an expedition remains ? When an expedition is undertaken, then *if* the enemy were to assemble in force and take up a position and offer battle, they could be attacked and defeated, and their discomfiture might suffice as a punishment, without any further measure. In *that* event the affair would be conducted after the manner of regular warfare. In civilized warfare, force is directed against the armed enemy and his defensible positions, but not against his country and subjects, who may be morally unconcerned in the hostilities and innocent of offence. *But this is not civilized warfare ;* the enemy does *not* possess troops that stand

Practicability of successful expeditions into the hills.

Policy of expeditions.

Reasons for destroying villages.

to be attacked, *nor* defensible posts to be taken, *nor* innocent subjects to be spared. He has only rough hills to be penetrated, robber fastnesses to be scaled, and dwellings containing people, *all of them to a man concerned in hostilities*. *There is not a single man of them who is innocent*, who is not, or has not been, engaged in offences, or who does not fully support the misconduct of his tribe, who is not a member of the armed banditti. The enemy harasses the troops as they approach threading the defiles, and leave the village, carrying off everything that can be carried, abandoning only immoveable property, walls, roofs,

Houses and grain of the enemy not to be spared.

and crops;—what are the troops then to do? Are they to spare these crops and houses, losing the *only* opportunity they are ever likely to have of inflicting damage on the enemy? Marching back to their quarters, without effecting anything, amidst the contempt of the hill-men, who would attribute the sparing of the property to nothing but their incapacity? These villages and grain are the resources and sinews of guerilla warfare and the basis of operations. They are as much the property of the enemy as the stores, convoys, arms and munitions belonging to an army in the field. The latter would *never* be spared; why should the former? To spare these villages would be about as reasonable as to spare the commissariat supplies or arsenals of a civilized enemy.

115. The effects of these expeditions are just as happy as the policy is reasonable. It might be supposed that the hill-people would be exasperated, but not overawed;—such is not the actual result. The tribe, after chastisement, usually professes repentance. They exhibit less, instead of greater hostility than before; their hard hearts can only be won by display of prowess and valour: they recognize no virtues except those connected with bravery; they do not comprehend forbearance; they regard might as the greatest of merits. If we beat them in style, they begin to regard us with something like esteem. They enter into engagements, and *for the first* time keep their faith. They do not repeat the offences which

brought on the punishment, such has proved to be the rule almost invariably. There have been fifteen expeditions against different tribes. In almost everyone of these cases the tribes behaved *badly before* and *well after* the expedition. In one case only has a tribe ever misbehaved *after* undergoing a regular expedition, and the solitary instance was that of the Kohat Pass Afrídís. The four tribes, *viz.*, the Pindí Alí Momands, the Bussí Kheyl Afrídís, the Mahsúd Wazírís,

and Bozdars, that are *now* misbehaving have *not* as yet been attacked in their hills. Two sections of the same tribe are both equally fierce and predatory by nature, the one *has* suffered an expedition and behaves well, the other has not suffered an expedition and behaves badly. There can be but one inference. The above proposition is amply illustrated by the case of the Umerzai and Mahsúd Wazírís, the Borí and the Bussí Kheyl Afrídís. In short, the moral effect of *every* expedition has been vast and beneficial.

116. From what has been urged regarding the policy and effects of these expeditions, the conclusion is that they are essentially and absolutely necessary for the peace of the border, and that without them our own subjects cannot be adequately protected. A reformation in the habits of our hill neighbours in their external relations is not to be effected by lesser means. It is not the object of this paper to treat of the history of these tribes prior to annexation. If it were, then their antecedent conduct might be shown to have been far worse than it has been subsequently. When the territories of the Sikhs passed into the hands of the British, these tribes had been accustomed for ages to plunder in the valleys, and to defy successive Governments. They then proceeded to treat us as they had treated our predecessors. It is not to be expected that our mere presence will induce them to desist, nor that a defensive system will alone suffice to keep them off. The British Government has indeed organized an excellent defensive system. It has built or fitted up no less than fifteen forts, and fifty posts of various

kinds on this frontier—it has caused many hundreds of miles to be patrolled. But the unvarying experience of six years has proved that success cannot thus be attained, though doubtless the mode of defence is good and useful in its way. The independent hills are in the closest proximity to the line of defence; however well the posts may be placed, there will be villages and cultivation in front of them, that is, between them and the hills, everywhere there is inhabited territory within easy reach of the enemy; in many places our subjects live within a mile or two of their tormentors. Under such circumstances, what human vigilance and arrangement can

Insufficiency of defensive measures. avail to entirely prevent the hill-men plundering in the valleys and the plains, and then escaping to their fastnesses with impunity? The assailants may often be foiled, but they will as often succeed. To thoroughly prevent the hill-people by this method alone, it would require nothing less than a Chinese wall securely manned for 800 miles! But in fact the fears of these people must be worked upon; the root of the deeply-seated evil must be reached; and the head-quarters of the offending tribe must be attacked in the hills. They have already desisted partially from the fear of these expeditions; if they were to become relieved of that apprehension, they would begin to harass and plunder again worse than ever.

117. If, then, it be shown that the policy of expeditions is consistent with reason and humanity, and if their consequence is proved by repeated instances to be that of deterring the tribes from rapine and murder, ought they not to be resorted to? Is it not clear that the lives of our innocent subjects are hereby saved and their property secured? The amount of subsequent saving in these respects vastly over-balances the destruction to life and property caused by an expedition. For the number of lives and the amount of property lost in fight, ten-fold that number and that amount is saved thereafter, to say nothing of the moral advantages. Is it not then due to our subjects that these expeditions should be undertaken? Are they

to suffer while our enemies are spared? An expedition and the like should not of course be resolved upon without *ample* cause, without a conviction that nothing short of this remedy will suffice. If too frequently undertaken, expeditions might perhaps exasperate and barbarize, just as Draconic laws, punishing minor offences with death, would fail of their effect. But if undertaken with good and sufficient cause, they are just as efficient as capital punishment and imprisonment are for the repression of social crime, and they rest upon moral grounds equally valid.

118. In fine, the whole argument terminates in this, that if expeditions were not resorted to, then all the territory within a night's run from the hills would virtually be given over to devastation. If the latter event were to happen, and if the Government were not to be willing to chastise the hill tribes, then our own Trans-Indus subjects would lose confidence, and would cease to be loyal, while the enemy gained heart. There would be some general combination against us, and sooner or later we should evacuate the Trans-Indus territory and the right bank of the Indus. If the right bank were lost, then the river itself would pass from our control; and then, with the loss of the Indus, there would be a sacrifice of advantages, political, physical, commercial, and moral, which it is not within the scope of this paper to describe. But in fact the British Government has every encouragement to maintain its position beyond the Indus; for, situated as it is, the representative of civilized strength, in the midst of tribes which are rude and savage at present, but possess the elements of good, and are susceptible of moral impression, it has, under Providence, a noble mission to fulfil and a purpose of regeneration to accomplish.

This paper has been prepared under direction of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab by

RICHARD TEMPLE,

*Secretary to the Chief Commissioner.*

LAHORE,  
The 31st January 1856. }



*Report by R. H. Davies, Esquire, Secretary to Government  
Punjab, dated August 1864.*

119. In a report drawn up by Mr. R. Temple, when Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, the relations of the British Government with the Mahomedan tribes on the North-west frontier were traced from the date of annexation to the close of 1855. The narrative will now be succinctly continued up to the present time.

120. In March 1856, after a long blockade and exclusion from the plains, the Bussí Kheyl, a branch of the Aka Kheyl Afrídís, made their peace with our Government, by complying with the terms demanded by the local authorities of Peshawar and Kohat. These involved the payment of a heavy fine, and the forfeiture of their share in the allowance for keeping open the Kohat pass enjoyed by the tribe. The Bussí Kheyl had been in the habit of making large profits by the sale of timber in the cantonments of Peshawar, and their losses, resulting from their exclusion, are computed at 50,000 rupees. Their submission was not made until they had vainly attempted to excite other branches of the Afrídís to the commission of outrages like those for which they themselves were punished, and their ultimate surrender fully justified the policy pursued towards them.

121. The expedition into the Miranzai valley in May 1854 was attended by the best effects ; and for some time afterwards peace continued to prevail there. Subsequently one of the most distant and largest villages, Darsamand by name, withheld the land revenue due from it. Numerous raids were also committed on our Khuttuk, Bungush, and Wazírí subjects resident in the valley, by the Túrís, whom the Afghan Government were unable to control.

The Túrís, it may here be noted, are not of the great Bardúraní\* branch of the Afghans.

The Túrís of Kúram. Elphinstone groups them with the Dámán tribes of the Derajst. but acknowledges their dissimilarity in many respects. They can assemble some 5,000 foot and 500 horse; are of the Shíah sect and Gar faction.† In the Appendix will be found a note on this tribe by Sir Herbert Edwardes, formerly Commissioner of Peshawar, from which it appears that they were originally a nomad tribe, grazing their herds anywhere between Kabul and Nilab, and gradually encroached on the Bungushes, until they are in almost entire possession of Kúram.

122. Previous to the advance of the expedition, the recusant proprietors of Darsamand  
Fine paid by Darsamand. paid up their revenue, together with a fine of 1,000 rupees imposed on them. It remained to deal only with the Túrís and the Zaimúsht Afghans, who abetted their incursions.

123. The Zaimúshts inhabit a narrow valley drained by the Schallí tributary of the Kúram, separated from the Orakzais by a high range of mountains, of which their stronghold Záwa is the loftiest point, and meeting the Kúram valley on the west. The fighting numbers of the tribe were estimated by Colonel Coke at 5,000 foot and 400 excellent horse. Their object has long been to encroach on the valley of the Bungushes, in which they have already acquired the village of Zorawarri. They belong to the Samil faction.

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\* The following are the sub-divisions of the Bardúraní :—

Yúsúfzai, Otman Kheyl Turcolanis, Afrídís, Momands, and other Peshawar tribes, Bungush, Khuttuk.

† The Pathans of the Kohat valley are divided into two hereditary factions, designated Samil and Gar, supposed to have been the names of two Hindus who some centuries ago headed them.

124. The Túrís had in May 1855 entered into engagements not to molest the British villages. Their coercion by military force had about that time been averted only by the intercession of the Kabul Government, whose subjects they were, and which promised to restrain them. But already in June 1856 no less than thirteen raids were recorded against them, "in which one Khuttuk, four Wazírís, and two Bungushes were killed; four Khuttuks and two Bungushes wounded; and nearly 500 head of cattle carried off."\* Afterwards another raid was committed, marked by the unusual atrocity of the murder of a young girl.

125. The force marginally noted marched from Kohat on 21st of October 1856, under the command of Brigadier Neville Chamberlain. The following are some of the scenes occurring on such occasions. A number of notorious criminals take refuge in the Zaimúsht village of Zorawarrí.

|                                    |                  |
|------------------------------------|------------------|
| <i>Strength of the expedition.</i> |                  |
| Native Arty.,                      | 246 & 14 guns.   |
| Cavalry, ...                       | 524              |
| Infantry, ...                      | 3,779            |
| Staff, ...                         | 4                |
| <hr/>                              |                  |
|                                    | 4,553 & 14 guns. |

Its progress. The village is surrounded by troops detached for the purpose, and retreat to the adjacent Zaimúsht valley cut off. An interval is allowed for the delivery of the criminals, and another for the retirement of the women. The guns fire blank cartridge. All without effect. It is not until some shells are thrown in that the women rush out waving their robes and holding up the Koran. They are sent back to tell the men to come out, and lay down their arms. Then a Native Infantry regiment enters the village to search for arms and the criminals. A soldier is wounded and his assailant killed. Still the criminals remain concealed. The winter forage is fired, and about one-third of the houses burned; and eventually thirteen criminals are surrendered. A fine of 2,000 rupees was imposed on the village. In this affair two of our men were wounded and two or three Zaimúshts killed.

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\* Letter of Commissioner to Sirdar Hyder Khan, Heir Apparent of Kabul.

126. The force reached Thull, our frontier village, on the left bank of the Kúram, on the 5th November; and as Gholam Jan, the Deputy Governor of Kúram, had, notwithstanding orders received from Kabul, failed in securing the attendance of the head men of the Túrís, it was resolved to cross the stream. About 600 men were left in an entrenched camp, and equipage and followers reduced as low as possible. The Kúram was forded on the 5th, and the force advanced by the following marches :—

|        |                                                             |       |           |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-----------|
|        | Sarra Khoá,                                                 | .. .. | 10 miles. |
| Route. | Hazzar Pír Zíarat,                                          | .. .. | 14½ „     |
|        | Darwáza Defile,                                             | .. .. | 10½ „     |
|        | Right bank of Kúram,                                        | }     | 12½ „     |
|        | about a mile and a half<br>from Sirdar Azim Khan's<br>fort, |       |           |

The route was stony, and difficult for the nine pounder guns. The force carried its own supplies. It is reckoned 25 miles from where the force halted to the Peywár pass, and over 70 thence to Kabul.

127. The Túrís did not venture on any resistance to the strong force entering their valley as friends of the Kabul Government. The claims made against them in compensation for their outrages were openly investigated, and the tribe were in the end required to pay Rs. 8,630, the exaction of which was guaranteed by Gholam Jan.

128. The force on its return made Ibrahimzai, 12 miles, on 23rd November; the Artillery and Cavalry following the bed of the river, and the Infantry a narrow path on the right bank, and reached Hazar Pír Zíarat again, 11½ miles, on the 24th. It was found that this route is easier than that by Darwáza, except when the river is swollen. The Brigadier

took the opportunity of reconnoitring the entrance to the Zaimúsht valley. The force arrived at Thull on the 28th.

Murder of grass-cutters. Here occurred the murder of four grass-cutters attached to the Cavalry. It was traced to the Míamí section of the Kabul Kheyl Wazírís. Reparation could not be obtained from the Mulliks, and coercion was resorted to. As this affair exemplifies the nature, difficulties and hardships of the hill warfare, it will be described in the words of Brigadier Chamberlain's report:—

“ After the murder of the grass-cutters, such of the Míamís as had previously been encamped on the right bank of the Kúram crossed the river, and the whole of the tribe having pitched their tents at the foot of a range of mountains which they had been accustomed to consider inaccessible, supposed themselves secure from any attack except in front, and cared not for the proximity of our camp.

“ For a surprise to be successful two conditions were indispensable, viz. the possession of the mountain in rear of their encampments, and their retreat down the left bank of the river being closed.

“ To Major Coke I assigned the first of these operations. At midnight his column\* was awoke, fell into their places without the slightest noise; and under the guidance of most expert guides provided by the Deputy Commissioner, commenced their march for the summit of the mountain by a circuitous and difficult path.

“ Four hours after the departure of Major Coke's column the remainder of the troops fell in, crossed the Kúram opposite camp, and marched down its right bank. On our reaching the village of Billund Kheyl the day began to dawn; so, leaving the Infantry and guns to follow, I pushed on with the Cavalry (the Deputy Commissioner accompanied Khwaja Mahomed Khan's horsemen) for the double purpose of cutting off retreat by the river bank, and to reconnoitre the mountain down stream for a place practicable for Infantry: for complete possession of the hills in rear of the Wazírí encampments was indispensable to perfect success. On crossing the river and entering the broken ground, we came suddenly on an encampment of the Míamís, who, warned of our approach, were hurrying their families and cattle up the steep mountain path in their rear. Here a few shots were exchanged; we having one horse-man wounded and two horses killed, the Wazírís also losing a man.

\* 1st Punjab Infantry.

6th do., do.

Tws 3-pounder guns of No. 1.

Punjab Light Field Battery.

"About this time intimation was brought that Major Coke's column had been seen on the summit of the mountain, so there was no longer any doubt as to his success; and the Gúrkhas and Mountain Train having come up with the Cavalry, we soon turned the southernmost of the Míamí encampments, and ascended the mountain, thereby completing our chain. Major Coke's column was above them, and completely closed the few paths which led up the mountain. Captain Henderson's regiment and the Field Battery threatened them from below; and lower down again the Gúrkhas and mountain guns had the command of the hill, whilst the Cavalry cut off all retreat by the plain.

"It was well known that the party implicated in the murder were to be found in the encampment immediately below Major Coke's column; so, sending Captain Henderson to carry on negotiations below, I proceeded along the top of the mountain to join Major Coke, that being the best place to commence operations from had the tribe refused to surrender the criminals. But, as might have been expected, our words from such a position were law; and without any delay, every man called for, and present, was at once made over to us. By way of further guarantee, several hundred head of sheep and cattle were brought away, to be restored on terms being definitely settled with the tribe.

"With exception of one Wazírí killed by a horseman, and a second shot by Major Coke's men whilst endeavouring to escape along the mountain side, no other blood was spilt; for the moment we were in a position when resistance became hopeless; no endeavour was spared to explain to all the precise object of our visit, and to assure them we should not injure them unless resisted. The precaution was also taken of sending messages to the other and neighbouring branches of the Kabul Kheyl tribe, not to interfere in support of the Míamí, and they were either so sensible as not to do so, or felt their inability to aid them."

There not being sufficient evidence to prove the murder against any individuals, a fine of 1,200 rupees was taken from the tribe.

On the 4th of December, while the force was at Thull, a party of Zaimúshts, having no quarrel with the people of Dar-samaid, and solely with the object of outraging our Government, seized three of them, one of whom afterwards died of his wounds. The Zaimúshts in the plains were not participating in this crime, and being powerless to procure the surrender of the culprits, preparations were made to attack the village of Dúmbakkí in the Zaimúsht valley, about two miles from our border; but the assault was forestalled by the appearance of a procession of the villagers, headed by the

women bearing the Koran ; a fine of 1,100 rupees was paid, and the Zaimúsht clan behaved peaceably afterwards.

129. The troops reached Kohat on the 22nd of December. The objects of the expedition had been fully accomplished. The exaction of compensation from the Túrís, in the Afghan territory, for wrongs inflicted on our subjects, had vindicated our power to protect them. The Zaimúshts had been rendered for the time perfectly submissive, and peace and order were re-established in the Míranzai valley.

130. It became necessary in March 1857 to send an expedition against the Bozdars. This is a Beloch tribe dwelling on the eastern spurs of the Súlimaní range, where it faces the country between Dera Ghazí Khan and Dera Futtéh Khan.

The repeated raids by the Bozdars into the plain country, both during the Sikh rule and since annexation, were fully enumerated in Mr. Temple's report. It was therein shewn that so formidable were these mountain robbers to the peaceful hamlets of the plain, that Sawun Mull, when Governor of Múltan, had been obliged to build a fort at Mangrotah, commanding their chief pass, named Sangarh ; and to subsidize the chiefs. The pecuniary allowances made were continued by the British Government. Nevertheless, scarcely a year after annexation passed away without a series of plundering expeditions by this tribe into our territory. Their incursions became more bold and frequent in 1856. Villages near to, and even in rear of our posts, were assailed ; and at last in January 1857 a patrol, consisting of one Duffadar and seven horsemen, was attacked in the Sangarh pass, with a loss of two men killed.

|                                                      |                  |                                                                                                                                          |
|------------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| The troops marginally noted were assembled under the |                  | command of Brigadier Chamberlain on the 6th of March, at Towsáh, seven miles from the Sangarh pass. Captain Pollock, Deputy Commissioner |
| Native Artillery, 184 & 12 guns.                     |                  |                                                                                                                                          |
| Do. Cavalry, 118                                     |                  |                                                                                                                                          |
| Do. Infantry, 2,338                                  |                  |                                                                                                                                          |
|                                                      | 2,640 & 12 guns. |                                                                                                                                          |

of Dera Ghazí Khan, accompanied the troops. The route through the Sangarh pass is up the stony bed of the stream from which it takes its name. It is practicable for guns, and, except at the "Khan Bund," is tolerably open. The Khan Bund itself is so called from an old embankment, but the designation is commonly applied to the strong narrow defile held by the enemy above the junction of the Drúg watercourse with the Sangarh. The enemy's position was attacked on its left by columns under Captains Coke and Green, with such vigour and success as to lead to its general abandonment. The Bozdar force was reckoned at about 1700 men, of whom some 30 or 40 were killed, and from 50 to 70 wounded. Our casualties amounted to 5 men killed and 49 wounded. The "Khan Bund" had previously been rendered famous by the retirement from before it of a large Sikh force under General Ventura and Jemadar Khoshal Singh, and the Bozdars also lay claim to having then inflicted a loss of 1200 on Dewan Sawun Mull's soldiers, and to have plundered his baggage.

131. Some crops and hamlets were laid waste by  
 Destruction of crops. Brigadier Chamberlain's force, and  
 on the 13th the Mulliks of the tribe  
 sent in messengers to sue for peace.

132. The tribe engaged to restore all property or its  
 value plundered within the preced-  
 Engagements entered ing twelve months, to pay certain  
 into by Bozdars. fines for every death caused or  
 wound inflicted, to furnish hostages for the future good  
 behaviour of the tribe, and to furnish 300 sheep for the im-  
 mediate use of the force.

133. These arrangements being made the force returned  
 to the plains on the 22nd March.  
 Return of the force. The Bozdars have since behaved  
 pretty well, and abstained from  
 raids into our territory.

134. It may be here mentioned that a serious raid was  
 made in August 1857 into the Dera  
 Khan of Khelat's expedi- Ghazí Khan district by the Murri  
 tion against the Murris.



tribe, whose settlements in the Kahun valley are somewhat retired from our frontier. Our relations with this tribe are managed by the authorities in Sind, and at their instance the Khan of Khelat, in the cold weather of 1858, sent troops, accompanied by Major H. Green, Political Agent, against them. Their granaries and fort were destroyed, and hostages taken for their future good behaviour; whence it would appear that measures similar to those found most effectual for the repression of the tribes on the Punjab frontier are not less applicable to those bordering on Sind.

135. On the 25th of May 1857, the mutinous 55th Regiment Native Infantry, stationed at Mardan, Yúsúfzai, fled at the approach of a force from Peshawar, and, to the number of about 500, escaped into Swat.

Mutiny of 55th Native Infantry at Mardan.

136. For some years after annexation, Swat had been the refuge of all sorts of criminals, who were allowed and encouraged by the chiefs to commit robbery and murder in British territory.

Superstitious and wonder-loving like all Yúsúfzais, the people of Swat had long yielded themselves to the guidance of a certain Akhúnd, who had become resident amongst them. Originally a Syud of Bonair, named Abdúl Ghufúr, he had passed his life in close study and asceticism, and at the present time must be nearly eighty years of age. Reverentially consulted, it is said that his advice was opposed to the disturbance of the British border, and was therefore not always followed. But when neglect of it led to the appearance of a British force at the mouth of the Mulla-kund pass, he prevailed on the frightened Khans to elect a chief. This was no easy task for the Yúsúfzais. The Khwaizai section on the right, and the Bhaizai on the left bank of the river dividing the valley, are frequently at enmity, whilst Ghazan Khan of Dhír, in the upper country, like his ancestor Kasim Khan, mentioned by

The Akhúnd.

The Swatis elect a king.

Epiphinstone, could tolerate no autocracy but his own. Ultimately the lot fell on Syud Akbar of Sittana, who was unconnected with Swat, and whose origin will be explained hereafter. He reigned in Swat for several years, and latterly gave no cause of offence to the British.

137. His death occurred just about the time of the mutinies. His son, Mobarik Shah, hoped to succeed, but the Swatís no longer desired a king. It was resolved to expel him, and also to get rid of the sepoys of the 55th, some of whom then accompanied him to the Punjtar valley, whilst the bulk proceeded towards Khagán, where they were ultimately destroyed.

138. At this time a Hindústání Moulví, named Inayat Alí, detached with his followers Moulvi Inayat Ali. from the main colony at Sittana, was in the same neighbourhood at Mungul Thana. He employed himself in prophesying the fall of the British power, and in proclaiming the duty of waging war in support of the Mahomedan faith. He was secretly supported by Mokarrab Khan, chief of Punjtar, who had in vain solicited the aid of the British authorities in coercing his clan.

139. There were, therefore, at this conjuncture, when the troops at the disposal of the Government were, owing to the events of the mutiny, much reduced in number, several elements which might, if allowed to develop themselves, have caused great confusion on the Yúsúfzai border.

140. Some of the western villages, particularly the Mahmúdzai tuppah, soon gave way to the influences by which they were tempted to disaffection, and refused to pay their revenue, and appealed to Mobaris Khan, the Khúdú Kheyl Mullik of Chinglai, and to Mobarik Shah. The former sent his nephew Baz Khan

Some villages withhold their revenue.

Occupation of a British village.

with 200 foot; the latter, a partisan soldier named Jan Mahomed, with 50 horse, who occupied the defaulting village of Sheikh Jana. The force marginally

Its recovery.

Vaughan, accompanied by Lieutenant Horne, Assistant Commissioner, moved from Mardan, and on the 2nd July attacked the village, killing Baz Khan, and executing Jan Mahomed, after capture.

80 Horse,  
250 Infantry, } Native.  
2 Mountain Guns.

141. The Moulvi and Mobaris Khan then collected their followers at the village of Occupation of Narinjī. Narinjī, which is in British territory, but at the foot of a precipitous hill, and partly enclosed by its projecting spurs. This village was well known as a refuge of robbers, and as proud of having once been attacked without success by a Sikh force. It was reckoned that the village was held by about 640 men, amongst whom were

about 40 sepoys of the 55th Native Infantry. The lower portion was attacked and carried by Colonel Vaughan, with a force of about 800 horse and foot, and four mountain guns, 50 or 60 of the enemy being killed. The upper village was not then attacked, and soon afterwards the Moulvi returned with an increased gathering. Reinforcements were sent to Colonel Vaughan from Peshawar, and on the 3rd of August he assaulted with 2,400 men, and, much aided by the local

knowledge of the Deputy Commissioner, Major Hugh James, succeeded in turning the position and in destroying the village. The Moulvi retired to Chinglai. It is noticeable that at this time he in vain attempted to secure the co-operation of the Bonair tribe.

Expedition against Sittana.

142. An expedition was undertaken against "the Sittana fanatics" towards the end of April 1857.

143. After the defeat and death of Syud Ahmed, their founder, at Balakot, in 1831, the Settlement of Hindústání fanatics at Sittana. remnant found refuge in Sittana, which stands on the Indus, in the narrow strip of plain country lying between that river and the Mahábun mountain. This village was then held by Syud Akbar, grandson of Syud Zamán. It was originally contested between the Otmanzai and Tanoukí tribes, and granted in "Sirrí," or endowment, to Syud Zamán, who came from Takhtabund, in Bonair. The priestly family thus settled, soon quarrelled with its neighbours. Syud Zamán began by killing his own brother, who claimed a share in the new acquisition. The Bonair tribe asserted the murdered man's rights, but Zamán was supported by the Otmanzai and Judúns. So strong was the feeling that, as stated by Colonel H. Lumsden, "a Bonair man would not sit in council or break bread with a descendant of Zamán Shah." Shahjí, his son, married a daughter of a chief of the Tanoukís, but subsequently plundered and refused to restore the property of the principal chief, and, being backed by the Otmanzai, his family has since been at feud with the Tanoukí clan.

Syud Akbar, above mentioned, was one of the six sons of Shahjí, the others being Azim, Asgar, Omarn, Omran, and Shah Madár.

It has previously been explained how Syud Akbar Shah came to be elected king of Swat, and his son Mubarik to be expelled, and we have also seen the hostile attitude towards the British assumed by him in conjunction with the fanatics of Mungul Thanah, Mokarrab Khan of Punjtar, and Mobaris Khan of Chinglai.

Punjtar had been the old original haunt of the Hindústánís in the days of the chief's father Fattah Khan, when they were led by Syud Ahmed, and openly aspired to rescue the Peshawar valley from the infidel Sikhs. It is probable that Mokarrab Khan invited the Hindústánís into his country to aid in exacting the tithe of grain which an encroaching

Yúsúzai chief always begins by exacting from his clansmen, and which was voluntarily paid by the Swatís to Akbar. Punjtar is only four miles from the British border, and the near neighbourhood of the Hindústánís was a standing menace to its peace. But it was not until October 1857 that any overt outrage was committed, when Lieutenant Horne, who had imprudently encamped in the vicinity of the hills, was attacked in his tent at night, and some of his followers killed, by a band of horse and foot from Punjtar. On this serious provocation the Governor General sanctioned the expedition.

|                                                       |            |              |              |                                                                   |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| The force marginally noted assembled on the left bank |            |              |              | of the Kabul river, opposite Nowshera, on the 22nd of April 1858, |  |
|                                                       | Eur.       | Nat.         | Total.       | under the command of Major                                        |  |
| Artillery                                             | 131        | 88           | 219          | General Sir Sidney Cotton, K. C. B.,                              |  |
| Cavalry                                               | 16         | 535          | 551          | and reached Selim Khan, our                                       |  |
| Infantry                                              | 632        | 3,475        | 4,107        | border village, on the 24th. The                                  |  |
|                                                       | <u>779</u> | <u>4,098</u> | <u>4,877</u> | attempt of Mokarrab Khan to levy tithes had alienated a           |  |
|                                                       |            |              |              | portion of the tribe. The Totallai villagers accompanied the      |  |
|                                                       |            |              |              | reconnaissance made against Punjtar on the 25th, and, on its      |  |
|                                                       | * Eur.     | Nat.         | Total.       | hasty evacuation, helped in burning                               |  |
| Cavalry                                               | ..         | 370          | 370          | the village. On the 26th, a column*                               |  |
| Infantry                                              | 250        | 1,456        | 1,706        | without tents, carrying two days                                  |  |
|                                                       | <u>250</u> | <u>1,826</u> | <u>2,076</u> | provisions, was pushed through                                    |  |
|                                                       |            |              |              | the narrow Darrand pass, which is                                 |  |

only two miles long, up to Chinglai, at the head of the Khúdú Khail country, containing about 1,000 houses; but this also had been precipitately abandoned, and was destroyed by the troops. The force returned by a more difficult route to Selím Khan. On the 28th, posting a reserve of 950 men at Punjtar, and again a support equally strong at Dakkára, half way, Sir S. Cotton made a night march of 12 hours by a rough and steep path up to Mangal Thanah, which, being found deserted, the fortified houses of the Sittana Syuds and Moulvís were blown up. The troops all re-assembled at Selím Khan on the 30th. The route to Sittana now lay through the Otmanzai country. The tribe were discontented

with the Hindústánís, who had threatened to take tithes from them. They had recently withstood the cutting of the crops by the Syud's followers, had killed Syud Omar, and wounded Mobarik Sháh in a fight. The attack on Sittana was made on the 4th. A force from Hazara, under Colonel J. Becher, Deputy Commissioner, crossed the Indus and co-operated, whilst the heights were occupied by the Umb chief. The Hindústánís, abandoned by their Pathan allies, still fought well, losing, it is said, 50 men killed. Sir Herbert Edwardes, Commissioner of Peshawar, who accompanied the force, then took engagements from the Otmanzai and Judún tribes to prevent the Hindústánís from returning to Sittana, and the troops returned to quarters.

144. Captain R. Mecham, of the Artillery, was murdered on the 5th November 1859, near Latammar, a post at the foot of the independent Wazírí hills, whilst travelling at night in a palanquin on the road from Bunnú to Kohat. The Wazírí hills form a block some twenty-five or thirty miles across, much broken up by deep precipitous ravines, and separate the Míranzai valley from the Bunnú district. The crime was committed by 5 or 6 men, some of whom were traced as belonging to a gang of robbers headed by one "Zungí," of the Kabul Kheyl section, which is reckoned at 3,000 fighting men. The attacks made by this section, since the annexation of the Punjab, on the Bahadur Kheyl Salt Mines, and their raids into the Khuttuk hills, were described by Mr. Temple. They had afforded an asylum to the murderers, and were, therefore, required to aid in their surrender. They refused to comply, and it was resolved to coerce them. Their habit is to descend in the winter from the higher ranges of the Súlímání mountains, with their flocks and herds, and to cultivate lands on both banks of the Kúram river, between Billund Kheyl and the junction of the Khetí stream.

145. The Wazírí is the strongest of the Dámán tribes. Their hills, forming the northern portion of the Súlímán range, run

with the Kohat and Upper Deraját frontier for about one hundred and forty miles. Their united numbers are counted at 37,000. Their main divisions are the Mahsúds, Ahmedzai, and Otmanzai. The Kabul Kheyl is one of the largest sections of the Otmanzai.

146. The actual murderers were of the Hattí Kheyl, a section of the Ahmedzai; but, as before said, were attached to Zungí's gang of robbers, known to be on the right bank of the Kúram, amongst the Kabul Kheyl settlements.

The great numbers, martial character, and unity of the Wazírí tribe, made it possible that a movement for the punishment of a particular section might meet with combined resistance. It was known, however, that the murder was the act of a few bravoës, and generally disapproved of, though the strong prejudice against the surrender of any person seeking an asylum prevented any active exertion for the apprehension of the criminals.

147. The force noted in the margin, under command of Brigadier Chamberlain, accompanied by Major James, Commissioner of Peshawar, crossed the Kúram at Thull, on the 20th of December. The Kabul Kheyl collected at a plateau called Maidaní, about 10 miles west of Thull. On the 23d the force advanced five miles to Gundíab. Here the route became narrowed by abrupt hills, and the field guns and Cavalry were halted, whilst the Brigadier caused two separate columns to ascend the heights on either side. The left column soon came upon the rear guard of the enemy, who were scattered about the hills, firing from behind bushes and low breastworks. The main body were already retiring with their families and cattle. After slight skirmishes, in which

|            |                  |
|------------|------------------|
|            | <i>Native.</i>   |
| Artillery, | 287 and 13 guns. |
| Cavalry,   | 103              |
| Infantry,  | 3,510            |

---

3,900 and 13 guns.

---

|           |                           |              |
|-----------|---------------------------|--------------|
|           | <i>Levies and Police.</i> |              |
|           | <i>Horse</i>              | <i>Foot.</i> |
| Khuttuks, | 131                       | 549          |
| Bungush,  | 10                        | 572          |
| Police,   | 75                        | 0            |
|           | <hr/> 216                 | <hr/> 1,121  |

the Wazírís showed some gallantry, the black tents at Maidaní were reached and burned. Large stores of grain, together with flocks of sheep, were captured. The losses were inflicted in the cold season, when the tribe could not return to the upper hills. The tribe lost about 50 men killed and wounded ; the troops only one killed and 14 wounded. The Túrís of Kúram, hereditary enemies of the Wazírís, assisted in the pursuit and plunder. The country on both banks of the Kúram was thoroughly explored by the force, and mapped by the Survey officers. The Hassan and Túrí Kheyl Otmanzai, on the banks of the Khetí, became responsible for the apprehension of Zungí. The Gangí Kheyl Ahmedzais actually gave up one of their own clan who had harboured the murderers ; and ultimately the principal in the murder, a man named Mohabat, was delivered up to Major Taylor, Commissioner of the Derajít, by the Ahmedzais, and executed on the scene of his crime. The troops, with the exception of two regiments detached by way of the Burghan-uttú stream to Bunnú, returned to Kohat on the 14th January 1860.

148. The Mahsúds have already been referred to as one of the main sections of the Wazírís. The Mahsúds. Unlike the others, they cultivate no lands in British territory, but reside entirely within their own hills, which command the Ghawailra or Goléri pass, one of the main avenues of the Afghan trade. They have long been in the habit of attacking the Powindah caravans, but the merchants, themselves of the Pathan race, are invariably armed, and able to offer a stout resistance. The number of the Mahsúds may be about twelve or fifteen thousand. In the Sikh time their raids into the plains were frequent, and once they burned the town of Tânk. After annexation they continued the same course. The best grass is often produced immediately at the foot of the hills, and the cattle sent there for pasture were constantly swept away. In 1855, a native officer and twelve troopers of mounted police, pursuing too far into the hills, were surrounded and slain, and later in the same year 3000 of the tribe were only prevented



by the timely advance of troops  
 Their offences. from attacking Tânk. Sir John  
 Lawrence in that year, and again in 1857, recommended  
 that an expedition into their hills should be undertaken, but  
 various circumstances postponed the measure.

149. Tânk stands near the Gúmúl stream, on the plain  
 not many miles from the foot of  
 Attack Tânk. the hills. It is the chief place of  
 a small district under the management of a chief named Shah  
 Nawaz Khan, who is connected by marriage with the Mahsúds.  
 On the 13th of March 1860, a body of some 4,000 men  
 of the tribe descended with the object of sacking the town.  
 They were gallantly met by a small party of the cavalry of  
 the Punjab Irregular Force hastily collected under a native  
 officer, and were repulsed with severe loss. It was then  
 determined to send a force to exact reparation for the past,  
 and security for the future.

150. On the 14th April the force marginally detailed  
 Expedition against them. assembled at Tânk under command  
 of Brigadier Chamberlain. It ad-  
 Staff, ... 8 vanced up the bed of the Tânk  
 Sappers & Miners, 478 stream, at this season much  
 Artillery, ... 287 shrunk, but liable to swell sud-  
 Cavalry, ... 339 denly after rain. It is strewn with  
 Infantry, ... 4,139 large boulders, and difficult there-  
 5,196 and fore for the passage of guns, and  
 12 guns. its breadth gradually narrows  
 Levies, ... 1,600 with the ascent. It sometimes widens so as to admit of  
 cultivation at the side, and for the encampment of a force,  
 and in other places, where traversed by ranges of hills, is  
 compressed to a mere defile. The tribe was required to pay  
 up 45,000 rupees, equivalent to the damage inflicted by them  
 on our subjects, or to allow the force an undisturbed passage  
 to Kanigorum, their chief place and the head of their country.  
 They declined both alternatives. Supplies having to be col-  
 lected, the Brigadier took the greater part of his force into  
 the western part of the enemy's country, which he laid waste,

leaving 1564 infantry at Pullosín under command of Colonel H. Lumsden, who was suddenly attacked on the morning of the 23rd by a body of 3000 Mahsáds, 500 of whom rushed into camp sword in hand, causing some confusion. They were soon driven out, and the troops being quickly formed pursued the Wazírís with slaughter for some miles. The attack was in the true Afghan style—dashing, and not ill-judged, but failing entirely for want of support and persistence. The enemy then fell back to the Barrára Tanga, one of the defiles in the bed of the stream already described, which had been effectually barricaded by felled trees. Brigadier Chamberlain had now abandoned his communications with the plains, and carried with him 15 days' supplies; the minute precautions involved in this bold measure need not be detailed. He attacked the new position on the morning of the 4th of May. The real assault was made on the enemy's left, a steep ascent defended by stone breastworks. The advanced party not being at once successful, the Mahsáds were encouraged to charge down the hill through the supports. But the leader being cut down by Captain Keyes, commanding a wing of Infantry in reserve, and the fire of a Mountain Battery, under Captain Butt, being turned on the party, they were soon repulsed, the breastworks carried, and a general retirement effected. The force then proceeded to Kanigorum, on which place a fine was imposed; and, as the tribe still refused to give security for their good behaviour, the crops were laid waste, and another chief town, Makín, destroyed. The force returned to the plains by the Bhissora ravine, said to be easier than that of Tánk, reaching the British border on the 18th May. The Brigadier thus describes the service performed:—"Our shortest march took hours to perform, the safety of our followers, supplies, and baggage requiring the heights on both sides to be crowned and held until the arrival of the rear guard. Though starting by sunrise, it was generally noon, and often later, before the new ground was reached. Arrived there, day piquets had to be posted, and escorts for the surveyors and cattle and foragers to be supplied: in the afternoon fatigue parties to be turned out to construct breastworks for the night picquets; these had

“ to be substantially built with stones collected from the hill  
 “ side, and to be palisaded to prevent a sudden rush by over-  
 “ powering numbers ; near sunset from 700 to 1000 men  
 “ occupied these works, their comparatively isolated position  
 “ rendering support extremely difficult ; at dusk the tents  
 “ were struck ; and in addition to in-lying picquets half the  
 “ men slept accoutred and the whole in uniform. The result  
 “ was that in a march of 160 miles through an unknown and  
 “ difficult country, with an enemy ever on the watch to take  
 “ advantage of remissness, we lost but three camp followers  
 “ and as many camels.”

151. The force left without securing the submission of  
 the tribe. A blockade was there-  
 Its results. fore established and all trade  
 prohibited. The Mahsúds com-  
 mitted some serious crimes in this interval, but in the month of  
 June 1861 sued to be allowed to come in and make terms.  
 They then entered into the following engagements:—

1. To maintain friendly relations in future.
2. To acknowledge the liability to seizure, for the  
 re-imbursement of sufferers from outrages, of the kafilas  
 belonging to offending sections of the tribe.
3. Not to give refuge to criminals escaped from British  
 territory or to receive stolen property.
4. To pay fines according to a fixed scale for all mur-  
 ders committed or wounds inflicted by members of the  
 tribe.
5. To give hostages for the observance of these terms  
 for one year.

Up to the time of writing these agreements have been  
 tolerably adhered to.

152. It has previously been mentioned that the Ot-  
 manzai and Judún tribes were  
 Expedition against Mul- bound over to prevent the return  
 kah. of the Hindústání fanatics to

Sittana. The Otmanzai are a small clan, but the Judúns number some 4,000 men and could easily have fulfilled their engagements.

153. On their expulsion from Sittana, Syud Mobarik and the fanatics went to Mulkah, Whither the Sittana fanatics had retired. on one of the northern spurs of the Mahábun range. This site belonged to the Amazai tribe. It was approachable from the British side only by difficult paths, nevertheless, there was no cessation of the robberies formerly committed from Sittana. Hence in 1861 the Otmanzai and Judún were blockaded, and made to renew their engagements to prevent these crimes, but without effect. In 1862, therefore, it was recommended that an expedition for the punishment of the fanatics should be undertaken; but this measure was not adopted until the autumn of 1863, when the increasing influence of the Hindústánís over the neighbouring tribes and hostility to the British Government became more manifest. Their numbers, which had much decreased after Sir Sidney Cotton's expedition, had now risen to about 1,000. Early in July 1863 they re-occupied Sittana and other villages of the Otmanzai, who, with the Judúns, made no resistance;—indeed the Mansúr section of the latter tribe are said to have invited their return. Failing on due warning to expel the intruders, these two tribes were on the 15th July again subjected to blockade.

154. The country immediately opposite to the Otmanzai on the left bank of the Indus is Exposed situation of Umb. held by a British feudatory named Akram Khan, chief of Tanawal. It will be remembered that there is an hereditary quarrel between his family and that of Syud Mobarik. He is peculiarly exposed to injury from his enemies Trans-Indus, his chief place Umb, together with a small flat slip of country, being on the right bank. Besides the Syuds, he has bitter enemies in a portion of the Hassanzai tribe, who have never

forgiven his father's seizing some of their clansmen in connection with the murder of two European customs officers in 1852. In that year the Hassanzai laid waste his lands, Cis-Indus, whilst the Hindústánís attacked him Trans-Indus. Similarly, in 1863, one of the first acts of Moulví Abdúlla was to address threatening letters to him, whilst the Hassanzais destroyed his border hamlets in the Shúngli valley, and killed several of his men. These outrages are more than suspected to have been originated by Kabúl Khan, son of the Hassanzai chief Hassan Ali, at the instigation of his father-in-law Atta Mahomed Khan, nominally a British subject, who holds the canton of Agrore adjoining Tanawal on the north-west.

155. On the 7th September the Hindústánís, led by Fanatics threaten out- Moulví Abdúlla, and accompanied posts of the Guide Corps. by a principal Judún Mullík, crossed our border in Yúsúfzai with the intention of attacking a detachment of the Guide Corps, at Topí; but, coming across a few horsemen, retired precipitately. They subsequently fired across the Indus at our picquets.

156. As regards physical force the Hindústánís alone are far from formidable. But an influence over the tribes, similar to that obtained by Syud Ahmed in the time of the Sikhs, might make them so. In their persistent preaching of war against the infidel, they raise a cry which might, as it did in the reign of Ranjít Singh, rally the divided tribes to united hostilities. To understand the spirit which might be evoked we must recall the state of feeling,—the ignorance, bigotry, enthusiasm, hardihood, and universal agreement,—amidst which the Crusades took their rise, and to which a parallel might be found amongst the excitable population beyond the border. There are fully developed “the implicit faith and ferocious energy” in which the essence of original Mahomedanism has been said to consist, and which the propagation of the Wahábí puritanism has done much to inflame. The existence of this religious element distinguishes the perplexities on the Yúsúfzai border from those occurring elsewhere on the frontier.

The position of Mulkah is not ill chosen for influencing the tribes. On the inner side of the Mahábun in the country of the Amazais it affords easy means of communicating with them ; the large clan of the Chigurzais and the Mudda Kheyl ; the Hassanzai Cis-Indus are also easily reached, and by southern routes the Khúdú Kheyl, Otmanzai and Judúns. The people of the Chumla valley are close at hand, and thence access to the Bonair, Swat, and Bajour valleys is practicable.

It is, however, by no means certain that the Hindústánis or their aggressive tenets had as yet met with much acceptance amongst the hill people. The Judúns had their own objects in assisting their return to the Indus. The Hassanzai were ready enough to aid them in attacking their old enemy of Umb. But by the great Yúsúfzai clans and their Patriarch their religious dogmas and innovations were regarded as heretical.

157. The Governor General having sanctioned an expedition it was planned that the line of advance should be by the Súrkhawí pass into the Chumla valley, in order that Mulkah might be destroyed, and retreat towards the interior hills cut off. The force under the command of Brigadier General Sir Neville Chamberlain was originally of the strength stated in the margin.

*Artillery.*

Half Battery Royal Arty.  
Huzara Mountain Train.  
Peshawur Mountain Train.

*Cavalry.*

Detachment Guide Cavv.  
" 11th Bergal Cavalry.

*Infantry.*

Detachment Sappers and Miners.  
2 Regiments British Infy.  
8 " Native Infantry.

It was a question whether Mulkah should be approached through the Khúdú Kheyl country, the Mahábun being then crossed by the long and tortuous Surpattí pass, or by the Súrkhawí pass and Chumla valley. It is possible that a force advancing by the former route might have alarmed only the tribes to the north of the range ; but, in the event of a check, it would have been placed in difficult ground, without safe communication with the plains. It was determined to make use of

the latter ; and General Chamberlain, moving with secrecy, seized the crest of the Súrkhawí pass in the afternoon of the 20th October. His intention had been to descend into the open Chumla valley at once, but the narrowness of the path, encumbered as it was with brushwood and boulders, so different from the dry beds of streams by which the Damán hills were entered, caused great delay in the passage of the baggage, and the rear guard did not join until the 23rd. The Bonair tribe had not in any force resisted the occupation of the pass. They had received a proclamation stating the objects of the expedition, but they had also been warned by the Moulví of the danger of its invading their country. It is said they were by its halt both encouraged to attack it and also alarmed for their own valley, the pass into which lay a few miles to the left of the line of advance below, and is not of much strength. There they collected, but it was not until the evening of the 22nd, when a party sent to reconnoitre the Chumla valley was returning past their village of Umbeylah, that their hostility was openly shown. On the 25th the Hindústánís with the northern Mahábun tribes came up ; on the 28th the Akhúnd of Swat with his people ; and on the 9th a large body of Bajourís. General Chamberlain's position necessitated the holding of outlying hills and crags, which were successively attacked, the enemy keeping up a fire for many hours on one post, then creeping up under the breastworks assailing them with showers of stones, and attempting to carry them with a rush sword in hand,—always bringing-up large bodies of men against exposed points. In these attacks they suffered great losses and met with occasional though transient success. After the 20th November they ceased to attack, and their numbers dwindled down ; but about the 12th December very large reinforcements under Fyz Talab Khan of Bajour, and Ghazzan Khan of Dhír, joined them, and it is probable that the offensive would have been resumed had not General Garvock, who on General Chamberlain being wounded had succeeded to the command, anticipated them. His force was now raised by reinforcements to about 9,000

men. He attacked the village of Lallú, on his right, and took it with H. M.'s 101st Fusiliers, 400 of the enemy being killed and wounded. Whilst this operation was going on the enemy made separate attacks on the remainder of the troops, and on the camp, but were severely repulsed. The next day the force descended to Umbeylah, which was abandoned, but a sharp resistance was made on this day by a body of Hindústánís, of whom 200 were killed.

158. The effect of these successes was immediate. The Bajourís and Dhirís fled at once; the Bonairwals submitted, and agreed to disband their forces, and to send a body of their tribesmen to burn Mulkah, giving hostages meanwhile for the performance of their engagement. They further bound themselves to expel the Hindústánís from the Bonair, Chumla, and Amazai lands. The burning of Mulkah was carried out by the Bonairwals under the inspection of Colonel Reynell Taylor, c. B., escorted by the Corps of Guides.

159. Major James, the Commissioner of Peshawar, whose counsels had much contributed to these favourable results, proceeded to take fresh engagements from the Judún and Otmanzai tribes, whom he employed to destroy Mundí, a village near Sittana where the Hindústánís on their return in 1863 had erected something like fortifications.

The Mudda Kheyl, Amazai, and Hassanzai tribes subsequently came in and subscribed to the engagements required of them.

The remnant of the Hindústánís found refuge amongst the Trans-Indus Hassanzai, on the confines of Swat, and in Bajour; and, though offered a free pardon by Major James, have not yet availed themselves of it.

160. Meanwhile the machinery employed by them for obtaining money and recruits has been exposed. It has been shown that the Moulvís of Patna have for a series of years



continued, by inculcating the duty and merit of waging war against unbelievers, to prevail upon the poorer classes in Bengal to subscribe funds and furnish recruits for the colony at Sittana. At first the infidels were the Sikhs, latterly the British. The hostile animus was perhaps most clearly manifested in the instigation of the Mahmúdzai Pathans to withhold their revenue in 1857, as has previously been detailed, but Syud Ahmed's continuous and occasionally formidable aggressions on Ranjit Singh's dominions sufficiently attest that the designs of the colony are limited only by its power. It remains to be seen if they are capable of further development.

161. The loss sustained by Her Majesty's forces in these prolonged operations was serious.

|             | Europeans. |      | Natives.  |      | TOTAL. |
|-------------|------------|------|-----------|------|--------|
|             | Officers.  | Men. | Officers. | Men. |        |
| Killed, ... | 15         | 34   | 4         | 174  | 227    |
| Wounded, .. | 21         | 118  | 21        | 460  | 620    |
|             | 36         | 152  | 25        | 634  | 847    |

162. In the last seven years, from 1856 to 1864, it has been necessary to operate against the hill tribes on seven occasions. In the seven years preceding, from 1849 to 1855, no less than fifteen expeditions were undertaken. It has not happened that a second expedition has been sent against the same tribe. It was pointed out by Mr. Temple in 1856, that the Bozdars, the Kabul Kheyl, and Mahsúd Wazír's continued to commit outrages, and that their country had not been entered by our troops. It has now been shown that it was not until the Kabul Kheyl abetted the murder

of a British officer in British territory, and until the Mahsûds invaded British territory in strength, that expeditions were directed against them. The conduct of tribes chastised, and of those unchastised, has alike testified to the efficacy and necessity of severe measures when justly called for.

163. The grounds on which the other expeditions were undertaken have been stated in the foregoing narrative, and furnish the means of judging whether coercion has been prematurely or unnecessarily resorted to. Whilst any hasty exertion of physical pressure to the exclusion of other methods of adjustment is confessedly impolitic, there is a point beyond which the practice of forbearance may not be carried. As without physical force in reserve there can be no governing power, so under extreme and repeated provocation its non-employment is not distinguishable from weakness. In each case separately, therefore, it must be judged whether or not offensive measures have been justified.

It must be noted that the despatch of an expedition into the hills is always in the nature of a judicial act. It is the delivery of a sentence, and the infliction of a punishment for international offences. It is, as a rule, not in assertion of any disputed right, or in ultimate arbitration of any contested claim of its own, that the British Government resolves on such measures, but simply as the only means by which retribution can be attained for acknowledged crimes committed by its neighbours, and by which justice can be satisfied or future outrages prevented. In the extreme cases in which expeditions are unavoidable, they are analogous to legal penalties for civil crime,—evils in themselves inevitable from deficiencies of preventive police, but redeemed by their deterrent effects. Considerations of expense, of military risk, of possible losses, of increasing antagonism, and combination against us on the part of the tribes, all weigh heavily against expeditions; and to set them aside there must be an irresistible obligation to protect, and to vindicate the outraged rights of subjects whom we debar from the revenge and retaliation they formerly practised.

To permit a Moulvi, openly preaching war against us as infidels, to occupy our villages with his armed retainers, or

murderously to attack the encampment of our officials;—to suffer a British officer to be murdered in our territory whilst travelling on the public road;—to allow a populous town to be plundered by an invading force;—to sanction passively the return of fanatical conspirators, robbers, and murderers to a post from which we had expelled them by military action;—this is the degree of inaction—this is the ignominious attitude—to which the British Government would be reduced were it admitted that the expeditions recorded have not been fully justified—have not been absolutely necessary.

The question is, indeed, much less one of moral right than of political expediency and of military practicability.

Morally we have the fullest right—as a Government it is our bounden duty, in proportion to our ability, and after exhausting all milder measures—to chastise in their corporate capacity tribes or sections of tribes who openly and habitually rob and murder our subjects or violate our territory. This is also a condition of our political existence,—the extension of protection in return for submission. And if by refusing the surrender of the actors in the crimes committed, the tribes leave no alternative but hostilities available, the responsibility is theirs.

But politically the advantages to be obtained will always much depend on the concomitant circumstances. The military success which in varying degrees has always attended expeditions, and the demonstration that their roughest hills can be penetrated by our troops, have done much to subjugate the minds and compel the respect of the hill population, and to reconcile them to peaceful pursuits. Success less distinguished might, on the contrary, excite them to continued rapine and resistance.

The expeditions against the Kúram Túrís, Narinjí, Sittana, and the Bozdars, were undertaken during the administration of Sir John Lawrence; those against the Kabul Kheyl, and Mahsúd Wazírís, and Hindústání fanatics of Mulkah, during that of Sir Robert Montgomery, under whose orders this paper has been drawn up.

R. H. DAVIES,  
*Secretary to Government Punjab.*

## APPENDIX.

### *Some Notes on the Valley of Kúram, and its People.*

Kúram is a modern name borrowed from the river that flows through it. The old name was Bungush, from the tribe that possessed it. Bungush was divided into "Ooliah," or upper, extending from the Peywar pass to Billund Kheyl; and "Sifleah," or lower, extending from Billund Kheyl to Gundíalí below Kohat.

The Emperor Baber, in his memoirs of the year 910 Hegira, (Anno Domini 1504) enumerates Bungush as one of the fourteen "túmuns" or provinces then dependant on Kabul; so that the settlement of the Bungush tribe is of very ancient date.

Upper Bungush, however, or Kúram, is now less the property of the Bungush than of the Túrís.

The Túrís are "Kúchís," or a wandering tribe. Their seat was at Níláb on the Indus, and they moved to and fro between that point and Kabul, with their flocks and herds. By the Bungush accounts it was about four generations back when the Túrís first took root in Kúram. The Bungush had rebelled against their Kabul sovereign, who sent a force, reduced them, and imposed on them a tax; to pay which they sold the village of Burrúkai near Peywar, to the Túrís. After that the Túrís got Peywar by another bargain, by which they were bound to supply Ussúd Khan, a Bungush chief of Shilufzan, with wood. Thus, little, by little, the Túrís availed themselves of Bungush dissensions to seize new villages, until the Bungushes say they have now only the villages of Shilufzan and Zíran, under the hills, and Uzza Kheyl in the plains, which are free. The rest of Kúram is in the hands of the Túrís, who have reduced the Bungushes to the condition of "humsayuhs," or dependants.

Every Bungush is obliged to attach himself to a powerful Túrí, who is called his "Naick" and who protects him from other Túrís.

If a Bungush leaves a son or a brother, the property is generally allowed to descend by inheritance; but often not, the Bungush Naick declaring it a lapsed estate.

There is war between the Túrís and the Bungushes of Shilufzan and Zíran; but the latter are strong from numbers and situation, and hold their own. But no man of theirs can travel about the rest of Kúram without taking a Túrí "budragga," or safe con-

Still the conquered Bungushes out-number the conquering Túrís, as will be seen below :—

| BUNGUSH.                               |          | TOORIS.             |          |
|----------------------------------------|----------|---------------------|----------|
| VILLAGE O. PARISH.                     | NUMBERS. | DIVISION.           | NUMBERS. |
| Shilufzan, ...                         | 2,000    | 1. Gúndí Kheyl, ... | 1,000    |
| Zíran, ...                             | 1,500    | 2. Alízai, ...      | 500      |
| Bogukí (of Futtch-<br>ullah Khan,) ... | 200      | 3. Mustú Kheyl, ... | 1,000    |
| Jalundhur, ...                         | 120      | 4. Humza Kheyl, ... | 1,000    |
| Shukkurdurrah, ...                     | 100      | 5. Dopuzzai, ...    | 1,500    |
| Azí Kheyl, ...                         | 200      |                     |          |
| Bulliamín, ...                         | } 1,500  |                     |          |
| Mukkázai, ...                          |          |                     |          |
| Bugzai, ...                            |          |                     |          |
| TOTAL, ...                             | 5,620    | TOTAL, ...          | 5,000    |

It will be observed that the Túrís are divided into five branches, ("Punjpudrí," or five fathered, they call themselves,) and when they first got possessions about the Pcywar pass they parcelled each out into five equal portions, to each branch a portion; a custom which they have strictly followed with each successive acquisition in the valley, without any reference to the comparative numbers of the five branches; and possession continues in this manner at the present day, except in individual cases of sale or other voluntary transfer.

Those Túrís who chose, took to building houses on their lands, but there are still a large number who remain "Kúchís," living in tents all the year, in winter about Bulliamín (in lower Kúram), and in summer in the Súfeyd koh.

Subjoined is a statement of the sub-divisions of the five branches of the Túrí tribe, and the number of fortified villages in which they are settled :—

| BRANCH.      | SUB-DIVISIONS.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | NUMBER<br>OF<br>FORTS. | NUMBER<br>OF<br>MEN. |
|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Gúndí Kheyl, | 1. Alúm Kheyl, ...<br>2. Rústum Kheyl, ...<br>3. Esau Kheyl, ...<br>4. Eesup Kheyl, ...<br>5. Mahmúd Kheyl, ...<br>6. Nundur Kheyl, ...<br>7. Shumsí Kheyl, ...<br>8. Tonch Kheyl, ...<br>9. Laik Kheyl, ...<br>10. Mírwullí, ...<br>11. Alizai, ... | 45                     | 1,000                |

| BRANCH.        | SUB-DIVISIONS.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | NUMBER<br>OF<br>FORTS. | NUMBER<br>OF<br>MEN. |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Alízai, ...    | 1. Múluk Kheyl, ...<br>2. Choge Kheyl, ...<br>3. Shermo Kheyl, ...<br>4. Musrí Kheyl, ...<br>5. Khodadád Kheyl, ...<br>6. Mayeh Kheyl, ...                                                                                                                                                                 | 31                     | 500                  |
| Mustú Kheyl,   | 1. Feroz Kheyl, ...<br>2. Múllah Kole, ...<br>3. Búgdeh Kheyl ...<br>4. Uzzí Kheyl, ...<br>5. Murrú Kheyl, ...<br>6. (Wanting,) ...<br>7. Dreywundí, ...<br>8. Júní Kheyl* ...<br>9. Turkál Kheyl,* ...<br>10. Ghúrúbzai,* ...<br>11. Minna Kheyl,* ...<br>12. Sín Kheyl, ...                              | 27                     | 1,000                |
| Humza Kheyl,   | 1. Spín Kheyl,* ...<br>2. Dreyplarch,* ...<br>3. Aka Kheyl,* ...<br>4. Jánú Kheyl,* ...<br>5. Buddí Kheyl,* ...<br>6. Purrí Kheyl,* ...<br>7. Kheshgi, ...<br>8. Shukúr Kheyl, ...<br>9. Suttí Kheyl,* ...<br>10. Sirragullah, ...<br>11. Jají, ...                                                        | 7                      | 1,000                |
| Dopuzzai, ...  | 1. Shiblan, ...<br>2. Súrroh Kheyl, ...<br>3. Míandad Kheyl,<br>4. Mírdad Kheyl, ...<br>5. Dowlut Kheyl, ...<br>6. Kímeh Kheyl, ...<br>7. Dreyplarch, ...<br>8. Tar Kheyl, ...<br>9. Khirlussí, ...<br>10. Pai Kheyl, ...<br>11. Umbur Kheyl, ...<br>12. Kuch-Keena<br>Kheyl, ...<br>13. Jaffir Kheyl, ... | 60                     | 1,500                |
| Five branches, | 53 Sub-divisions, ...                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 170 Forts,             | 5,000 Men.           |

N. B.—All those sub-divisions marked with an asterisk thus\* are “Kúchís,” with no fixed residences.

The Deputy Governor told me that the revenue fixed on the Kúram valley is 1,20,000 Kabulí rupees, but that

\* In the same way he said the revenue of the adjoining valley of Khost is Rs. 70,000, but he collects 80,000.

he collected 1,40,000,\* Syud Mírza Gúl, the most powerful and intelligent man in Kúram, told me that the revenue under the kings of Kabul was always always reckoned as follows :—Kúram was

declared to be 29 miskals; one miskal equals 1,440 juríbs. Three hundred and sixty juríbs are consequently a “páo,” or one-fourth; and each “páo” was assessed at Rs. 600 Kabulí. At this rate 29 miskals would give a land tax of Rs. 69,600, which was the olden revenue. The Bárukzais have, however, raised it by various devices :—firstly, there is the “Jezzia” tax, three rupees a year on every Hindú person; and three rupees a year on every house of artisans (Mahomedans); secondly, there is the “Dúdh,” or chimney tax, of one rupee a house per annum, which is a permanent fine on the people for destroying the fort; thirdly, all waste lands (called mírát) belong to the crown, and if any one chooses to cultivate them he pays in kind one-third of produce, the cultivator providing himself with everything. (In exposed places on the border one-fourth is taken.) Mírza Gúl declared that one-half of Kúram had been escheated as Mírát.”

The present mode of assessing the lands in Kúram which are not “Mírát is this: a juríb of land pays Rs. 1-8 Kabulí, in cash. On every five juríbs an extra rupee is put, and called “Súrsánt.”

Mírza Gúl considered the valley to be easily capable of yielding one lakh of revenue per annum to a good Government; now more is taken with violence and wrong. He said there was no sort of justice administered, and that the Deputy Governor (Gholam Ján) himself causes people to be assassinated. All wood and grass consumed in the cantonment is brought by the people without remuneration.

Mírza Gúl said he was deputed by the Túrí “jírghah,” or council, to say that whenever we wished to take their country they were ready to welcome us.

The Túrís are all of the Shíah sect, and this is a constant source of resentment between them and their Dúraní rulers. Kúram used to be under the six brothers Ukbar Khan, Gholam Hyder Khan, Sher Ali Khan, Mahomed Amín Khan, Mahomed Shurríf Khan, and Ukrum Khan, sons of the Amír :—but they bullied the Túrís so on the score of their being Shíahs, that the Túrís petitioned the Amír to change them, and the country was made over to Mahomed Azím Khan.

On one occasion the Túrís defeated Sher Alí Khan, and Mahmud Amín Khan, and killed 500 Dúranís, on the Jají border; and would have killed more had not a nephew of Khan Sherín Khan, named Súltan Ahmad Khan, a Kuzzílbash, and Shíah, come between them, and begged for quarter.

When the Túrí thieves were lurking about the Dúraní camp to steal horses, the Kuzzílbashes used to call out from inside their tents the Shíah war cry "Yah Alí! Yah Hyder!" on hearing which the Túrís left that part of the camp, and went on to plunder the Afghans.

The Bungush join the Túrís in all wars, but not often in raids. If they are summoned and fail to join, they are fined when the expedition is over.

Snow falls in Kúram about the middle or end of December, and lies two months on the ground about three feet deep. On the Peywar Kothul it lies as deep as a man's shoulder; but the pass is never closed; traffic keeps it open, the Dúraní troops come over it when the snow is on it.

The chief crop of Kúram is rice, and one juríb yields  $7\frac{1}{2}$  Peshawar maunds. Next to rice comes wheat; one juríb yields 80 "tutties"\* Then comes the cotton crop; of which one juríb yields 163 seers (of 85 Kabúlí Rs. to the seer).

|                                        |     |     |                |
|----------------------------------------|-----|-----|----------------|
| Selling prices are, Cotton, per rupee, | ... | ... | 8 or 10 seers. |
| Wheat, „ „                             | ... | ... | 20 tutties.    |
| Barley, „ „                            | ... | ... | 40 do.         |
| Jowar, „ „                             | ... | ... | 25 do.         |

Only the Wazírís buy and eat jowar. The fruits are apples, pomegranates, walnuts, umlok, melons, quinces, apricots, and excellent grapes. But the soldiers have spoilt the gardens. The vegetables are pumpkins, cucumbers and turnips.

The Túrís are not in general large men; and their dark complexions mark their eastern origin; but they are strong, hardy, and courageous. The dress of the common people consists simply of a blanket shirt. As horsemen they are as superior to their neighbours as the Wazírís are on foot. A mounted Túrí is the perfect model of a moss trooper. His horse is small, but active and enduring, and carries his own clothing under the saddle; while at the saddle bow, in leathern wallets, hang food for man and horse, spare shoes, nails and a hammer in case of accidents, and an iron peg and rope to picket the horse anywhere in a moment. The object of horsemanship with them is to commit distant and daring raids, rather than for defence, and any distinguished highwayman earns the honor-

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\* NOTE.—3 tutties equal 5 seers of Peshawar weight.



able title of a "Cluck"! or crack man. The present "Clucks" of Kúran are,

1. Nuzzurí, Alízai.
2. Timúr, Mustú Kheyl.
3. Mír Hússein, Dopuzzai.

A profusion of arms cover every horseman; one or two short brass bound carbines at his back, two or three pistols and knives of sizes and sorts all round his waist-belt, and a sword by his side. The introduction of "revolvers" would save them a good deal of weight.

I asked Mírza Gúl to tell me who were the enemies of the Túrís. He said Wazírís, Khuttuks, Zymúsht, Alísherzai, Mussúzai. Parrai, Ningrahar, Jají, Múkbul, Myndan Jají, Khostís, and above all—the Naib ! (meaning Gholam Ján, the Deputy Governor).

PESHAWUR DIVISION,  
*Commissioner's Office,*  
*The 7th February 1857.*

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HERBERT B. EDWARDES,  
*Commissioner and Superintendent.*

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DISTRICT MEMORANDUM.

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DERAH ISMAEL KHAN.

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1852.



## DERAH ISHMAEL KHAN.

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FROM

MAJOR REYNELL G. TAYLOR,  
*Late Deputy Commissioner,*

TO

MAJOR J. NICHOLSON,  
*Deputy Commissioner,  
District of Derah Ishmael Khan, Trans-Indus.*

SIR,

IN accordance with a wish expressed by the President of the Board of Administration, I proceed to furnish you with a few memoranda on the affairs of the District of Derah Ishmael Khan, lately under my charge, which, though they may convey but little new matter or information to you now, may yet I hope be of use as a record of my opinions of individuals and subjects connected with the district, after an experience of some years.

During my own employment in the district, I became fully aware of the advantages of being possessed of a thorough knowledge of the views, projects, and opinions of my predecessor, Major Edwardes, with regard to the various leading characters in the district; though, of course, those which I myself subsequently formed did not always coincide with them, and thus, though I have no hope of greatly assisting your judgment of men and affairs, and though I had an opportunity in most instances of communicating to you my impressions on subjects connected with the district before I left, still I am sure that you will not be sorry to possess an official record of them, let their practical value to you in your future management be what it may.

I have addressed this paper to you because my doing so will enable me to speak more freely than I otherwise could of small men and matters of mere local importance, mention of which would appear out of place in a formal report addressed to the Board of Administration.

I shall notice the various points on which I have remarks to offer, in the following order :—

1st. General remarks on the border tribes, their strength, power of injuring us, &c. ; difficulty of making the men of the plains assist Government in protecting the frontier line ; our mode of holding a frontier district contrasted with that usually adopted by a Native Government ; general treatment I would recommend for the hill tribes, &c.

2nd. The Wazírí tribe on the Bunnú border, numbers, armament, influence, &c. ; general conduct of the numerous sections of the tribe since our occupation of the valley ; influential and trustworthy Mulliks of the sections ; salt mines as bearing on Wazírí politics ; the Khuttuks of Luttummur, Bahadúr Kheyl, &c. ; the Manjai Nusruttí and Shinva Khuttuks ; relations of the Wazírís with both classes ; Wazírí cultivation on the Thull and in the Tuppahs ; cultivation of the Otmanzai Wazírís on the south-western border of Bunnú ; revenue settlements of the Bukkí Kheyl and Janí Kheyl tribes ; Wazírí revenue generally.

3rd. Out-posts of Bunnú village, defences, &c.

4th. Bunnúchís, influential Mulliks and men, settlement, new cultivation, &c.

5th. Murwut, influential Mulliks and men ; prospect of settlement, new cultivation, &c. ; Berat of Mulliks, relations of the Murwuttís with Shinwa Pukkí, &c. ; Músa Kheyl Tuppah, village of Drukká, village of Mullizai ; Bain pass ; post at Amán Kheyl ; Syuds and religious classes of Murwut ; Sikunder Kheyl Mulliks.

6th. Esá Kheyl, Mahomed Khan and family ; Shere Khan ; settlement, nuzzarana, extra cesses, &c. ; alum pits, Chicalí pass, Mír bihree, gold washing.

7th. Kala Bagh, Alíyar Khan and family, Bungí Kheyl, Shukurdurruh pass to Kohat.

8th. Pezú Pass, Sheikh Buddín.

9th. Border tribes of the elaquahs south of the Pezú pass, Wazírís, Sheoranís, Usteranahs, Kusranís, Powinduhs, border posts, Tank fort, &c.

10th. Nawab of Derah, and other influential men and bodies in the district.

11th. Intelligence department.

12th. Police force, horse and foot; force required for the district, &c.

In treating of the hill tribes generally, it will be difficult for me to write as earnestly as I would wish, with a view to urge the necessity of constant care and watchfulness in our dealings with them, without, on the other hand, appearing to make too much of their powers of injuring us, and of their political importance generally. I feel confident, however, that you will not be inclined to weigh my remarks entirely by a standard having reference to the exact light in which the prowess or strength of the tribes happens to be viewed at the time these notes may reach you; in which case, should they have been long pacific, or have lately suffered defeat, it is very possible that my estimate of their powers of giving annoyance to Government may appear too high. You will find, if you have not done so already, that one of the chief difficulties in dealing with these men is to avoid a certain inconsistency both in yourself and those above you in estimating their powers of mischief, an error which may lead to serious evils by inducing at one time a rash harshness or indifference to the feelings and prejudices of the class, at another an inclination to over-estimate their strength and the difficulty of controlling them. With regard to this I can only say (without referring to other tribes in other quarters, the men of which have shown apparently a more determined feeling of hostility towards us), that as far as the Wazírís, a very powerful clan, enjoying among all Afghans a high character for courage, are concerned, though they possess powers of combination and unanimous action superior to those of other tribes together with innumerable advantages of position, &c., they are still only formidable as warriors where intimate knowledge of local advantages afforded by ground for fighting or retreat gives them confidence, and also that the efforts they have hitherto made at war on anything like a grand scale, have failed most signally. The fact, I believe, being that though

they have the bravery to make spirited attacks, they have not the constancy to sustain the effort after a first unsuccessful attempt; and, therefore, that careful precautions and good defensive arrangements will always keep them fairly at bay, while at the same time I would strongly deprecate their ever being driven to try their worst, which might yet astonish us were they to adopt the simple expedient of falling on several points at once and turning the Government posts instead of throwing themselves upon them as they have hitherto done. I believe it would be perfectly possible for the Wazírís (and I could not name another tribe likely to be able to act together so well) to make simultaneous attacks on Bahadúr Kheyl or Luttummur, the Sheorání tuppahs, the Mírí tuppahs, and on Tánk, which would cover a line of 70 miles in extent; and I think you will agree with me that such an effort would greatly embarrass our troops in Bunnú and Derah.

To account for the importance of the question concerning the treatment of the tribes generally, it is only necessary to draw attention to the fact, that they possess the whole hill tracts bordering on and overlooking the cultivated plains, which are covered with open villages, herds of camels, cattle, &c. That possession of the hills gives them command of all the passes issuing on the plain below, and that a party of hill-men that a company of infantry would defeat in the plain could without risk to themselves inflict severe loss on a much larger force advancing up one of the passes. That in form, feature, dress, and language, they in most instances differ materially from the men of the plains, rendering it easy for them to recognize a stranger or spy in their country; while from the fact of their being allowed, according to our usual custom, to trade freely in our towns, and cultivate their hereditary lands under our rule, they have every facility, not only of gaining most accurate intelligence about proceedings in the plain, but it would even be possible for the very men who were to lead an attack on a position in the plain, to visit the spot on the previous day and lay their plans after personal observation. What would you have given on some occasions for the same advantages? Add to the above, that the line of

country below the hills is very extensive, covered, as I have said, with villages very seldom under our rule, prepared and strong enough to take care of themselves, and not often near enough to one another to admit of their affording each other efficient support, while the passes along the hill-side are so numerous that marauding parties can never be at a loss for convenient means of approach or retreat to or from any particular spot; and, lastly, that the act of surprising, over-running, and firing an unprotected village, is the work of so few minutes, that it may be done at night even in the immediate neighbourhood of support; and, aided by darkness, knowledge of the ground, hill legs, and five minutes' start, with the avengers of blood in the rear, who, if placed in the position of the marauders, would feel that there was much risk in the matter?

I have always been of opinion that the above considerations should in a great measure temper the surprise that is felt at the extent to which these rude, undisciplined, ill-armed, mischievous, but not very daring mountaineers are found capable of annoying a strong Government. I have carefully watched the progress of events on the frontier from Peshawur to Derah Ghazí Khan, and am decidedly of opinion that we are only as yet partially aware of the trouble that these men may entail on us, while at the same time I have seen no reason to accord them a higher character for courage, combination, perseverance, and other soldierly qualities, than I was at first inclined to allow them, and while I anticipate almost complete ultimate success in keeping them fairly at bay.

The strangest part of the game perhaps is, that we find war, opposition, and difficulty, where we come in to aid a native population that have hitherto been perfectly able to take care of themselves, but such, strange as it may seem, is indeed the case, and it frequently happens that when Government comes in to assist the native úlus of a village against their hereditary enemies, it encounters more difficulty in the task of preserving peace and safety than was experienced by the community it is supposed to be assisting, before Government troops appeared on the stage at all. I believe this apparently



anomalous result to be from certain causes which I shall try to explain a natural one, and not attributable generally to any actively evil disposition on the part of our own ryots. In some cases, indeed, a general dislike to control of any sort, and a preference for an alliance with even hereditary enemies to the hitherto almost unfelt reins imposed by a Government, which albeit has only succeeded one to which the community have long nominally owed obedience, may lead to the result in question ; I do not, however, conceive such to be the rule, but am inclined to attribute the difficulties we experience chiefly to the following causes ; first, the fact that directly Government assumes the protection of a district or village, the original inhabitants consider themselves from that time forth virtually freed from the responsibility of taking care of themselves, and speedily relax those habits of military watchfulness and readiness for action on which their own safety, and those of their homesteads and property, had previously entirely depended, and this not from timidity or dislike of petty warfare, in which, on the contrary, when coupled with freedom and the necessity of reliance on their own resources, they rather gloried, but partly from a certain indolence of character, and partly from the fact that the presence of Government troops destroys the feeling of independence and pride in holding their own with their neighbours, which they before were apt enough to cherish ; a feeling which, if once weakened or destroyed, can rarely, if ever, be revived, as it rests chiefly on the prestige of having always dealt in a rather distant and independent manner with Government in matters of revenue, criminal cases, &c., and on never having at any time required the assistance of Government against external enemies. The day on which this foreign assistance is forced upon them, or they consent to call it in, breaks the spell, and all the Queen's horses and men will not avail to set that village community in its former position in the neighbourhood again. The result is, therefore, that where we assume control and place our troops, we must be prepared, if not content, to play the whole game ourselves, and must not expect that the village community will fight against foreign enemies and protect themselves as of yore, and yet yield to a new and

more exacting Government (in the way of obedience) than they have hitherto had to deal with, that implicit subservience which it is part of our system to require at the hands of all our dependants. Under the late native Government there always existed in these localities two distinct classes of subjects, namely, what were termed good ryots and bad ; the former were completely under the thumb, and could be screwed to any extent in the way of revenue, while the Government was obliged to protect them from external enemies ; the latter dealt distantly with the Government officials in revenue matters, rendered but a half obedience at convenience in criminal cases (though liable, of course, at times to revengeful spoliation and punishment), and finally shifted entirely for themselves in the matter of self-protection against aggression from without. We acknowledge no distinction of this sort, but strive and intend to make all good ryots ; and the result, at any rate at the commencement of the game, is not unnaturally that we find more work on our hands than we can easily arrange for.

In this way our method of managing a frontier province is diametrically different from that practised by our predecessors, the Sikhs, who, when they occupied a district even on a border, merely looked to the requisite facilities for collecting their own revenue, without the slightest reference to the safety of the villages from external aggression, except on a grand scale. The ordinary method, therefore, adopted by them was to build a small fort somewhere in the middle of the district, strong enough to hold out against its population, until relief could be afforded, and then to withdraw the large detachments to long distances, from whence, however, they could be rapidly moved up to prevent the entire loss of the district, from an inroad of the enemy. The result of this system was, of course, to leave the people of the country as much on their own resources as ever they had been before the district was annexed by a strong ruling power ; and, as long as their petty wars with their neighbours produced no injury to the Government

interests, there was little chance of their being noticed by it. Thus, the village communities retained their own wild laws and relations with their hill neighbours, and conducted matters in their own way, in doing which they were enabled to avail themselves of many means and measures which no Government could with any propriety sanction, some of which I shall notice presently. Well, this independence, though coupled with the necessity of paying a certain amount of revenue, and also of occasionally attending the neighbouring Kardar's court in judicial cases, was more palatable to the semi-barbarous inhabitants of many of the border villages than our system of complete subjection on one side, and sometimes rudely imposed assistance and protection on the other ; the result at any rate was that under the Sikh rule, partly from necessity and partly of free will, they retained their former warlike activity and watchfulness, and this they will not do under us who have not the philosophy of our predecessors to enable us to keep never-minding, when outrages are occurring on the border, but on the contrary feel it incumbent on us to render our protection when it is afforded as complete as possible, making ourselves answerable for every cow that is lifted, and distressing ourselves about accidents and offences which would be received with little emotion by a native Government, as it would consider such matters entirely the business of the village communities themselves. Two questions will naturally suggest themselves after what I have said, namely, that allowing that if Government troops are employed at all they must do all the work themselves, and not look for assistance from the village communities ; how it should happen that though better armed, drilled, and organized, they should find more difficulty in fully preserving the peace of the border than the village úlus did before they came on the stage ; and, secondly, whether I am of opinion that Government could revert to the Sikh or native system in the management of its border provinces ; or in case of our being led on into the hills and taking up new ground, whether we could adopt that mode of holding valleys in the hills. The nature of my explanation of the first difficulty will account in some

measure for an unfavourable reply to the second question.

There is no comparison whatever between the advantages possessed by a village population in its natural state, for resisting and punishing aggression, and those which fall to the lot of a small Government detachment which has assumed the task. The former, sons of the soil, numerous enough themselves, and probably having the sympathy of considerable bodies of men in neighbouring villages, thoroughly acquainted with the country, and with the strength, temper, ways, and means, &c., of their hereditary enemies, and probably having friendly relations with many classes and individuals living among them, have always been able to gain timely intelligence of any intention to annoy them, to band unanimously in sufficient numbers to resist it, and frequently to make a counter-attack, and punish the injury inflicted or meditated on themselves, and recover plundered property ; and in such cases, the population of the village of the plain had not to contend as we have with the whole hills, but merely with the immediate section of the hill tribe which had invaded its rights, and in fact, the distinction of hill-men and men of the plains was not so marked as at present : each community, whether inhabiting a village of the plains, or a tract in the hills, had its own particular relations with its neighbours, and if it failed in preserving a good understanding with them, had its own battle to fight, and could not expect to be backed in all quarrels by every section of the family to which the community belonged ; whole tribes of the hills, and whole communities in the plain districts, only moved when some grand question which interested the entire family was at issue, sections and villages settled their own quarrels among themselves either by war or council, and the rest of the tribe looked on, allowing each party free passage and any assistance required in effecting a peaceable arrangement ; and, further, a native community in the plains, at war with a section of a hill tribe, could take means of prosecuting the feud, which (and I have alluded to this subject before) could never be sanctioned by an overruling Government, but which were nevertheless most effective in their

way, such as assassination of individuals of the hostile tribe wherever found, and indiscriminate retaliation on property. Enabled as they were from long acquaintance with the men with whom they were dealing, and the power of gaining accurate intelligence to hunt out and waylay individuals and property belonging to their adversaries, and slaughter and plunder in full confidence of the blow being bitterly felt by the enemy, without apprehension that a transaction in common course of blood feud would necessarily bring down the remaining portions of the tribe upon them, it may be easily fancied that this was a species of warfare which carried conviction of insecurity and danger to a declared enemy, such as was not rashly to be encountered. It is this system which a Government could never sanction or imitate, which renders a comparatively weak body of men—whose abodes enable them to infest a pass—so formidable to classes or troops which they could not face for a moment in fair fight; and a system more difficult to deal with when opposed to open fighting, and law which only punishes the actual perpetrator of a crime, and that only on clear evidence can hardly be conceived. It may be easily understood, however, how very different must be the position of a small detachment of regular troops, relieved at intervals, composed of heterogeneous classes, having no permanent interest in the locality, known to act merely on the defensive as far as the frontier line is concerned, and the presence of which is known to be more or less distasteful to the community of the village in which they are quartered. Why, the natural result is, that they become an isolated body of men, few in numbers, and wanting even the sympathy of the very men whose property they are placed there to protect. They can but ill depend for this reason on information given them, lest the object should be to draw them away from the quarter really threatened, and the result is, that they can only look out for their own safety, or act against the enemy, when an open aggression has taken place.

With regard to the second point, then, namely, whether we could adopt the native mode of holding a border or hill district, I should say, decidedly, that we could not; in the first

place, because we would not sit by and allow a system of indiscriminate retaliation and assassination to be carried on by men who nominally owed us allegiance (nor should we, on the other hand, have a right to put a stop to it without affording the community in question that efficient protection which would supply its place to them); and, secondly, because there is another reason which would at all times render it more difficult for us to retain our influence over a village or province near which we did not quarter enough troops to awe it into obedience, than it would be for a native Government. Our name is respected, even revered by some of the wildest and most refractory of these men for our known wish to do justice to all, and our known enmity to tyranny, exaction, and oppression in any shape, while the power of our Government and armies is not in the least under-rated by them; but the very kindness and consideration on which this favourable opinion is grounded, prevents our displeasure being dreaded by these semi-barbarous men in the way that the once provoked enmity of a native Government would be; we are known too well as peaceable and lenient, not given to severe and revengeful punishments, anxious if possible to visit the consequences of an offence on the heads of the especial delinquents; and, lastly, prone, when a certain amount of punishment has been inflicted, to forget and forgive all that has happened, and let things go on as if the community had been a pattern of good behaviour from time immemorial. All this is, I believe, quite opposed to the usual conduct of native Governments under similar circumstances; for with them, when classes or individuals offended, they could never know what the extent of their punishment would be, when it would be inflicted, or when they could really count on the offence having been forgotten or expiated. The axiom that a Sikh never forgot or forgave an injury or slight was given me by an officer who had served with them the greater part of his life, and this principle was in some measure put in practice in squaring accounts with turbulent refractory communities. If offence was committed, it was pretty certain that some time or another, when it suited the convenience of Government, the delinquents would smart for it,

and such a knowledge had naturally more effect in influencing their half-enlighted minds than our peace-ensuing unvindictive mode of proceeding.

The result of my views, then, is, that we cannot make village communities pay us revenue and take care of themselves, and further, that we cannot hope for much assistance from them in the task of preserving peace on the frontier.

There are only two alternatives : one to farm districts to men of local influence, and allow them to keep up a certain body of troops on their own terms to protect the border ; the other to occupy the whole line with our detachments and posts, and play the whole game ourselves.

In speaking subsequently of the Elaquah of Tánk and the Western Khuttuk district, I shall have an opportunity of remarking on two instances of the former experiment which have come under my notice. Of the latter alternative I need say but little, as the subject has been, and will continue to be well studied and considered by more competent judges. What remarks it may appear to me worth while to offer will probably occur in writing on the border posts of the district. In this place I shall briefly mention the general

treatment I would recommend for the border tribes, premising my remarks by saying that it has always been my theory with regard to Pathans generally, that there is perhaps no class of men over whom a more singular influence can be obtained by an assiduous attention to their habits, wants, and troubles, by an officer who has leisure to devote to them, such leisure as Major Edwardes and myself had under the Resident previous to annexation, when the details of district management were carried on by the officials of the Sikh Government. Under that system we had no more interesting employment than to study the characters of every class of men in the district, listen to them, talk to them, and act as arbitrators or advisers in all their difficulties ; and, as far as my own case is concerned, I can truly say that I have never since possessed anything like the personal influence with the Wazírís which I then had. The difficulties entailed upon me by accounts, and the labours

attendant on first establishing new systems in a district, and afterwards learning their meaning and use myself, subsequently left me neither leisure nor temper sufficient for mixing freely with the people, and the result was, that I in a great measure lost the hold I had originally had upon all classes in Bunnú, so that I possessed less personal influence the last year than the first; but I have always held to the belief, that if a man have leisure to study the characters of the men of Paltran tribes, or communities under his charge, can make himself acquainted with individuals and show interest in their affairs, knowledge of their previous history and present position, as to feuds, &c., that he would generally be able to acquire an apparently wonderful amount of influence over them, and be able to control their conduct in a great measure for good. I had, as I have said myself, a great deal of this influence before annexation. Soon after that event the Wazírís and others found that I had no leisure as of yore for talking over their affairs, and left off coming to me, attributing the change, as I heard at the time, to the fact of our then having secured our hold on the country, and taking no further interest in their petty affairs; implying, in other words, that our previous care and kindness had merely been exerted to court popularity on interested grounds.

As my acquaintance with them diminished, my influence also declined, and I attributed several of the difficulties which subsequently occurred, both in Bunnú and on the lower border, to my not having been able to find time to interest myself in the case, and exert care and time in healing growing sores before they reached a dangerous pitch. The first thing I should recommend, then, is, that the officer entrusted with the political management of the border tribes should as much as possible be left free to move about among the people, and, if I may use the expression, waste some time in receiving them and talking over their affairs, and apparently interesting himself in matters of merely ephemeral importance, but which his having been a party to may on some other more important occasion greatly increase his influence. This sort of exertion can only be expected from a man whose mind is at ease about other district affairs; at least the man who



could do it in the half hour spared him from accounts, magisterial duties, and other pressing matters, must be differently constituted from myself, though I would yield to none in the hearty wish to make all dependant on me contented and comfortable. I am confident, however, that nothing will so far further the ends of Government as this, ensuring that the political officer have leisure to study the men and tribes on his border ; for the rest he must act to the best of his judgment, be kind and considerate without being ostentatiously conciliatory, treat the Government demands, whatever they may be, as a black necessity over which he has no control, but to meet which he is anxious in a private way to assist all parties to the utmost of his ability ; he must be firm in not losing sight of offenders till they have formally appeared in court. He should carefully avoid rough over-bearing language, and never threaten more than he intends to perform ; for, if the fulfilment fall short of the promise, no class of men will more acutely compare the two, and draw an inference from the result which may finally lead them on to their own ruin ; change of purpose or a disposition to relent on the part of the managing officer having been mistaken for weakness in himself or his Government. Above all should the officer turn a studiously deaf ear to all hints or suggestions of the necessity or expediency of providing by money allowance or otherwise, for individuals or classes on the border, on the score that they may otherwise give trouble. If ever such an arrangement be really expedient, which is not often the case, it should come from the officer himself after a most careful and leisurely consideration of the case. I am certainly an advocate for making leading characters, who are our own ryots, comfortable, but even this should be cautiously set about, and come as a spontaneous act on the part of the civil officer, but suggestions of the propriety of pensioning and providing for individuals or classes who have no interest in the soil, and no claim of long standing on Government, should not be listened to for one moment. I have not much to pride myself on in my administration of the district, but one thing does yield me satisfactory reflection, and that is, that though it was my fate to pass

through a period of considerable turmoil and difficulty in the district, in only one instance, namely, that of Swahn Khan, did I advocate a grant of money to an individual or class of doubtful fealty, and the boon I obtained for Swahn Khan was in accordance with a promise made to him by my predecessor ;\* but I have on every occasion quietly but firmly resisted every attempt to obtain money allowances or undue advantages for doubtful or turbulent characters like Munzur Khan of the Hattí Khail, Kutál Khan Sheorání, and others, though they were frequently made.

Several requests were preferred by the Thull Wazírís, to be made custodians of the Luttummur road, receiving of course an allowance from Government for the duty, but I always steadily resisted any proposition of the sort, knowing the evils to which it would inevitably lead ; and, though the Thull road has always caused much anxiety and trouble, especially when it became necessary to forward kafilahs of supplies by it to the detachments of the Khuttuk country, it has still, I am sure, given less annoyance than if, to save the necessity of constant care in the matter of escorts, &c., I had thrown its protection into the hands of the Wazírís.

Kutál Khan Sheorání had failed for the second or third time in an attempt to negotiate an arrangement of the sort, by which, according to his own proposal, he was to receive an allowance, and his son be entertained as an officer of horsemen, and earn both advantages by keeping his clansmen in order, when he made his last raid into the Government lands, and met his death by the hand of Gholam Ali Khan Kholachí. Had Kutál Khan lived I have no doubt but that he would have given a good deal of trouble ; and characters like him, who cannot get paid to be quiet, will doubtless do the same to the best of their power ; but nothing that they can do will be as injurious to the interests of Government as the admission of the system of allowancing men who have no immediate connection with the soil would be, specially as it has

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\* This grant was, however, in every way appropriate to Swahn Khan, the leading man of the Wazírí clan in Bunnú, possessor of considerable lands himself, and agent for the Government revenue on the extensive cultivation of his clansmen. He has, moreover, always been a loyal and useful subject.

not hitherto existed in the district. I do not consider the case of the villages under the Sheoraní hills, which still pay a certain share of the produce to the Sheoranís, an exception to this, as that is by an old arrangement a remnant of border politics, when cultivators of the plain wished to break up land under the hills, the produce of which they knew perfectly well that neither their own strength, that of their village, nor the name of a distant, and in such matters indifferent, Government could protect from violence on the part of their neighbours in the hills. In such a case, as also in allowancing men not our immediate ryots, I would always permit long existing custom to weigh strongly in favour of a continuance of the provision ; what I would always deprecate is the originating of any fresh grants of the kind.

As part of this subject I would advise that no overtures from individuals beyond our border be entertained. The orders of Government have been issued with reference to such communications from members of foreign governments, but they might not be considered to extend to petty chiefs, heads of tribes, &c. ; but, as I have said before, I would strongly advise that any communications of the sort should be at once civilly but unfavourably answered. During my residence in the district, the Torí Bungush, the Sahíbzádá of Khost, the Kanígorum and Shingí Wazírís, and Kutál Khan Sheoraní, have made distinct overtures of the kind alluded to, and to one and all I have always returned the same answer, namely, that I was gratified to hear of their kindly disposition towards my Government, &c. ; that they were, of course, free to come and go with others in the country, and that I should always be glad to see and talk with them if they came to visit me ; but beyond that their lands and position being without our border, there could be no connection or communication between us.

These advances are entirely in accordance with ordinary native policy, the object being, I believe, in some instances, merely to obtain a friendly answer from the English officer, to be shown on some future occasion to the leaders of an English army if the country should fall into our hands ; in others, to prepare the way for the eternal request for a pen-

sion or money-allowance, which an Afghan can make without the remotest shadow of a claim from past services rendered, or any clear prospect of future ones to come. The effect of all such communications with men beyond our border is bad, unsettling the minds of our neighbours generally, and inclining them to doubt the sincerity of our assertions, that we have no wish to advance our border line, while it would no doubt have a tendency to render the Kabul Government suspicious and uneasy, and make it cast about for ways of annoying us which it would otherwise not think of employing. One expedient of the sort which is within its reach, and would cost but little expense or trouble, I will mention, for instance, and that is by commissioning mischievous characters to stir up the border tribes against us; for, strange as it may seem, the Kabul Government, though utterly unable to control these tribes for good, could at any time find a heap of idle hands ready to join in projects of mischief, for little more than the love of the thing. So, in my opinion, the less we have to do with even empty complimentary communications with individuals or classes in the hills the better, as supposing it possible we could be induced to attempt serious intrigue, we should find the, to all appearance, weak influence of the Kabul Government more than we could cope with among these very tribes that have time out of mind repudiated its authority.

I must briefly notice the matter of apprehension of offenders where they belong to border tribes or village communities of doubtful loyalty; and, with regard to such cases, I have always followed the plan of making the seizures direct. I at first tried to make use of Swahn Khan and the other Mulliks in such matters, but soon found it was of no use depending on them, and rather foresaw that in the end it would lead to the Mulliks themselves getting into trouble, and perhaps being obliged to fly to the hills. The fact is that the Mulliks and influential men of tribes could not and would not face the obloquy and enmity which would be entailed upon them by their becoming the means of delivering up members of the family to justice, and rather than do it they would (when the civil officer rejected the whole train of ingenious excuses of the delinquent having fled to the hills or taken refuge in

another tribe, &c.) remove bodily to their ready refuge in all difficulties, their mountain home, and give up all connection with Bunnú; and thus Government would lose good, useful, and respectable subjects, and the civil officer be not one whit nearer the attainment of his object, namely, the apprehension of the original offenders. The best plan, then, I believe to be for the officer to ascertain in his own way, as nearly as he can, where the man sought or some member of his family is, and either take or send a party of horse, under an intelligent officer, sufficient to overawe resistance and seize the parties,—the real offender if possible; if not, some of their relatives, or one or more men of the tribe to which he belongs. When the latter alternative, which is, however, if possible to be avoided, is adopted, the relatives of the captured parties will generally either force the real defendant to surrender himself, or point out where he really is, so as to enable the Government officer to lay hands on him. I have never known this mode of proceeding opposed or obstructed by the Mulliks; on the contrary, I have often made efficient use of them by laying hands on them on the spot, and making them point out the offenders sought or their relations; this they can do then, as they appear to their fellows to be under constraint and unable to help themselves. It must, however, be remembered, that there is always some danger of resistance, and a scene ensuing such as occurred between Major Edwardes' party and the Nassurs. The approach to a kirrí should be made unexpectedly, but not too rapidly so as to create alarm, and the main strength of the party should be halted at a little distance in good order, ready for action, and clear of the first confusion that would ensue if resistance were attempted. If a native officer be employed it should be one of known sense and intelligence, acquainted with Pushtú and Pathans. I almost invariably went about these matters myself, and have never experienced any difficulty; on some occasions, when I was not present, evasion and insolence, and in one instance, resistance was shown, which, of course, necessitated more serious measures subsequently to punish the parties. If the European officer be present, all know well that there can be no mistake in the matter, and that what is required will be done without

taunt or roughness, while all are also well aware of the serious consequences that must ensue if the immediate ruler be resisted.

I shall conclude these remarks on the treatment I would recommend for the border tribes by declaring myself a decided advocate for allowing the men of the hills to mix freely with all classes in the plain, cultivate lands in the plain district wherever they possess them, attend our markets, &c. I have seen the best possible effects from the system, and though it involves some difficulties and drawbacks, I feel certain that the eventual result will be far more satisfactory to us than if we were to attempt to effect a separation between the classes of the hills and plains, and confine the former to their mountain homes; far better that they should wander through our well-stocked bazaars, talk with strange merchants, acquire a taste for clean clothes, roofed houses, and sweetmeats, and experience the advantages of a warm market themselves, by finding a ready sale for their own cattle, tobacco, and other hill produce, than that they should be shut up in the hills to gaze on the luxuriant but indifferently protected valleys of the plain, and with no better employment than to plan highway robbery and assassination, if not more active hostility. The arguments against allowing the hill-men free access to the plains are, first, that it gives them the vast advantage I have before noticed of acquiring accurate information concerning localities, and all transactions, in the plain below them; and, further, that it affords such facilities to bad characters of all sorts, whether really belonging to the hills or not, for carrying out plans of highway robbery or revengeful assassination; for the Wazirís and other strangers being allowed free access to the country, every crime that is committed is conveniently attributed to them, and the general difficulties of detection in criminal cases are thereby much increased. These are, I allow, great evils; but though they can, I believe, be truly traced to the cause mentioned, still I am not of opinion that it would be remedied by an attempt to exclude the classes of the hills from all intercourse with the plains. It will be very long before we shall establish a frontier line that could not be passed by

individuals or small parties night or day, and an attempt to make outside barbarians of the mass of men inhabiting the hills, would make literally thousands of men who now pursue peaceful avocations our active enemies, while at present we have only to deal with gangs of evil-disposed men recruited frequently from both hills and plains. It is, however, useless to discuss this question with reference to the Bunnú valley, where, as you are aware, the Wazírís have good valid claims to the soil, and at one season of the year form nearly a fifth of the population, and are so mixed up with the classes of the plain that it would be impossible to separate them by any method short of a general ejection from rights and possessions of many years standing, and such as we have formally recognized.

The measure alluded to might be more feasible on the Tánk and Sheoraní border, but would there also be, in my opinion, far from expedient. It is by all means our policy to employ the hill-men, secure the means of observing them and becoming acquainted with their habits, mode of thinking, &c.; and, lastly, to do all in our power to soften their manners and dispositions by bringing them constantly in contact with a more advanced state of civilization than their own; and the accomplishment of all these objects is best to be hoped for from allowing them to come and go freely, and, if they fancy it, settle in our territories.

My recommendations are very pacific and conciliatory you will perceive. I am aware of it, and they will be so throughout. Violence and coercion are at times most necessary and beneficial, but they should be resorted to only when other means have failed. The less bloodshed the better chance there will be of peaceful amalgamation, and the growth of a friendly good understanding. It is also partly from prudent motives that I recommend a cautious, mild, but firm line of conduct as the one best calculated to ensure us against sudden and injurious retrogressions in the game, which, though a petty one, not materially affecting the safety or even general tranquillity of our possessions, is yet difficult and important in its way.

I must refer you to two reports of mine, one on the Wazírís of Bunnú, and the other on the frontier line generally, written in March 1850, copies of

The Wazírí tribe on the Bunnú border.

which you will find in your office, for a full history of the conduct of the various sections of the Wazírí tribe connected with Bunnú, from the period of our occupation of the valley up to the date of the letters in question. In them you will find a fully detailed account of the nature of our quarrel with the Omerzai Wazírís, and portions of the Hattí Kheyl and Mahomed Kheyl tribes. I shall here notice the general conduct of the sections and individuals subsequent to that date, and mention the present position and prospects of each, bringing such individuals to your notice for their good or bad qualities, as it may appear to me advisable that you should be made acquainted with.

I should first remark that I have a considerable respect and liking for the Wazírí character, the distinguishing features of which are very much what they were forty years ago, when Mr. Elphinstone wrote of them, as he states, "on hearsay"—"They are remarkable for their peaceable conduct among themselves, and have neither wars between clans nor much private dissension. Though they are notorious plunderers, the smallest escort secures a traveller a hospitable reception throughout the whole tribe. . . . Their manners are haughty and their voices loud and commanding, but they are gentle and good-tempered in their intercourse with their guests and with each other. Such is their veracity, that if there is a dispute about a stray goat, and one party will say it is his and confirm his assertion by stroking his beard, the other instantly gives it up without suspicion of fraud." Though Major Edwardes has taken exception to this last paragraph, I should say that altogether nothing could be more truthful than these passages. The Wazírís are undoubtedly the most unanimous of all the Afghán tribes that we are acquainted with; they never quarrel among themselves, safe-guards are always respected by them; and though, as Mr. Elphinstone says, proverbially addicted to plundering, I have known large bodies of them live from one year's



end to another without falling into any impropriety of the kind; and, with regard to their veracity, as the quotation given above merely extends to their conduct to one another, and as every quarrel among them is settled by arbitration and discussion, and as I never heard a Wazírí complain of another Wazírí having robbed or defrauded him, I consider the eulogy in a great degree correct and deserved. The possession of such an extent of virtue would not, however, make it incumbent on them to adhere to truth in their dealings with Bunnúchís, Khuttuks, or the Government officials, the duties towards such being quite another affair in Wazírí ethics.

The Wazírí tribe is nomadic, depending chiefly for support on flocks and herds which a few individuals of the family can watch; and such being the case, that is, there being in every kirrí\* so many muscular lusty hands unemployed, it has always been a matter of some surprise to me that they do not prove more mischievous than they are wont to. As it is, if it were not that in Bunnú they find more active employment than elsewhere, in the salt trade, carrying fuel to market for sale, and working on their lands, we should probably find them more troublesome than we do; but take them for all in all, they are a fine race of men, prone to plunder and careless about blood-shedding it may be, but bold, plain-spoken, true to their friends, and not usually treacherous in their mode of prosecuting hostility to their enemies, for men in this aboriginal state must not be too severely judged for using assassination of individuals as a regular means of warfare, as in their eyes it is no more than harassing an army by cutting up its straggling parties or shooting its videttes. I never remember to have heard of a Wazírí, or body of Wazírís, enticing an enemy into their power by false overtures and then wreaking their vengeance on him, nor of their undertaking to guide or guard a man or kaflah† through their country and then falling on it. I wish I could say as much in either case for the Bunnúchís or other Afghán tribes of my acquaintance who pretend to higher

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\* Kirrí is a camp of black tents.

† Caravan.

civilization, and who would speak of the Wazírís as ignorant savages, or, as the often used expression is, *animals*.

The Wazírís are numerically on a par with the Afrídís, but there is no comparison whatever between their characters. When a Wazírí lets blood, there is generally either some semi-political object or private revenge at the bottom of it, and they do not usually rob or murder strangers ; but an Afrídí has so natural a relish for violence, that no clear prospect of gain and permanent advantage is sufficient to ensure his keeping his hands off a traveller when he arrives at that unexceptionable spot in the old family durrah, where wayfaring parties have usually been dealt with. The opportunity, locality, the ravishing edge of his chúra, and the prospect of taking something in the shape of property by violence, form temptations which some of the more elderly characters who have had their day and sown their wild oats might be able to resist, but which few young Afrídís would be likely to struggle against successfully. Now the character of the Wazírí *animal*, as a Kabulí or Peshawarí would not scruple to call him, is quite opposed to this. I have observed several instances where my own subordinates had acquired such perfect confidence in the good faith of the Wazírís, that they were willing to go anywhere among them on the safeguard of the Mulliks. Among the men now with you, Nourung Khan, Gundapore ; Dín Mahomed Khan, one of Gholam Hussun Khan's retainers ; Súltan Muhmúd Khan, Thannadar, and Rozí Khan, a retainer of the Esá Kheyl Khan's, have at times been thus employed. Major Edwardes' old spy, Nízamúdín, whom you may remember by name, used to live for weeks together with the Bukí Kheyl Wazírís when I was pressing them for revenue. I sometimes remonstrated with him on the risk to his throat incurred by the proceeding, but he always replied that he could fully trust the safeguard of the Mulliks ; and so I believe he could.

A more singular instance perhaps was that Bazíd Khan, the main cause of the Omerzai quarrel, and whose life they have often sworn to take, went several times into

the hills and stayed there for some days at a time, discussing the feud with the Omerzais and other Wazírís.

The loud talking alluded to by Mr. Elphinstone, which is a perfectly correct trait, is the quality I should be most inclined to object to in the Wazírí character. There is no denying that they are inclined to be boastful and rough in council, but for this allowances must be made, when we consider that, until we came in contact with them in Bunnú, they had never paid revenue to any Government, and have never been anything but what they still are in their own hills, a thoroughly independent body of between twenty and thirty thousand fighting-men, at peace among themselves, and at war with some of the strongest tribes in the country. I remember a characteristic story illustrating the estimation in which the Wazírí spirit of independence has always been held in Afghánistán, which was told me by one of the young Barakzai Sirdars, which was to the effect that one of the kings of Kabul having had an argument with one of his officers about the Wazírí character, the officer maintaining that the spirit of independence was too strongly implanted in them to admit of their ever submitting to Government, was resolved to try the experiment, and either summoned or captured a Wazírí chief and had him brought before him when sitting in full durbar in great state and circumstance; the king desired the Wazírí to make formal and final submission to Government, which the other, confounded by all he saw for the first time in his life, accordingly did, and was removed for the time, the king proceeding to twit the officer of state on his mistaken views of the case; the officer confessed himself surprised, but begged that the king would on another occasion call the man in and make him repeat his professions, standing on some of the soil of his native hills, to which the king consented, and some soil from the mountains of the tribe having been procured and placed on the spot where the prisoner would stand to repeat his submission, the result was that he broke out into open rebellious language, and bearded the king in the middle of his court. The fiction is significant and somewhat poetical. I have heard many stories supposed

to illustrate the charge of barbarism in religion, &c., freely made by the more polished Afgháns against the Wazírís, and to which I have before alluded. One I remember was of a Wazírí, who, after an earthquake, said that he really now had some idea that there was a God, since he had seen him shake so much earth at once. Mr. Elphinstone tells a story of a Wazírí joining in conversation in the middle of his prayers. I have heard another somewhat to the same effect, of a Wazírí who when engaged in his devotions, heard the alarm cry that a kafilah of merchants was approaching, upon which he left his prayers, went and joined in the attack and plunder of the kafilah; and, returning with his share of the booty, entered the mosque and completed the unfinished balance of his prayers. Some of the by-standers, who were much scandalized by this conduct, reproved him sharply for it, asking how he could dare to leave his prayers for so unhallowed a purpose, and then return and finish them; he replied that he had been instructed that it was not good to pray when you had any worldly care or matter on your mind; and, if by chance you found it impossible to prevent your thoughts dwelling on it, it was better to leave your prayers for the time, go and get the worldly matter settled, and then return with an undistracted mind to your devotions. Now, in his own case, he said, that do what he would he could not have helped thinking of the kafilah, and therefore he had deemed it advisable to go and clear scores with that before finishing his prayers. The veneration for zíaruts or holy shrines is common to all Afgháns. The tomb of a holy man is a blessing to its neighbourhood; all property placed near it is safe from theft, travellers encamping near it are safe from injury; and even the avenger of blood must spare his victim if he take refuge at the zíarut—in fact the more thickly the bodies of saints are sown about in a wild and troubled neighbourhood, the more feasible does it become to travel or reside in it. It was, I believe, to your brother that a Fakír in the Derah district said that syuds and holy men did not fancy travelling in the Wazírí country, as they (the Wazírís) were in the habit of killing them to make shrines of them. I mention the idea because it is humorous

and of a piece with the unfavourable stories I have above related ; but I reject the whole charge contained in this latter story as a gross libel against the Wazírís.

It was undoubtedly a terrible fall in life for the Wazírís, being obliged to submit to have their lands measured and then pay away a fixed share of the produce to Government ; and I occasionally conceded to them the privilege of talking loud as some slight indemnification for the annoyance. The Mulliks and leading men who were in the habit of visiting me, however, had become much less rough and uncouth, both in manners and appearance, than they were at first. In the matter of dress indeed the change that has taken place among the mushírs or leading men of the Wazírí tribes since we first came in contact with them is very remarkable, and promises well for the future. When a man becomes in some measure careful about his dress, it is a sign that he feels that he has a certain position in civilized society to fill and dress up to, and he will, therefore, always have an assailable point when the duties and qualities of that grade are the subject of discussion. With regard to this you will find it a good plan if the Mulliks do not come cleanly dressed to see you, to put them on the ground or stone floor, while others in better garb are allowed a rug or carpet. I have known the best effects from a little discipline of this kind ; a man thus made the laughing stock (for such is the effect) of his fellows will always take care to come better dressed the next time.

One other fact connected with my general mode of dealing with the Wazírís I may mention here, though from difference of constitution, manner, &c., you may not think the hint of any importance to yourself. Major Edwardes bequeathed to me the custom of receiving the Wazírí Mulliks in large be vies, headed by Swahn Khan or some chief of influence among them. They were allowed to sit round the tent or room in a ring much as they would at one of their own councils, and any order that was given or proposal made was fully discussed as in their own jirgah, and the heads of each tribe proceeded to deliver their opinions on the point at issue ; and, if opposed to the proposition, to argue the matter

with the presiding officer with all the ingenuity and acuteness, sharpened by long practice in such discussions, which they possess. This was all very well with Major<sup>3</sup> Edwardes, who could always hold his own in the debate and turn the argument, or failing that, the laugh against the best orators of the kizhdí,\* but I was more easily non-plussed and confounded by some of their very home arguments, retorts, queries, &c. ; and, surrounded by numerous indifferent or not over well affected spectators, who rather enjoyed the joke, I have at times found that the Wazírí conclave had the best of it. I also observed, that, though there was much talking, there was little business done on these occasions, and also that men like Swahn Khan and others, who were willing enough to work for Government at other times, always sided ostentatiously with their countrymen on these occasions, and lived in a perfect halo of applause from them for the truly noble and Wazírí sentiments of which they delivered themselves, the same being entirely in opposition to their every-day language, to the interests of Government, and to the real interests of their tribesmen, as being calculated to impede the great object in view, namely, to induce the whole family to bow quietly to the yoke, and prevent by orderly good conduct the necessity of resuming their lands and ejecting them from their grazing grounds. For these reasons, though myself liking the principle of receiving them in bodies, and hearing all they had to say, I found it more advisable to summon the heads of each section at a time, tell them what was wanted, receive their opinions, and either direct the thing to be done at once or dismiss them with the intention of consulting others first. In this way I found that I encountered less opposition to reforms, and arrived at the opinions of all parties unobscured by oratory with more rapidity.

As an instance of their natural quickness in reply, I shall conclude with relating an answer that I received on one occasion myself from a Wazírí Mullik at one of their jirgahs. Part of the council had requested leave to say their prayers, which had been granted, and they were performing

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\* The black tent in which the Wazírís live.

their devotions in the verandah of the tent, while I carried on a desultory conversation with the remainder. Looking at the men praying, I said to the chief, that it was a pity that men who were so particular in their religious observances should be so careless about some of the cardinal virtues advocated by all religions, such as speaking the truth, so that the very men who were then on their knees would presently come before me and not scruple to attempt to deceive me about their crops, revenue, &c. The Mullik replied immediately, that it might be so ; I was no doubt correct ; there was probably some radical defect in their religious conduct, as God had thought fit to confer a Hakim\* on them after so many ages of independence.

The Wazírís connected with Bunnú may be divided into two classes, namely, those who cultivate on the northern side and Thull, and those settled on the

General conduct of the various sections of the tribe.

south-western border ; the former are the Ahmedzai family, the latter are Otmanzais. The chief tribes of the Ahmedzais are as follows :—The Hattí Kheyl, Súdun Kheyl, Mohmand Kheyl, Bízund Kheyl, Sirkí Kheyl, Omerzai, Paenduh Kheyl, and Bodín Kheyl. Of these the Omerzais are

Since our occupation of the valley.

at present ejected from Bunnú, and their lands are sown for Government. The original cause of quarrel you will be well acquainted with from the account of it given in my former report, since the writing of which the Omerzais have several times made overtures with a view of obtaining pardon for their offences, and permission to return to their lands ; but though I have, in accordance with instructions received from the Board of Administration on such occasions, prescribed what might be considered under the circumstances lenient terms for them, they have never been able to agree among themselves about accepting them. The terms I was empowered after reference to offer to them, were to pay a fine, restore plundered property, and give good security for future good conduct. For a long time the Omerzais had a number of their tribe prisoners in our hands, these

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\* A Governor, meaning "to subject them to a Government."

were men that were seized on the day that they as a tribe absconded to the hills. It was part of the terms offered them, that when they had fulfilled the proposed articles the prisoners should be released; but, owing to want of unanimity, they were unable to raise the proposed fine, 700 rupees, at once, while at the same time I was aware that the relations of the majority of the prisoners were ready to pay their share of the fine. I, therefore, as it was an object to us to get rid of them, divided the amount of fine over the eleven prisoners, and gave notice to the Omerzais, that on the required eleventh share of 700 rupees being paid for any of the prisoners, he would be released. This was gradually accomplished for all but one man, whose friends were not, I suppose, prepared to ransom him. At any rate his case was still unsettled when the Omerzais, in November 1850, banded with the Mahsúd Wazírís and made an attack on the out-post in the Sheoraní tuppahs, and were driven back from it with considerable loss, since which the unhappy prisoner has remained in hopeless imprisonment. On a subsequent occasion, when the Omerzais again sued for terms, I put their fine at the amount of the remaining sum due for the last hostage, the rest having in fact been realized, but at the same time refused to receive his ransom, unless it was the distinct wish of the tribe to obtain pardon, make peace, and give security for the future. The fact is that the Omerzais suffer very heavy pecuniary loss yearly by being out of possession of their Bunnú lands, besides losing the advantages of a grazing ground on the Thull, and the power of trading in our markets. I should recommend that they be allowed to make their peace on any fitting occasion when they may again sue for terms, and that Government should not be too hard with them in the matter of terms; and I should also recommend that the first opportunity be taken for releasing the prisoner still in our hands. The Omerzais have certainly not made a very good thing of their opposition to Government, having lost about 3,000 rupees yearly by their crops, and having had a considerable number of men killed and wounded since the commencement of hostilities.

The Omerzais number about three hundred men. The chief Mulliks of the tribe are, Mír Sullam, Muddut, Mehrab,



Mangh, Atul, &c. ; their lands are, you are as aware, chiefly in Bazíd Khan's tuppah, near the new post in front of the Gúmuttí pass ; they also possessed a portion of the Sudarawan tract bordering on the Jhundú Kheyl tuppah.

The two Spirkai tribes of Súdán Kheyl and Mohmand Kheyl, numbering together about one thousand men, have continued to behave well, especially the former, which has never given any trouble. Swahn Khan may be said to be the head of the Súdán Kheyl, though he is really only the Mullik of a small section of the tribe ; but, being the most influential Wazírí in Bunnú, he naturally heads the whole family of Súdán Kheyl, and has always kept them in admirable order. I have given a full opinion of Swahn Khan in my former report, and have seen no reason to change it ; he is at present, I think, thoroughly disposed to be loyal and content with what he has received.

A part of the Mohmand Kheyl under Ulmur Khan were concerned in the first attack on the Sheoraní tuppahs, as described in my first report ; the rest of the tribe have behaved well, paid their revenue regularly, and refrained from plundering. Khaní Khan, brother of Múrsil Khan, formerly head of the tribe, may be looked upon as the leading man of the Mohmand Kheyl ; he is a shrewd, intelligent individual, of quiet insinuating address, not a safe man, but very useful, and at times active in the Government interests ; he has several times given me good useful information when attacks were threatened from the hills.

The Hattí Kheyl is a strong and important tribe, numbering one thousand men, and occupying a rather distant position from our head-quarters at Bunnú, which makes them more difficult to control. The Hattí Kheyl cultivate lands on the Thull under the Burghonuttú and Chushmeh springs, and also in the neighbourhood of Júr. Their grazing grounds extends from Burghonuttú on the one side to near Zerkai in the Khuttuk range on the opposite side of the valley. The Hattí Kheyl employ themselves very much in the salt trade, and are not by any means an ill-disposed tribe generally, but they have so many idle hands, that it is not wonderful that some mischievous characters should be

found among them ; but their misdeeds are generally confined to cattle-stealing. The chief Mulliks of the tribe are Azím Khan, Belluch Khan, Heibut, Sullor, Zumturrah, Munzur, Shumadí Khojah Mír, &c.

Azím Khan is the most influential and useful man of the number ; and, though a wild rough brigand of a fellow, he has on many occasions shown a decided good-will towards Government, and has made himself actively useful in collecting Government revenue, settling disputes, &c. Belluch is a quiet man, well-disposed, but of little influence. Khojah Mír is a bold, shrewd, energetic little man, but too much occupied with his quarrels with the Powindahs to attend to the Government affairs, and this leads me to notice a very difficult class of case, which you will not unfrequently have brought before you, namely, where Powindah merchants come into court and claim camels as their property, which are at the time standing in Wazírí kirrís. In these cases I have always refused to listen to any claim which was not founded on the fact of the camels having been stolen from the Powindahs, when encamped within our territory. The Powindahs and Wazírís, as all the world knows, are bitter enemies, and being both powerful tribes there is little to choose between them as to who oppresses and who is oppressed ; it is not, therefore, fair to allow the Powindahs the use of the law in obtaining redress for loss inflicted on them in fair warfare in the hills. I had a case of this sort before me a short time before I left, in which the Mullik above mentioned, Khojah Mír, was the defendant. In the course of the enquiry, I was pressing him rather hard to make some restitution to the Powindahs, saying that he ought to be ashamed to make so much ado about a few head of camels, when I had seen about three hundred head of camels, his own property, in his kirrí only the year before. He looked up quietly and said, " Ah, you saw those camels, did you not ? a fine lot ; well, I have not ten of them left, the rest are all standing in the Powindah kirrís. Under the restriction laid down, the plaintiffs always take care to declare that the camels were stolen within the Government limits, and the test for ascertaining the correctness of this assertion is

to enquire whether notice was given at the nearest thannah or out-post at the time of the loss, a question which can always be cleared up by reference to the thannahdar's diary, or the officer in charge of the post. Munzur Khan, of the Hattí Kheyl, formerly owned the land under the little chushmí on the Thull, where he had a small mud fort. This Mullik never came in either to Major Edwardes or myself; but, fearing to remain in the country, relinquished his land on the Thull and removed to the hills behind the Chunghozeh pass, where he has always since lived, assisting occasionally in the attacks made on the Government lands. But he has not moved at all for a long time now; and, like the Omerzais, he has, I fancy, rather wearied of a game from which no profit but considerable injury was to be reaped.

The lands of the Sirkí Kheyl tribe are in the neighbourhood of Júr. You will find an account in my first report of the offence committed by this tribe in conjunction with part of the Hattí Kheyl, in the first year of our occupation, and of the fine levied on them in consequence; since that period they have behaved well. They number about two hundred and fifty men. The chief Mulliks are Lall Mir and Murwut; the former is an intelligent and tolerably well-disposed man.

The Paenduh Kheyl and Bodín Kheyl are two small tribes that have always acted implicitly under Swahn Khan's orders. The head man of the Paenduh Kheyl is Zuwer, and that of the Bodín Kheyl, Lughman. The lands of these two tribes are mixed up with those of the Spirkai on the Dhum-mai Thull.

The Bízund Kheyl is a very well behaved respectable tribe. The chief Mulliks are Sullat and Sheikh Peob. The Bízund Kheyl also cultivate some land in a valley within the hills called Ping, which lies to the north of the Gúmuttí pass between that and Bhurghonuttú, but with this we have, of course, no concern. This tribe has never joined in any act of opposition to Government, and I have always looked upon them as a very respectable body of men.

The above are the Ahmedzai tribes. I have not thought it necessary to give the minor divisions of each tribe, because

they are fully detailed in my former report.

The Otmanzais, whose lands and grazing grounds lie on the south-western border of Bunní, are divided into two large tribes, the Bukí Kheyl numbering one thousand men, and the Janí Kheyl about four hundred. The Bukí Kheyl have some land on the left bank of the Tochí river, on the very edge of the Bunnochí cultivation; they have also a considerable tract of cultivation on the right bank of the Tochí, and their grazing grounds extend from the Great Baram water-course opposite the Mundí Koneh pass into Dour, to the lands of the Janí Kheyl, near Walí.

The Bukí Kheyl have always been an excessively well behaved tribe; have always paid their revenue regularly, and have not only refrained from theft and plunder themselves, but have always refused a road to the evil-disposed through their kirrís. There are three minor sub-divisions of the Bukí Kheyl, which, as they are a good deal separated from one another, I shall mention distinctly, namely, the Tuktí Kheyl, whose lands lie on the edge of the Merí tuppahs on the north bank of the Tochí and round the Tochí out-post, and below it opposite the Mudun tuppah on the south bank. The chief Mulliks of the section are Duddur, son of Khanazad, deceased, Ján Bahadúr, or, as he is usually called, Ján Bud-dur and Adíl Shah. Duddur is a particularly respectable, well-behaved man, as his father was before him; the other two are also good useful men. The Surdí Kheyl is the second sub-division; their lands lie in the centre of the large Thull between the Tochí out-post and the Janí Kheyl lands. The chief Mullik is a Sirdar, a good man, active and useful, but not possessing much authority in the tribe. Reza Khan has influence, but is not much disposed to use it for good. Wazír, of whom I do not know much, and Ghassím, not a very fine character, who has been deprived of all power by Sirdar and the rest of the tribe.

The third division is the Nurmí Kheyl, whose lands join those of the Surdí Kheyl; the chief Mulliks are Nowaz Khan and Tazí Khan, the first is the only one that I am at all acquainted with, and he has always conducted himself well.

When I say that the Bukí Kheyl have never given trouble, I use an incorrect expression, for they have at times given me an infinity of trouble and annoyance, and have occasionally been guilty of mutinous and improper acts, such as turning off the water from the Mírí tuppahs, declining to pay their revenue, &c.; but on these occasions I have always treated them like children, sometimes putting several of the Mulliks into confinement for several days, until the rest of the tribe came in a humble way to obtain forgiveness and sue for the release of their Mulliks, obtaining which, they would, after a friendly conversation with me (in which they would laugh much at the imprudence and uselessness of their whole conduct) go off to their kirrís in high good humour, as if they had rather cleverly adjusted a difficult affair, not at all attributable to their own folly or misconduct in the first instance.

The Janí Kheyl are a less well-conditioned tribe than the Bukí Kheyl. Their position is very distant from our Bunnú head-quarters, they have always been at feud with the men of the Músa Kheyl tuppah of Murwut, and they are naturally addicted to cow-lifting and theft of all sorts. However, they have always paid their revenue, and on the whole have given very little trouble. The chief Mulliks are Shahbaz Khan, Alladad Khan, Ruza Khan and Shiewan; the three first are good men, the last is a rather refractory and turbulent character.

The above are all the Wazírí tribes that have any direct connection with Bunnú, by cultivating lands or occupying grazing grounds within our border; of those beyond our boundary the following are the most important, namely, the Mahsúds and Toroe Kheyl on the south-western border, and the Kabul Kheyl, Khojul Kheyl, Gungí Kheyl, Hussein Kheyl, and Tazí Kheyl, on the northern side.

The Mahsúd is the most powerful among the Wazírí tribes. They inhabit a large tract of the hills west of the Ghubbur mountain, which stands between the Bunnú and Tánk valley. They have always been noted as a great fighting tribe. I believe that for any great movement in which the whole tribe were interested they could muster ten thousand fighting-men with ease, while half that number could be turned out tho-

roughly equipped with matchlocks, &c. The country they inhabit is five Afghan marches from the Bunnú border, but they on one occasion, at the instigation of the Omerzais, made the whole distance in so short a time, that they were within a march of the border, five or six thousand strong, by the time that information sent from Dour had reached the merchants in the town of Bunnú. The Mahsúds made a failure of that expedition, and have never actually moved since. When they do espouse the cause of any discontented tribe, and show an intention to attack us, the affair may be considered an important one, requiring care and vigilance and stronger preparations than are usually considered necessary when only the smaller tribes are banded together against us. The Mahsúds are governed like other tribes by a conclave of Mulliks, the chief of whom, Jungeh Khan, is a noted character, said to be wise in council, and bold and business-like when the tribe is involved in war. It was this Mullik and his fellows that so heartily aided Alladad Khan, Kuttí Kheyl, when a fugitive in the hills, in his efforts to annoy and injure the Múltaní Khans, to whom the Sikhs had entrusted the elequah of Tánk. On several occasions they reduced the Múltaní Khans to great straits, and once hemmed them into the fort and burned the town of Tánk under the walls of it.

The Torí Kheyl lie between the Bukí Kheyl and Mahsúds. They are not an important tribe, and my acquaintance with them is small; there is an old feud between the Torí Kheyl and Mahsúds, the only instance I am acquainted with of feud between two Wazírí tribes. In my recollection there have been several solemn jirgahs held with a view of arranging matters; but, though a partial arrangement of differences has been more than once arrived at, the reconciliation has never been complete or lasting.

The four tribes of Kabul Kheyl, Khojul Kheyl, Hussun Kheyl, and Gungí Kheyl, muster about eight hundred men between them; they inhabit lands on the banks of the Kúram about Thull and Bilund Kheyl, are always deeply engaged in the salt trade, and are apparently always ready to join in any mischief or trouble that is going forward. They are not, however, in a position to annoy us much in Bunnú; in the

neighbourhood of Bahádúr Kheyl, or near their own homes on the Kúram, they would, of course, give more trouble. It was the Kabul Kheyl tribe, assisted by part of the Tají Kheyl, that in October 1851 attacked the village of Bahádúr Kheyl and were beaten back with loss by the villagers.

The Tají Kheyl we do not often hear of in Bunnú. Some members of the tribe occasionally join with the four tribes above-mentioned in some expedition, having for its object the molestation of some of our less well-protected villages ; but the camps and grazing grounds of the tribe are removed from our Bunnú border, though they approach more nearly to our general boundary in the neighbourhood of Togh and Therí. The tribe is, I believe, generally a trustworthy and respectable one. I have heard Khojah Mahomed Khan himself and his official speak well of it.

The valley of Dour, which lies to the west of Bunnú, the nearest part of it being about fifteen miles distant from our Tochí out-post, contains a population of eight thousand men, similar in character to the Bunnúchís, and quite separate from the Wazírís, who in the cold weather overrun the hills surrounding the valley. Dour has always been the refuge for Bunnú fugitives from justice, and when we first occupied the latter valley, the Dourís (stirred up by the Bunnú refugees to the belief that our next step would be to absorb their country also) were constantly in a state of ferment and unrest, and for a long time threatened to join with the hill-men and attempt to rescue Bunnú from complete subjugation ; with the conviction, however, that though we had in reality from a humane policy finally subdued the valley of Bunnú, to put an end to the misery created by the Sikh mode of collecting the revenue of it by making periodical raids into the country, we had no wish whatever to advance further unless obliged to do so, the anxiety of the Dourís died away ; and, with exception of a party of the clan that accompanied Dilassa Khan from the hills, and fought bravely with him in an attempt to raise the siege of the inner fort of Dhullípghurh, in which Mullik Futteh Khan was beset, the Dourís have not appeared on the plains of Bunnú, and the whole family have kept clear of the aggressive attempts

that have been from time to time made by the Wazírí tribes about them. I do not consider the community answerable for the acts of the brigand called the Sukhun Pír and his gang of cut-throats. This man was a well-known desperado long before we came to the country ; his favourite haunt was the wild bit of ground near the Baram water-course, where he on one occasion cut up a party of five unarmed artillery waggon men ; on another he made an unsuccessful attempt to waylay and murder the Mírí Thannadar, who saved himself by his own gallantry, though he lost a horse in the fray ; and, lastly, in the summer of 1851, the Sukhun Pír made a bold attempt to carry off the camels of the Luttummur detachment, and for this enterprise he had mustered as many as sixty horsemen and marched them with such rapidity from the confines of Dour through the hills to the back of Luttummur, that though Khaní Khan of the Momand Kheyl sent me immediate information when they passed the Kúram on their way up, and intelligence was sent off by horsemen to Luttummur, the attempt had been made before the warning arrived in camp, and the Sukhun Pír and his horsemen had been beaten off by the guard protecting the camels at graze, and had left his own horse and arms on the spot ; tied to his saddle-bow was found his koran, and between the leaves of it some of his private papers ; among others, I discovered a kind of roving commission from Sirdar Mahomed Azím Khan to his trusty and well-beloved well-wisher, Sukhun, directing him to be active in the service, and warning all parties to assist him with food, supplies, &c., as they valued their good name with the Kabul Government. No particular service was alluded to, and you are aware that a document of this sort is often given by a native governor to characters known to be stirring and useful in difficult times without any exact signification, or the prescribing of any especial duty to be performed, but merely as a sort of retaining notice to the individual to secure his services when necessary, and to be shown by him when employed on any Government duty as a voucher for his trustworthiness. Such a paper was this no doubt which was found in the Sukhun Pír's koran, but it may in some measure be taken as an



instance of the kind of irons which might on occasion be put in the fire to cause us annoyance and unrest, without the execution being a matter of the least trouble or expense to our enemies. The Sukhun Pír has not re-appeared on the stage since his last adventure.

One of the most important subjects bearing upon the position of the Wazírí tribes in and about Bunnú is that connected with the salt mines, and the traffic they give rise to. The chief mine in the neighbourhood, that of Bahadúr Kheyl, supplies the whole of western Afghanistan with salt, and the Wazírís are the chief traffickers in the same.

Before annexation the Bahadúr Kheyl mine and others were included in the farm of Therí, Salt mines as bearing on Wazírí politics. which Khoajah Mahomed Khan, chief of the western Khuttuks, held from the Barakzai Sirdars of Kohat. Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan was well aware of his own inability to enforce a remunerative salt duty from the Wazírís, who traded at the Bahadúr Kheyl mine, or even to coerce the strong ùlus of the valley itself. Khoajah Mahomed Khan, therefore, paid but little for the mine in his rent, and with good reason, as he realized little or nothing from it. The village ùlus of Bahadúr Kheyl and its dependencies being too strong for him, and in fact the chief part of what was realized from traders at the mine as price of the salt, or of the labour of extracting it, fell to the share of the village community, who had frequently to enforce payment by armed demonstration, occasionally actual fighting, in which, from the great strength of the position of the mine, they possessed advantages which the strongest of their adversaries found it difficult to cope with, and thus the villagers of Bahadúr Kheyl made an excellent living from the mine, and occupied a most distinguished position in the neighbourhood.

After annexation, we assumed direct management of the salt mines, but for some time paid but slight attention to Bahadúr Kheyl. In the autumn of 1849, the sale of salt at the Bahadúr Kheyl mine was suspended until a rate of duty should be fixed for the whole of the mines. Two rupees per maund, the same rate as that of the Cis-Indus mines,

was the first scale decided on ; but, it being found that so high a rate had the effect of completely stopping the trade, it was first reduced to one rupee, without, however, producing the desired effect of re-opening the trade. Thousands of men, usually engaged in extracting or conveying salt from the mines to all parts of the country, were thrown out of employment, and some disturbances occurred at Kohat and Bahadúr Kheyl, but passed off ; tranquillity was restored, but the hill-men had relinquished the salt trade, which, on account of the high duty, they considered beyond their reach. Things were in this state, when, in May 1850, the rate of duty was finally reduced to a scale which was calculated to throw the salt trade open to every idle man in the hills and elsewhere who chose to undertake it. This scale has been the rule ever since ; and, as far as Bahadúr Kheyl, Nurrí, and Khurruk are concerned, I should advise its never being altered. We have now certainly put a good serviceable post at Bahadúr Kheyl, and are fifty times as strong at that point as we were when the present rate of salt duty was fixed ; and it is also undoubtedly true, that by increasing the rate of duty we might very possibly, without causing difficulty, increase our income from the mines by fifty thousand or even a lakh of rupees ; but it is also extremely probable that it would give a great impetus to salt smuggling from petty mines, which exist in the hills in considerable numbers that we are aware of, but I suspect in far greater numbers that we are not apprised of. The result would be the necessity of stronger preventive measures, and preventive arrangements must in those parts be carried out with regiments, not police companies, and a regiment of infantry costs a lakh and ten thousand rupees yearly, and a cavalry regiment two lakhs. I hope that any change in the present arrangements will be well considered before it is adopted. Our hold on the wild tracts of country between the Bahadúr Kheyl and Míranzai valleys, the ridges of which are full of salt, is anything but complete at present, and our knowledge of the Munjai and Lowaghir Khuttuks is imperfect ; in fact, my meaning is that we have a good deal to do in quietly bringing every inch of

hill and valley between our chief points under thorough command, without running the risk of raising universal discontent and opposition by premature attempts to realize a higher income from the salt mines. I have not had much opportunity of studying the exact bearings of the case as regards the more northern mines, nor do I understand exactly how the present state of the traffic affects the large Afrídí clan; but the position and politics of the southern mines is simple enough, namely, that hundreds, if not thousands, are at present engaged in the traffic, which employs them thoroughly, and takes them away for weeks together into the hills and to other places, who, were the duty raised, would either throw up the trade or strive to get salt from some other spot in the hills unknown to the Government officials, and thus evade the duty altogether; and, under these circumstances, it would, in my opinion, be most impolitic to meddle with the existing scale of tax until we are at any rate prepared to establish a far more complete exterior preventive line than we have hitherto found necessary.

The Khuttuks of Bahadúr Kheyl and Luttummur are

The Khuttuks of Luttummur and Bahadúr Kheyl of the same family, and have always fought and sided together.

The three most remarkable Mulliks of Bahadúr Kheyl are Kukkur, Delassah, and Wazír. The first is a double-dealing, bold, stirring character; the second is a scholar, and like Pope's tradesman, "meek, and much a liar," the most dangerous character of the two no doubt—in fact, Kukkur and Dilassah together are enough to embroil, or, if they chose, keep in order any community, but I fear their tastes are rather in the way first named. Wazír is a fine old red beard, meaning well, but led by the nose by the other two. There are four or five other Mulliks, of whom I at this moment only remember two, Khutmul and Zullai; but, though heads of certain sections of the community, they are all led by the triumvirate above-mentioned, and are, therefore, of not much importance individually. The chief Mulliks of Luttummur are Douran and Nusrut, the former a good man and almost entirely ruling the úlus of the village.

The inhabitants of Luttummur have suffered a good deal of annoyance of late years, that is, since we occupied the fort in October 1850. It is a dry, desolate spot, and water is only procurable in the hot months by scraping up the sand in the bed of the water-course; the presence, therefore, of soldiers, and especially horsemen, puts the inhabitants to real inconvenience and difficulty, and the result has been that the Luttummur people have several times petitioned me to allow them to remove their houses elsewhere, which petition I have always refused; and I mention the subject to advise you to do the same. They must be encouraged to remain where they are; care must be taken to prevent their suffering any real unnecessary annoyance, but they must be kept up to the collar; as, should they desert the locality, it would be a hard matter to feed the detachment quartered in the fort, and the whole of that part of the Thull would suffer materially by the removal of the old known and populous village of Luttummur. The village is properly in the Kohat district; but, being immediately on the Bunnú border, and garrisoned from Bunnú, I write as if it were really within the district. In the same way I have a few words to say about the Nurri and Khurruk salt mines, and the Munjai and Nusrutti hills, though they are all properly in Khoajah Mahomed Khan's country, and part of the district of Theri.

Nurri I merely mention to solicit your good offices for Ahmed Khan, Yar Khan, and the rest of the Mulliks, should it ever be in your power to be of use to them. It was once necessary to quarter a considerable body of men at Nurri to watch the Bahadur Kheyl valley. This was a great infliction to the Nurri people; but, owing to the judicious and conciliatory conduct of Captain Vaughan, who commanded the party, the Mulliks, and in fact the whole community, put themselves entirely at the service of Government, and behaved so admirably on all occasions, that I have always remembered it with pleasure and gratitude, and numbered it among the instances of that influence which can be gained over these people by care and kindness.

The Khurruk mine was not opened till some time after the others had been in full play, the occasion being when the Bahadúr Kheyl villagers had behaved ill in October 1850. The opening of this mine was calculated to separate the interests of the Thull Wazírís from those of the Bahadúr Kheyl úlus, and also to lessen the press of custom and traffic at the Bahadúr Kheyl mine. The quality of the Khurruk salt is very fine, and the mine is conveniently situated and easy of control.

Before crossing the valley to the Munjai hills, I must notice the SúrdaK pass from the village of that name, two miles from Luttummur, through the chain of hills bounding the plain Chounterah to Bahadúr Kheyl. The mountains on either side for the first two and a half miles are of great height ; and, if held by an enemy, could not be assailed and cleared without great loss to the attacking party. Two miles further on comes a steep\* kothul, the road over which is very rugged and bad ; were this strongly held, it would be a difficult matter to force it. You will remember that a Jemadar's party was attacked last year while returning from SúrdaK through this pass, after having escorted Lieutenant Pollock from Bahadúr Kheyl to SúrdaK ; the Jemadar was killed and several of the party wounded, though they behaved well, inflicting loss on their opponents and bringing off the Jemadar's body. I do not myself think it likely, that holding Bahadúr Kheyl and Luttummur, we should ever have very large bodies of men to deal with in this pass, though in the year 1851 our force of six hundred men at Luttummur was several times molested ; but, were we to use the SúrdaK pass as a means of communication for supplies, &c., we should be constantly liable to have the kafilahs attacked, or if guards were sent (unless the laborious operation of crowning the heights on every occasion were adopted) to have men of the escorts shot from the hills commanding the pass ; while straggling individuals, camp followers, &c., would always be in danger of assassination. It would not be feasible to protect the whole road by a line of posts, on account of the want of good water, all that is found being strongly im-

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\* Kothul is the term applied to a pass surmounting a high ridge or mountain.

pregnated with salt ; and, I believe, that the only plan that would afford a reasonable hope of protecting the road would be that of placing a strong post at the SúrdaK mouth of the pass, where there is water to be found in the bed of the nullah. This would command one of the worst parts of the whole durrah, and the garrison might be strong enough to furnish escort from the post to the kothul, which in dangerous times should have by previous arrangement been crowned and occupied by a detachment of troops from the Bahadúr Kheyl side. In this manner the durrah might be safely made use of on important occasions, but straggling wayfarers, merchants, &c., should be warned that, unless they choose to wait for the escort of troops, they must either take the longer route, *viâ* Chounterah and Nurrí, or go through the pass at their own risk.

The position of the Munjai Khuttuks, and those of the Loaghir valley, and the villages of Zerkí, Showa, Shenwa and Pukkí, is peculiar. They are properly subjects of the Khuttuk Khan of Therí ; but, before we came to the country, his power over them was next to nothing. When we occupied Bunnú, Khoajah Mahomed Khan began to recover his authority over them to a certain extent. On the occasion of annexation I summoned the Mulliks of the four villages of Zerkí, Showa, Shenwa, and Pukkí, and they all came in to me at Bunnú, and I had a long talk with them in presence of Khoajah Mahomed Khan's naibs, the result of which was that they formally took the yoke upon them, undertaking to pay their revenue to the Khan without difficulty or demur, and to render him due obedience in all matters ; at the same time I arranged with Khoajah Mahomed Khan that he was to build a post at Luttummur while I put one at Dhummai, which would form grand strides towards bringing the whole of the then raw tract of border country from Bunnú to Chounterah under subjection. The posts were built, and, from that time up to last year, the whole of the Khuttuks of the range of hills in which the above-named villages are situated, and which divides the Bunnú Thull

from the Esa Kheyl district, have behaved most peaceably and well. Last year, however some of the men of Pukkí, in conjunction with some Wazírís, re-commenced their former practices of highway robbery, plundering, &c. ; and, though I hope the notice taken of this at the time, and the punishment which the chief Mullik underwent in several months' confinement, may have had the effect of checking it, I fear it is probable that they may from time to time break out in the same way. Should this be the case Khoajah Mahomed Khan should be made to take the whole tract more completely in hand than he has hitherto done. When the Bahadúr Kheyl post is built and garrisoned, neither he nor we shall have any anxiety about that formerly troublesome locality, and the Khan should then be made to put a small post at or near Zerkí, and to depute an influential motubur capable of keeping the communities of these villages in order ; we might at the same time put a small post at Duddianwallah on the Thull, and these two controlling points would be sufficient to ensure peace and safety to the whole line. I think under any circumstances it would be a good plan to establish a strong police post at Duddianwallah. There is a large tract of country from Michen Kheyl in Murwut to our border line, which is but ill-cared for ; it is covered with Wazírí camps, and the road taken by merchants from the Deraját to the Khuttuk salt mines lies directly through it. It is natural that the Wazírís should wish to monopolise the salt trade on that side, so far at any rate as the passage of the Thull is concerned, but there is no reason why they should be allowed to do so ; in pursuance of that object, however, they would gladly encourage the idea that the road was unsafe, and without a good supervising post at or near Duddianwallah, we could not well control and check this improper project on their part. The system has, indeed, generally been that the Wazírís have carried the salt from the mines to Duddianwallah and there sold it to the merchants of the lower Deraját, Powindahs, and others, and a very good division of labour and profit too. We must merely be careful that the Wazírís do not resort to improper means to insure to themselves a monopoly of the Thull traffic, and that if the other merchants

prefer to go to the mines themselves, they may be able to do so in safety.

The post at Duddianwallah should be rather a strong one, forty or fifty men, of which twenty should be horsemen. I mention this, because the men of the post would have to act in the open over a large tract of country. They should also have a tower or entrenchment in or near the village, where they may leave their property, when obliged to turn out, under a small guard, in safety.

The chief Mulliks of these Khuttuk hill villages are Bazíd Khan of Zerkí, a man of considerable character and influence, and, from what I have seen, well disposed; Jehangír Khan and Shírukh Khan of Showa, of whom the first is the most intelligent and was the most influential, but I believe he has of late been ousted by a rival clique; Ruddut Khan and Hussein Khan of Shenwa; and Bungí Khan, Hattí Khan, Hakím Khan, and Abútí Khan of Pukkí. Of these, Bungí Khan was once a noted freebooter and troublesome character, and the whole of the men of Pukkí enjoyed but an indifferent character in the country; they have, however, behaved quietly and well under us till lately, in the instance before alluded to. There was formerly a good deal of *buddi* or feud between the Wazírís encamped on the Thull and the Khuttuks of the hills and Chounterah plain, but that has

Relations of the Wazírís and Khuttuks. very much died out. The Hattí Kheyl camps now stretch to points close under the hills, and I believe that Azím Khan is on excellent terms with Bazíd Khan of Zerkí.

The man best acquainted with these Khuttuks under you is Súltan Mihmúd Khan, Polídar of Músah Kheyl, who is also, as you know, a very intelligent sensible man; he is personally acquainted with most of the Mulliks I have named, as well as with their history, present position, former feuds, &c.

From the Chounterah plain a pass by name Chichalí leads directly through the chain of hills to Kotkí in the Esa Kheyl district. The defile is a very narrow and difficult one. At one spot the daylight over head is reduced to a



narrow streak between precipitous rocks of gigantic height. The hills are not thickly inhabited in the neighbourhood, and the pass is now scarcely thought of. I notice it to advise you at any rate not to encourage its being used, as, in case of merchants or travellers adopting it, the facilities afforded for highway robbery in it might tempt even men who had reached an advanced age in peace and honesty, and therefore must be wholly irresistible to mountaineers with Afghan blood in their veins.

The Wazírí cultivation on the Thull is assessed at one-sixth share of the produce; of Wazírí cultivation on the Thull. this ten per cent., as in all Bunnú, is returned as mullikanah. In the case of those tribes, the revenue of which is collected by Swahn Khan, the mullikanah is paid to him. Azím Khan has generally acted as agent for the Hattí Kheyl, and I have generally given him a present equal to one-fourth of the amount collected through him; in the same way the mullikanah of the revenue of the Mohmaund Kheyl, collected and paid in by Mullik Khaní Khan, is made over to him, and he, as an influential and useful Mullik, has also generally received a similar gratuity to that given to Azím Khan; but in both these cases I have carefully explained to the parties that this extra allowance is only given in reward for actual service done, so that if the recipients flagged subsequently in their activity, and others became more zealous and stirring in the Government service, the favours above-mentioned would be transferred to them. I have always thought this plan better than irrecoverably alienating a portion of the revenue in favour of an individual who, considering the summit of his hopes gained, would thenceforward relax his efforts, and relapse into apathy and uselessness. All the Wazírí lands in the Bunnú tuppahs pay a one-fourth share to Government, the same scale as that taken from the Bunnúchís.

It is necessary always to keep a careful watch on the Hattí Kheyl and Sirkí Kheyl crops at Burghonuttú and Júr, lest any attempt should be made to defraud Government by cutting the crops, removing the grain to the hills,

and then turning up the ground as if for the following harvest, and denying that a recent crop had been taken from it. The Wazírís are respectable savages in their way, but they would not be above a trick of this sort. The best mode of dealing with the matter is, before the crops are ripe, to summon Azím Khan and the chief Mulliks, and send the Jeríbkushes\* with them to measure the crops; the estimate of the produce can be made subsequently, when the grain is nearly ripe. The Mulliks must be called on to give security for the payment of the revenue. If Azím Khan takes it upon himself, well and good, he has often done so, and has never failed to make good a promise of this sort; if he, however, object to do this, the best plan is to take hostages from the sections of the tribe which he distrusts, the same to remain in confinement till the revenue is paid.

The same system must be pursued with the Mohmand Kheyl revenue, the tribe being disunited, and not over well-disposed to be led entirely by Khaní Khan. From those sections of the tribe, for which he says he will be answerable, it is unnecessary to demand further security; if, however, he decline to be responsible for any tribe or section, especial security or hostages must be demanded.

The cases of Wazírís holding land in the tuppahs should be carefully watched in those instances, especially where they pay their revenue through the Bunnúchí Mulliks, as there is danger of Bunnúchís treating them harshly. Wherever I had discovered this to be the case, I would at once separate the Wazírí from the Bunnúchí Mullik of his tuppah, and allow him to deal with Government direct; where they continue on good terms with the Mulliks, it saves much trouble; and, moreover, has a beneficial amalgamatory effect that they should continue to pay through them.

The Bukkí Kheyl and Janí Kheyl tribes have made money settlements, records of Bukí Kheyl and Janí Kheyl which you will find in your office; they have also given good per-

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\* Measurers employed to estimate the crops.

manent security for the fulfilment of their agreements. This is a great step in civilization, and saves a great deal of trouble to the officer in charge ; at the same time it does occasionally occur that the crops of these tribes which are raised in stony arid soil, in a great measure fail : on such occasions, after due enquiry, a remission of part of the settlement should be made.

The settlements made with these tribes include the lands of the Tuktí Kheyl on the left bank of the Tochí, and all lands in fact in the possession of the tribe at the period when the agreement was concluded.

The tribute of dúmbahs, for the privilege of grazing on the Thull, is collected from the Ahmedzai Wazírís through Swahn Khan or Azím Khan. The original number was 250 sheep, of which the Hattí Kheyl paid 160, being the largest tribe and richest in flocks. On the misconduct and defection of the Omerzais and part of the Hattí Kheyl, the number of sheep due by these tribes was excused to their better-behaved fellows, who remained, the number thus deducted amounted to twenty-seven, that is, nineteen due from the Omerzais, and eight from Hattí Kheyl, leaving 223 to be collected.

I think under the present state of things this duty falls rather heavily on the Wazírís, especially as the Bunnúchís pay no tax or tribute for the same privileges. However, I am not an advocate for remissions, especially to Pathans, and anything of the sort should be done grudgingly. I would, therefore, in this case, only recommend that the 223 dúmbahs be taken at one rupee a head ; or, if sheep be taken, that the number be reduced to 100 or 150. This tribute falls particularly and injuriously on the Hattí Kheyl, and all for advantages which the Bunnúchís, Khuttuks, and Otmanzai Wazírís on the southern border enjoy gratis.

Of the out-posts of Bunnú, I shall say but little, as I have often discussed them with you in private intercourse, and you are, therefore, fully aware of my opinions on all points connected with them. Three things, however, I wish to notice, namely,

Outposts of Bunnú,

first, that I think it will be eventually necessary to place a post at Burghonuttú, to form a connecting link between Gúmúttí and Luttummur; secondly, that better water arrangements than at present exist are required in the Luttummur post, where the water of the present well is undrinkable; thirdly, that though the border of the Sheorání tuppahs and the head of Bunnú are fairly cared for by posts, I have long been aware that the south-western border of Bunnú is completely open and raw, with regard to which I have, I believe, to you used the expression that it would not have surprised me at any time to be roused in the night, and be shown the whole of the Mírí villages in flames, and this is not in the least exaggerated. Were we to quarrel with the Bukkí Kheyl they would call in the Mahsúds and Torí Kheyl, and this is the side they would naturally assail, and there is no disguising that they might work their will on the whole line of villages long before any assistance could be afforded to them. As long as we remain on good terms with the Bukkí Kheyl, I believe that there is no chance of any attempt being made on that side; and, in regard to this it is worthy of remark, that when the Mahsúds made their grand attack in November 1850, they marched round the whole of the northern end of Bunnú, crossed the Kúram, and attacked from the Gúmúttí pass, whereas it would have been far easier and nearer for them to have fallen on the Mírí tuppahs. The Mírí villages have, indeed, always been allowed to keep up certain defences, and the Mulliks and úlus have always borne a good fighting character. These are some grounds of safety, but I could not lean on them if any real danger threatened. The defences are merely the ruins of the former walls, imperfect in many places, and the warlike Mulliks and villagers have so long been used to peace, that they are lulled into security, and their arms are mislaid or rusty and ill-appointed, and should a night attack take place, you would see that the resistance offered by the villagers would be next to nothing; though well armed, and with their úlus equally well appointed at their backs, Mulliks Mír Baz and Ghazí would give a good account of their assailants. Rely upon it that if we quarrel with the Bukkí Kheyl, one of two things must be done at once, either

we must occupy the whole line with our own troops, with good supports in the rear, or we must supply the Mírís with arms and ammunition, bid them look to their defences, and take care of themselves. To do the former permanently we should (you are acquainted with the extent of country) require half as many troops again as we at present have in Bunnú, while the latter plan would be undoing Major Edwardes' labours in reducing the valley, and form a step backwards in improvement and civilization, and perhaps lead to some difficulty in subsequent dealings with the class. It is a choice of evils, and the question must be decided by the general spirit and intention of Government arrangements on the rest of the frontier : thus, if in every case the principle acted upon be to occupy the border with Government detachments and play the whole game ourselves, then I should say at once on danger threatening, let Government detachments be placed in the Mírí villages till posts can be built for them ; if, however, the general plan be to economise troops, and allow, whenever it is feasible, the people of the country to care for their own safety and fight for it, then I would adopt the second plan, and feel very well assured that the Mírís, with good arms in their hands, could at any rate take care of themselves and hold an attacking body in play till assistance reached them from head-quarters. With the consequent evils which I have mentioned as likely to occur, the officer in charge must deal at his leisure.

You are aware that, after several attacks had occurred on the northern border of Bunnú, I, in accordance with directions issued by the Most Noble the Governor General himself, allowed one line of villages on the outer circle of Bunnú to repair in some measure their defences, and also supplied them with some of the old confiscated matchlocks and muskets formerly belonging to the Sikh corps, a measure which decidedly tended to render the whole line more secure ; and, as the villages in question re-built their defences by order, were in one continuous line, and all in the immediate neighbourhood of the roads connecting the posts, no evil effect is likely to ensue, but I would caution you to keep a careful watch on

the propensity inherent in the Bunnúchís to surround themselves with walls; never allow any village wall, garden enclosure, &c., to be erected without its having been first inspected by one of your myrmidons, and distinct sanction having been had and obtained, otherwise you will find some day, on riding through the tuppahs, that the Bunnú of former days (when the whole country was a chess-board of forts, and the view in every direction was impeded by mud walls) is springing up again about you. This is a matter that has given me constant trouble, the more so that the crowds of Ghilzais and Jhundrans that visit the country in the winter especially employ themselves in building walls for low hire; and, if the Bunnúchí taste were uncontrolled, and he could afford it, he would have a mud wall five feet high round every field, if it were only to prevent his rival seeing how his corn grew. To keep this evil in check, I was in the habit of periodically sending an intelligent native officer through the whole of the tuppahs with orders to report on any new walls that had been built or were in course of erection. In any flagrant case I went and inspected the new building myself; and, if it were in any way in the form of a defensive work, and had been erected without leave, I had it levelled again without mercy. No inhabitant of any village within the outer line can plead the excuse of danger for this morbid desire to wall themselves in; it proceeds, I believe, entirely from the life they have led from childhood, ever living within four square walls twenty feet high; but the propensity must be combated, as there are many potent reasons which would render it most impolitic to allow them to re-build their old defences and retire within mud walls again.

The Bunnúchís taken as a class are very inferior to their neighbours, the Wazírís; Bunnúchís as a class. small in stature, and sallow and wizend in appearance, they always reminded me of the lives they had led in youth, of which their appearance is in fact but a natural result. When we first arrived in Bunnú, it was a common thing to find a man that had never in his life been more than two miles from his own village, the village possibly being at war with its neighbours, which rendered wander-

ing in the fields in the neighbourhood a service of danger, while within the walls it is sad to think of the heat, dirt, squallor, and stagnation that must have existed. The villages in those days walled up to the sky, so that no air could reach the houses below, must, indeed, have been hot-beds of all that was enervating and demoralizing, and the characteristics of the full-grown Bunnúchí weed correspond but too well with the nature of its origin and training. Here and there a fine character may possibly be found, and they no doubt have some domestic virtues, which in some measure redeem their public and social immorality; but, taken as a class, they certainly are the worst dispositioned men I have ever had to deal with. They are vicious, false, backbiting, treacherous, cruel, and revengeful. I have never known or heard of men so utterly regardless of truth, even in cases of the most vital importance; for instance, a Bunnúchí, either from private spite or some petty object of his own, or perhaps merely to oblige a friend, will deliberately give false evidence in court, such as, for aught he knows or cares, may lead to the execution of one or more men under trial, and this without a shadow of compunction; they are also the class most naturally addicted to assassination that I have met with, having that fatal attachment to the use of the short knife or dagger, which more than anything stamps the character of the true assassin. A Bunnúchí idea of a successful field is, time, midnight, and the long-sought rival or enemy asleep under his vine in the open air, no witness but the moon, and leisure given for three well-planted blows of the small broad-backed knife, which makes a deadly three-cornered wound like that of a bayonet, under which a man may linger long enough to drink the full bitterness contained in the knowledge of his enemy's triumph, but the effect of which must eventually be fatal. This shall occur at midnight, and the next morning the magistrate will be engaged in the harassing and perplexing task of trying to arrive at some clue to the identity of the murderer through the mass of contradictory, false, and blinding evidence procurable on the spot, the friends of the deceased hesitating at no assertion in the hope of criminating the known enemies of the murdered man and

thereby defeating their own object, while the secret favourers of the assassin throw quietly every obstacle in their power in the way of the investigation; the feeling common elsewhere of horror at the crime, pity for the victim, and desire to see the offender punished, which aids the ends of justice by inducing men to volunteer evidence, and assist in tracing out the guilty, is here wholly wanting, and the investigating officer has indeed a hard and almost hopeless task to extract useful practical evidence from a mass of by-standers, the only uninterested, and therefore partially trustworthy, portion of whom are wholly indifferent as to his success in the matter in hand. It is consequently a very difficult thing under such circumstances to convict offenders against whom there is the strongest presumptive evidence. The result is that crime goes unpunished, and the evil consequences usual in such cases naturally ensue; and so utterly rotten, and so studiously false, is all evidence procurable in Bunnú, that, unless we occasionally consent to punish on strong suspicion, it will be found a hard matter to remedy them.

One thing I must say for the Bunnúchís, is that they are good ryots in the way that the term is made use of under a Native Government, that is, they are quiet and orderly, obedient to the police officials, and submissive and punctual in revenue matters.

On the whole, I think, it is unlikely that even with favourable opportunity the Bunnúchís would wish to throw off our yoke. The dream could only enter their heads when we were engaged in some great difficulty and obliged to leave Bunnú very ill-guarded; and then they could only hope to accomplish their object by calling in the assistance of the hill-men, and between them and the Wazírís there is perhaps less possibility of sympathy and fellow-feeling than between the Bunnúchís and ourselves. The Bunnúchís and Wazírís have never intermarried. The wolf would as soon take a mate from the sheepfold as would a Wazírí think of asking a Bunnúchí woman in marriage; and for this and other reasons the sheep might as well invite the wolves into the fold to help them break penn as might the Bunnúchís call in the aid of the Wazírís to shake off our



held upon them. There is little or no danger of it, though by a strange concurrence of circumstances it has once occurred in my memory. The Bunnúchís, after being once completely under subjection, were again for a time free, and on that occasion, after passing through various hands, they were, I believe, really glad to get us back again. They had had several different masters, Bunnúchí, Wazírí and Dúraní, in the interim, and found them all considerably more exacting and harsh than they knew we were ever likely to be, so they returned with a good grace to their original subjugators.

I shall here mention the names and characters of the chief Mulliks of Bunnú, though Influential Mulliks and I am well aware that you had men. acquired a considerable knowledge of them even before I had left the district. The two chief Mulliks are Jaffir Khan of the double tuppah of Tuppai, and Lall Baz Khan of Bazar. These two were each heads of old gúndís, or fighting associations, in the days of Bunnú independence, and first brought themselves into notice by their zeal and activity in the Government service on Major Edwardes' first arrival in the district; they have always since acted up to the good characters they then established, and may be looked upon as the safest and most loyal men in the country. Jaffir Khan I have a particularly high opinion of, thinking him very true to our interests, and an honest well-intentioned man in all things. Lall Baz Khan is deeper and less fathomable; he lived formerly in more intrigue, trouble, and bloodshed than Jaffir Khan, and is therefore surrounded by more secret enemies, who are anxious enough to work his downfall, and against whom he occasionally tries to spring counter-mines. His principal and natural rival and enemy is the son of Dukkus Khan, former possessor of the tuppah of Bazar, whom Lall Baz Khan killed and then took possession. I mention this to warn you not to be led into taking up this boy's case against Lall Baz Khan, who is the man whom we found in possession and have always recognized. It would have caused a complete game of change seats, had we, on assuming charge of the country, gone back a few years into

Bunnú history to ascertain who had murdered whom and possessed himself of a third's village and property.

Jaffir Khan's especial rival and enemy is his own nephew, Alladad Khan, who claims one of the tuppahs of Tuppai, but has no right to it. This man behaved very ill during the rebellion, was one of the first to join the Sikhs, and after them the Dúranís and Mír Alim Khan. When I recovered possession of Bunnú, Alladad Khan fled to the hills, and remained in exile up to last year, when he was allowed to return and settle on the newly cultivated land on the Nar, on the strict condition and understanding that he was not to annoy his uncle by reviving a claim, which Major Edwardes had not allowed in the first instance, and which his (Alladad's) own subsequent conduct had put out of the question. It was also expressly stipulated that he should reside on the Nar and not in his former house in Jaffir Khan's tuppah, though his own land in the tuppah was to be made over to him. I have no doubt but that Alladad Khan will attempt sooner or latter to evade these restrictions, and will petition to be allowed to occupy his former quarters ; but, for the sake of peace and quietness, and with a due regard to Jaffir Khan's safety and comfort, I should advise you to enforce the above conditions without any abatement.

Both Jaffir Khan and Lall Baz Khan behaved well during the rebellion ; Jaffir Khan assisted Futteh Khan Tewanná and the Esá Kheyl Khans as much as lay in his power against the Sikh troops ; and, when he could do no more, took refuge with the Mulliks of Drukka in Murwut, in preference to making his submission to the new masters of the land, as most of the others did ; he subsequently joined me at Esá Kheyl, and did good service by assembling a force and occupying the eastern tuppahs of Bunnú, from whence he could watch and in a great measure control the proceedings of Mír Alim Khan, whom the Sikhs had left in charge of Dhullípgurh, preventing his collecting the revenue of several tuppahs and curtailing his powers of doing mischief in many ways : this was when I was employed in the attack

on the fort of Lukkí. When the Afghans came down Jaffir Khan was obliged to retire and join me at Lukkí.

Lall Baz Khan had been previously put in irons and carried off by the Sikhs, and he did not regain his liberty till after the battle of Gúzerát.

In addition to the five per cent. on the village revenue fixed for all the petty Mulliks, and five per cent. on the tuppah revenue for the head Mulliks, these two men receive one-fourth of the revenues of their respective tuppahs, Lall Baz Khan of his tuppah of Bazar, and Jaffir Khan of one of his tuppahs of Tuppai, or one-eighth of his whole collections. These grants were recommended by Major Edwardes to the Resident in Jaffir Khan's case on the strength of an old sunnud held by him, and in Lall Baz Khan's on account of good service and zeal in the Government service.

The character of Mullik Dellassah Khan of Daúdshah is well known to you. He always bore the highest reputation as a warrior among the leaders of the Bunnú Gúndís ; he several times resisted the Sikhs, and on one occasion actually defeated a strong Sikh force, which, retreating in disorder from the walls of his mud fort, never stopped again till it reached Lukkí. On another occasion, he defended his fort for several days, and at last made his way with his followers through the Sikh army and escaped to the hills.

On the first occasion of Major Edwardes entering Bunnú with a Sikh army, Delassah Khan came in and made submission ; but after a time, for some unknown cause, fled from the camp and took to the hills. On Major Edwardes' second visit, when the valley was finally subjugated, Delassah Khan would not come in but remained in Dour, and his sons were extremely active in attempts that were made at the time to accomplish a general combination of the hill-men to assist the Bunnúchís in ejecting us. Delassah Khan was a personal friend of Futteh Khan Tewannah, and when the latter was besieged in Dhulípgurh, Delassah Khan brought down a large body of hill-men and joined the Esá Kheyl Khans and loyal Bunnúchís in their attempts to raise the siege. Directly Sirdar Mahomed Azím Khan retreated from Bunnú, Delassah Khan came straight in to me at

Lukkí, and has ever since conducted himself in the most quiet orderly manner. I have a great respect and liking for the old man—respect for his known courage and feats of arms, and liking for his quiet modest bearing, so far removed from the usual loud and vaunting tone of a Pathan brave, who, whatever he may do in the field, generally rather over-acts the character in the council or market-place. Delassah Khan is only really Mullik of one-fourth of the Daúdshah tuppah ; but, in consideration of his name in the country, I have always treated him as head Mullik. His son, Khojeh Khan, an active, shrewd, stirring man, generally does the working part of the duty for his father. Khojeh Khan is not a very fine character, being grasping, quarrelsome, and vindictive. Delassah Khan has two other sons, Mawe Khan and Shaikh Sitár, but they generally reside in Dour. My impression of both is that they are rather mischievous evil-disposed characters, but they have given us no trouble whatever since their father finally made his submission. The other Mulliks of Daúdshah are Mír Ahm, son of Futteh Khan Mushir, Ursula Khan, and Zuffer Khan ; the latter was engaged in a plot to assassinate Major Edwardes, or was strongly suspected of being so ; he is a deep-dealing, dangerous individual. Mír Ahm and Ursula are harmless, but they all quarrel among themselves and with Khojeh Khan about water and other points.

Bazíd Khan Sheoraní was one of the great leaders of fighting gúndís in the olden time, and he looks the character well. You will find the nature of his quarrel with the Omer-zai Wazírís fully set forth in my former report ; I need only mention here that Bazíd Khan has a right to great consideration and sympathy at the hands of the Government officers from the fact of his having lost his eldest son in the fight at the mouth of the Gúmúttí pass in 1849 ; he also did his best to assist Futteh Khan Tewannah when besieged in the fort. I have on these accounts always treated him kindly, but have never been able satisfactorily to make out whether he was our well-wisher or not.

Zubburdust Khan and Khillut Khan, Sheoraní Mulliks, are men of no character ; they perform their duties as

tuppah Mulliks fairly, but in troubled times they showed an unhealthy alacrity in assisting our enemies, and altogether they are not to be depended upon for a moment.

Nezum Khan and Zabtah Khan, also Sheoraní Mulliks, are better men. I have always liked the former and thought him a good man. These two Mulliks favour the pretensions of Dukkus Khan's son to the Bazar tuppahs, and therefore are declared enemies of Lall Baz Khan.

Shere Must Khan of Jundú Kheyl is a good man, not very intelligent or useful, but well disposed towards us. He is, like most Mulliks, provided with a rival and enemy in Paenduh Khan, with whom he has long been at issue about the division of certain inherited property. The case was formally settled once by moonsiffs, with the consent of both parties, but they still manage to quarrel about the interpretation of certain passages of the decision. You will, I doubt not, have had the case before you several times ere this reaches you.

Shukurúlah Khan, always Mullik of three-fourths of one of the tuppahs of Mudán, now acts also as Mullik of the one whole tuppah formerly held by the rebel Mír Alim Khan. Mír Alim Khan was Mullik of one of the tuppahs of Mudán, Shukurúlah Mullik of three-fourths of the second tuppah, and Khan Soubah of the remaining quarter. Mír Alim Khan was always an ill-conditioned and dangerous character. He became, in some way that I did not clearly understand, a great friend of Sirdar Ram Singh Chapuhwalah, then commanding the Ghorchurahs of the Sikh force in Bunnú, and who afterwards headed the rebellion, and this proceeded to such an extent that Ram Singh advanced money to Mír Alim Khan to enable him to pay up his arrears of revenue, concerning which he was at the time likely to get into trouble. I remember hearing of this at the time, but it did not then strike me as suspicious, nor do I now think that what subsequently occurred was necessarily connected with it, further than as it might be the natural consequence of Mír Alim having received kindness from the Sikh chief. However this may be, it is certain that on the first outbreak of rebellion among the Sikh soldiery, of which Ram Singh

was no doubt one of the chief instigators, Mír Alim Khan openly joined him, and remained throughout the agent through whom all transactions with the Bunnúchís were carried on by the Sikh rebels ; and when the latter marched to join their brethren on the Jhelum, they left Mír Alim Khan with money, provisions, ammunition, and a certain number of men to hold Dhullípgurh in their absence. It was Mír Alim in a great measure who induced Sirdar Mahomed Azím Khan to descend into Bunnú and attempt the relief of Lukí, the garrison of which place he had all along buoyed up with hopes of speedy succour. When the Afghans retreated, Mír Alim Khan went with them, and has remained in exile ever since. He has constantly preferred requests to be allowed to return, and once sent his children to me to sue for pardon ; but I have always returned an unfavorable answer to his overtures. Apart from his misdeeds, he is, as I have said, an ill-conditioned dangerous character, likely to make dissension and difficulty where no real cause existed for either, and I would not recommend his ever being allowed to return. He is now living at Khost and has obtained some influence there, and he has always had the countenance and support of Sirdar Mahomed Azím Khan to back him ; it is possible, therefore, that, acting as a sort of agent to the Kabul Government, and stirring up the hill-men to annoy us, he may occasionally be the cause of our being more disturbed by them than we otherwise should be, but he will not be able to do us material injury when in exile ; he might do us more as a treacherous subject dwelling in the country.

Shukurú'ah Khan, before named, is a man of little character. He played fast and loose during the rebellion like the rest ; he is deceitful and cunning. I suspected him strongly of having instigated or connived at a murder that occurred in his tuppah not long before I left.

Khan Soubah is a well-disposed man, and bitter enemy of Shukurúlah.

Músah Khan of Sikunder Kheyl is another of the exiled Mulliks. He sided with the Sikhs and Afghans and fled on our return. His brother Mumrez Khan manages

his tuppah. Músah Khan I think might be allowed to return to Bunnú at some future period, on his furnishing good security for orderly behaviour in time to come. Neither his offences nor his talents for mischief are equal to those of Mír Alim Khan.

Mír Baz of the Barakzai Mírí tuppahs, and Ghazí of the Nurris tuppah, are two influential men, who formerly carried considerable weight in Bunnú politics. They have always behaved well under us.

Shahwullí Khan of Howeyd I recommend to your care and consideration, as a fine-tempered well-dispositioned old man.

The above are the Bunnú Mulliks that I think worthy of being brought to your notice, either on account of their merits, demerits, or of events connected with their former history. The Mulliks of Kukki Bhurut, Mandeo, Mama Kheyl, &c., small Mírí tuppahs, and Namáwur Khan of Fatmuh Kheyl, Mutseh Khan of Kalí Kheyl, Amír Khan, and Nourung Khan of Mummush Kheyl, are all decent characters in their way, but not remarkable enough to require separate notice. I may except Mír Khan of Amundí, whose sons I believe to have been concerned in more than one murder; and, if so, no doubt with the full cognizance of their father. Mír Khan is always feigning great alarm at the Wazírís, with whom he has, I believe, in truth an old feud, but his real object has been to obtain permission to re-build his defences and arm his followers to secure himself against his immediate Bunnúchí rivals, or plot mischief against them.

With regard to the settlement of Bunnú, one of the greatest difficulties occurs from the fact of part of the community being assessed at one-fourth of the produce, and part at one-sixth. When Major Edwardes took possession of the valley, the whole of the religious classes of Bunnú claimed total exemption from taxation on the strength of old royal sunnuds, and the fact of the Bunnúchí laity having, they asserted, never attempted to make them assist in paying the kullunk or arbitrary money assessment imposed by the Sikh army when it marched into

the country. In support of these claims of immunity, sunnuds bearing the royal seal and sign were produced, by the wording of which it appeared that certain individuals, the fathers or grand-fathers, or great-grand-fathers, of the present claimants had been made free of all demands, while all Government officials and others were warned not to molest them ; and, further, the syuds and múllas brought forward the Bunnú Mulliks and laymen, who corroborated the statement that it had never been the custom to take a share of the Sikh kullunk from the religious classes. One thing, however, was apparent at the time, and that was that the wording of the sunnuds was most vague ; that many of them, or probably all of them, were given when the ruler who professed to make the grant had little or no hold on the valley of Bunnú ; and, further, that the relationship of parties then living to those named in the sunnuds (thirty men perhaps claiming as great-grandsons of one name in the original sunnud) was doubtful, while it would be next to impossible satisfactorily to ascertain its correctness. Under these circumstances Major Edwardes recommended to the Resident that the religious classes of Bunnú should be assessed at one-sixth instead of one-fourth, which was sanctioned ; and then the difficulty ensued of ascertaining who had a right to share in this privilege, and there can be little doubt but that a good many names found their way into the lists that had no right to be there ; every man who could read a few verses of the Koran claiming exemption as an akhúnd or múlla. Before settling the revenue of the Bazar and Tuppai tuppahs, therefore, I was obliged to summon every individual claiming to be a syud or múlla before me, and decide upon his claims after a summary investigation, and after hearing the opinions of the Mullik and chief religious characters of his tuppah ; when these lists were finished, the settlement could be commenced upon. The tuppah of Bazar and the syuds, nine villages with the two tuppahs of Tuppai, had been settled before I left. Bunnú is a country in which a settlement ought to answer well, as there is a fixed and certain irrigation, and the produce consequently varies so much less than in other places. The cultiva-



tion of Bunnú did increase very considerably in the years 1850 and 1851; but, owing to the immense increase of grain all over the country, which caused a glut in the market, the price at which the grain was converted into money in taking the revenue was so much lower than in previous years that the increase of income to Government was comparatively small. Care must be taken to encourage the growth of the rich crops of sugar and turmeric which thrive so well in the Sheoraní tuppahs; all that is necessary, however, is to assure the cultivators that the produce will be converted into money at the market price when the crop is ripe. From the cause I have mentioned above, the market prices of both descriptions of produce have progressively fallen so much in the last few years that (the cultivation being expensive and laborious) the farmers will not put these crops in unless they are assured of fair consideration at the time of harvest.

With regard to the Wazírís who have land in the tuppahs, it was my intention if they feared taking the settlement under the Bunnú Mulliks, to give them their leases separately; but I should by all means advise their being left under the Mulliks if they make no objection to it themselves. Those Wazírís whose revenue Swahn Khan has been in the habit of collecting, must pay the amount of their settlement through him in money or kind. It would be a good opportunity at the time of the settlement to insist on money payments from all parties owning lands in the tuppahs, which would not, I think, press hard upon them now that they understand the thing better than they did. I would not yet press the matter with the Wazírís on the Thull. The whole item realized by the Thull crops is so small, and the crops themselves are so poor and uncertain, and the men who sow them are still so wild and ignorant of the ways of the civilized world, that I should deprecate any particular point being made of the matter. As long as they duly pay the requisite share of their produce, and bring it to our doors either in grain or money, the Government object is gained, and their obedience and allegiance is fully demonstrated. Thus with regard to the Thull crops those few Wazírís in the tuppahs who do not at present pay in

money might be directed to do so at the time of settlement.

I have alluded above to the old royal sunnuds of immunity from payment of revenue held by many individuals in Bunnú. Before leaving the district I informed you of the state of the case regarding these deeds; I shall here briefly allude to it again. When Major Edwardes recommended to the Resident to sanction an assessment at one-sixth for the religious classes of Bunnú, it was under an implied promise that each individual case should be subsequently investigated; and, if there appeared grounds for granting a total immunity, it might yet be done. I was aware of this promise; and though it was my opinion that scarcely in any case would the sunnuds bear out the claims of the parties, still I have always been most anxious to carry through the investigation and settle the matter one way or another; but, owing to the complete employment of my own time in accounts and other things of more pressing nature, I was never able to carry out my wishes and intentions in the matter. Shortly before leaving, I sent you the misls in the cases of all claimants belonging to the Bazar tuppah and the syud's nine villages, and at the same time wrote you my opinion on the extent of weight which I considered due to the vague and unsatisfactory wording of most of the sunnuds. As the promise of investigation was given however, I hope that you will be able to find the time which I could not to carry it out; but I should recommend your warning the parties not to indulge hopes of advantage therefrom, as you feel pretty well assured that in very few cases will it appear necessary or proper to exceed the indulgence already granted, namely, the assessment at one-sixth of the produce instead of one-fourth.

There are not above three or four cases of dhurmurth in Bunnú itself, these are grants originally made by Konwr Nou Nehal Singh, or the Sikh Generals commanding armies sent to collect revenue in Bunnú, and are worthy of favorable consideration.

I recommend the young Kazí Haider Shah, son of Kazí Mahomed Kusím, the old Kazí of Bunnú, to your

especial care; his father was a loyal, zealous, and useful man, who declared boldly for us during the rebellion, and was very useful to me then in procuring intelligence, both concerning affairs in Bunnú and also of the progress of events above the passes. His son will have the same connections and correspondents, and may be useful in the same way that the father was when necessity occurs. You will find his case duly set forth in paragraph 18 of my memorandum of the claims of certain individuals in the district, to which are appended notes and replies in the handwriting of the President of the Board of Administration, which paper I forwarded to you in original from Bombay.

Since the subjugation of the valley of Bunnú, two very extensive tracts of country, which New cultivation on the Nar lands. were formerly mere waste jungle, have been brought under cultivation. The reclaiming of the first tract called the Nar was projected by Major Edwardes, and was effected by considerably enlarging an old aqueduct, and cutting a new channel to connect it with the land in question, which really had in a great measure lain uncultivated on account of its unprotected position, which, owing to the enmity between the two classes, rendered it impossible for either the men of Murwut or Bunnú to undertake the task of raising crops upon it. General peace having been established by the advent of a paramount power, this difficulty vanished, and the Bunnúchís gladly adopted a project so much to their advantage. Some interruption occurred in the completion of the plan caused by the rebellion and our losing possession of the valley for a period; but, on our return, the works were resumed and completed, and a final allotment of the tract made. The Tahsídár has a detailed statement of this distribution, signed by me, of which I also possess a copy.

The whole amount of land brought under cultivation by this first effort was about 20,000 bigahs. This land, as I have said, was termed the Bunnú Nar. Since that, by a plan devised by the Tahsídár of Bunnú, Rai Tehil Ram, another large tract, called the Murwut Nar, adjoining that of Bunnú, and subsequently named Gulzar, for distinction, has been

apportioned for cultivation, the only difficulty being irrigation, and that having been arranged for, partly by enlarging the original canal of the Bunnú Nar, and partly from the water of the Zumbálá, a water-course which irrigates the Tuppai tuppahs and other lands at that end of Bunnú. The whole of the Gulzar land, which will be brought under cultivation by these arrangements, will amount to about 19,000 more bígahs. You will find a detailed statement of the allotment of this land, together with a copy of the terms on which it has been made over to various parties for cultivation, both signed by me, in the hands of the Tahsildar above-named. Should any doubt or question arise, I shall be able to clear it up by reference to papers in my possession.

Formerly, a large tract of jungly ground intervened between Bunnú and Murwut, which, in the olden time, bore the worst character for robbery and murder; now from Bunnú to Murwut the whole will be covered with hamlets and cultivation.

In both these divisions a fair share of the land has been reserved for the zemindars of Bunnú and Murwut; that done, I have given allotments of the remainder to numerous individuals of other classes, who appeared to me entitled to consideration at our hands, or whom it was an object to Government to induce to plant villages and settle on the spot. Most various, indeed, are the classes that have solicited and obtained improving leases in this tract, ranging from Wazírís and Fakírs to Pathan Sirdars; but the effect of all is a great measure to provide employment and subsistence for a number of deserving men, some of whom have fought for us in the field, and further, to colonize a tract of country hitherto only inhabited by unruly half-reclaimed Afghan classes, who have been but a few years subject to any Government at all, with a strong body of loyal and civilized men belonging to provinces long under strict subjection, and therefore likely to side with order and discipline against sedition, treachery, hill influence, &c. A considerable number of the Pathan officers, who served with Major Edwardes and myself in the late troubles, have gladly accepted leases of portion of this land; these are men of

some consideration, in many cases possessed of other means, and in several instances they have with considerable exertion established good substantial villages on the lands allotted to them, and have collected men from the neighbourhood and have summoned others from their own homes to carry on their farms; all which has led to the wild tract in question being quickly warmed up by a tribe of busy hopeful settlers. I consider it a most advantageous thing that respectable men of name and weight should have thus acquired an interest in the soil in that before rather raw and ill-famed strip of country.

The elaquah of Murwut requires little notice. It is divided into three large tuppahs, namely, Dreypelarah, Baram, and Murwut. The chief Mulliks of Murwut are Abúlsum-mund Khan and Surwur Khan of Dreypelarah, Lungur Khan of Pahar Kheyl; Púrdil Khan, Fakír Khan, and Mahomed Khan of Totezai. Some of the more important minor Mulliks are these, of Sikunder Kheyl, namely, Gouer Khan, Hattí Khan, Hakím Khan, and Abbas Khan; also Druk Khan, Sikunder Kheyl; and Saheb-dad, and Feroze Khan of Pahar Kheyl. All the above are of the Dreypelarah and Baram divisions; while of the Músah Kheyl tuppah the following are the chief Mulliks—Akber Khan of Gerzai Cashmír Khan, Saheb Khan of Gundí; Zuffur Khan of Muma Kheyl; Moul-tan Khan of Murwundí; Sikundur Khan, Mahomed Yar Khan, and Wazír Khan of Drukkah; Tor Khan and Hakím Khan of Walí; Bukhmul and Rehmút Shah of Ahmedzai; Summund Khan and Sohbut Khan of Adumzai, &c. &c.

Púrdil Khan is quite a boy; the other four first-named Mulliks—Abúl Summund Khan, Surwur Khan, Lungur Khan, and Fakír Khan—who are certainly the chief Mulliks of Murwut, are no great favourites of mine, because at a time of need I tried to get them to occupy a portion of the ground round Lukkí to complete the investment of the place, and they hesitated, made difficulties, and at length excused themselves from the task on the plea that they were not fight-

ing-men; the real reason of their backwardness not being fear, but lukewarmness in our cause, or in fact in any cause that was not more clearly the winning one than ours was at that time; they were in fact watching the course of events, and were, therefore, unwilling to be made to declare themselves openly on either side prematurely; while in the interim it was greatly to their advantage that the fort, the key of the district, should remain unreduced, as then neither party would have leisure to press them for revenue. I was sorry for this unworthy conduct on the part of the chief Mulliks, as I had before had rather a high opinion of them. The duty which they had thus avoided was taken up and well carried through by the Mulliks of Sikunder Kheyl before mentioned, and I hope you will ever remember this to their credit, and show them any kindness in your power. The times were gloomy when they came forward to do service; and, though investment working, of course under cover, was all that was required of them, they might at any moment have had to fight hard had the garrison or their friends from without attempted to surprise or break through their portion of the line. In recognition of the good service performed by these Mulliks of Sikunder Kheyl on that occasion, the Board of Administration recommended them for a pension of 120 rupees monthly, or 1,440 rupees a year. This was nominally 30 rupees a month to each of the four men I have named above; but, as in reality they only acted as officers or leaders of a considerable body of men of the same family, several members of which were as deserving of consideration as themselves, I, with the consent of all parties, finally made the following division of the grant, which I mention in detail here, lest at any time dissension should arise on the subject. The 120 rupees monthly to be divided thus :—

|                     | Rupees. |  |  |
|---------------------|---------|--|--|
| Gouer Khan, .. ..   | 24      |  |  |
| Hakím Khan, .. ..   | 22      |  |  |
| Futteh Khan, .. ..  | 20      |  |  |
| Hattí Khan, .. ..   | 20      |  |  |
| Dewanah Khan, . . . | 10      |  |  |
| Abbas Khan, .. ..   | 10      |  |  |

|               |    |    | Rupees. |
|---------------|----|----|---------|
| Mahomed Khan, | .. | .. | 7       |
| Amír Khan,    | .. | .. | 7       |

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120

The following sums are paid to the Mulliks of the elaquah of Murwut, being the same fixed by Major Edwardes when he reformed the revenue system.

To the following Mulliks per harvest in money :—

|                         |    |    | Rupees. |
|-------------------------|----|----|---------|
| Abúlsummund Khan,       | .. | .. | 250     |
| Surwur Khan,            | .. | .. | 250     |
| Púrdil Khan,            | .. | .. | 200     |
| Lungur Khan,            | .. | .. | 175     |
| Mulliks of Músah Kheyl, | .. | .. | 200     |

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Total per harvest in money, .. 1,075

To ditto ditto in grain :—

|                              |    |    | Mds. |
|------------------------------|----|----|------|
| Abúlsummund Khan,            | .. | .. | 150  |
| Surwur Khan,                 | .. | .. | 150  |
| Púrdil Kheyl (Ghuzní Kheyl), |    |    | 80   |
| Lungur Khan,                 | .. | .. | 20   |
| Mulliks of Músah Kheyl,      | .. | .. | 100  |
| Nusrut Khan,                 | .. | .. | 10   |
| Púrdil Khan, (Begú Kheyl),   | .. | .. | 10   |
| Muddut Khan, son of Abúl-    |    |    |      |
| summund Khan,                | .. | .. | 10   |
| Azím Khan, son of Ursulah,   | .. | .. | 10   |
| Azím Khan (Khúidad Kheyl),   |    |    | 10   |
| Mír Kullum,                  | .. | .. | 15   |
| Sheikh Paenduh,              | .. | .. | 5    |
| Mían Omur Fakír,             | .. | .. | 15   |

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Total amount in grain per harvest, 585

On account of sowars the chief Mulliks receive—

|                   |    |    | Sowars. | Rupees. |
|-------------------|----|----|---------|---------|
| Abúlsummund Khan, | .. | .. | 6       | 360     |
| Surwur Khan,      | .. | .. | 0       | 360     |

|                               |   |     |
|-------------------------------|---|-----|
| Púrdil Khan and Mahomed Khan, | 0 | 360 |
| Lungur Khan, .. .. .          | 4 | 240 |
| Feroze Khan, ... ..           | 2 | 120 |
| Mulliks of Músa Kheyl, ..     | 6 | 360 |

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Total per harvest on account of sowars, 1,800

These sowars are not kept up. The Murwut Mulliks are ill-provided for with reference to the revenue realized from the elaquah, and also as compared to the provision made for men of their class in other elaquahs, and this item for sowars, which they have always received, serves as well as any other head under which to afford them something to live upon and fulfil the duties of their position with.

Before the Sikhs gained position of the Trans-Indus provinces, the elaquah of Murwut was held by the Nawab of Derah in much the same manner that the Sikhs subsequently dealt with Bunnú, that is, that no troops were kept up in the district, nor were the people interfered with in any matter but that of revenue, and to collect this it was always necessary to send a force into the elaquah, and on these occasions the Mulliks of Murwut always made a good harvest, acting as agents between the commander of the troops and the people of the country, for which duty, in addition to any profits made in their own way in the course of business, they received, at the close of the proceedings, handsome gratuities and khilluts, and at all times were treated with that consideration and distinction which Native Governments and their officials usually show to men who have it in their power to be useful in dealing with subjects disposed to be refractory. The system I have mentioned was in a great measure kept up by the Sikh officials, to whom the management of the elaquah was entrusted, though after Futteh Khan Tewannah had placed a fort in the middle of the district, the people were of course under more complete subjection than they had been. One tuppah, however, that of Músa Kheyl, always remained in rather a wild ill-controlled state, and Lukkí Mul, Kardar of Derah, and his son and successor, Doulut Rai, were both more than once under the necessity of sending a considerable body of troops to enforce payment of revenue,



&c., from the Murwuts of Músa Khayl; on such occasions the services of the head men of the two more loyal tuppahs were always put in requisition and always rewarded with honour and khilluts.

It may be easily conceived that the position of the head Mulilks of Murwut under such a system was much more to their taste than that which they at present hold with fixed unvarying allowances, little consideration, and no marks of especial favour—add to this that the amount realized by the Nawab of Derah from the elaquah of Murwut amounted to about one-third, and that which Dewans Lukki Mul and Doulut Rai took to two-thirds of the sum which we now collect yearly from it, and, I think you will agree with me that the head Mulliks are not too well cared for. Major Edwardes himself was of opinion, that about 65,000 rupees would be the proper assessment of Murwut. The revenue in the last four years has ranged from a lakh and ten to a lakh and twenty thousand rupees yearly. The accession of income is attributable partly to increased cultivation and partly to the effects of the change in the system of assessment, by which every individual has to pay a certain share of his profits in revenue; the former mode of taxation, though felt to be more irksome, did not reach all parties as the present does.

The case of the syuds and religious classes of Murwut you will find fully explained in paragraph 19 of my memorandum, of deserving individuals in the district, to which I have before alluded. I hope you will kindly exert yourself to get what I have proposed for them confirmed. I think the grant would be politic and proper in every way.

There are not above three or four cases of Dhurmurth in Murwut.

The settlement of Murwut is a difficult question. The revenue is at present collected by Kunkút; a plain one-fourth of the crop with five per cent. jerib or measurement cess (calculated to cover the expense to Government of men employed in measuring and estimating the crops) and the one per cent. road fund being taken. The

evils of a measurement system in a country like Murwut where the crops cover the ground like a sheet, undivided by fences or even marks apparent to the uninitiated, are very great, and the opportunities for fraud and deception, both on the part of the zemindars and officials entrusted with the duty of measuring the crops infinite, but it has two undoubted merits, it sits lightly on the people, while at the same time it enables us to realise a larger revenue from the country than we could ever venture to take by a fixed settlement. I have mentioned that the revenue of the elaquah has greatly increased since Major Edwardes remodelled the system of assessment, abolishing several obnoxious cesses and raising the rate from one-sixth to one-fourth; and yet I am confident that the payment of revenue presses less hardly upon the zemindars generally now than it did in those times, when a smaller sum was taken in an irregular way, and the head Mulliks were the parties through whom the collections were made. You will by this time have learned enough of the Murwut character to know that the complaints they make and the trouble they give at the time of measurement do not invalidate my theory in the matter. I have constantly taken up their cases and examined carefully into the charges of over assessment frequently preferred by them against the Tahsil officials, and have almost always found them ungrounded and frivolous. In such matters the Murwuttís, though a better class of men than the Bunnúchís, have not a shadow of principle, and will band together to declare their crops did not produce twenty seers per kinal, which, when tested, would prove to yield one and a half maunds. These complaints, under the present system, as they occur only at the immediate period of measurement, can be dealt with and examined before the proofs are removed, as even a Murwuttí can comprehend, that, as all his crops pass under review he must make the struggle when their value is being estimated, then or never. But under a settlement this would not be the case; the crops would be first removed and cared for, and then—and not till then—the zemindars would adjourn to your gate and rend the air with lamentations on the utter impossibility of their making good the amount of their rents, when you have the opportunity

which I do not envy you, of trying to work on their feelings by arguments founded on reason, common sense, propriety, high feeling, &c. A *dhurna* of this sort is often undertaken by a village community as a good joke even under the present system. All work on the crops being at an end, and most of the hands at leisure, and it being known that the village accounts for the harvest are about to be closed in the Tahsildar's office, they think it worth while to try the effect of a grand supplicatory visit to the Deputy Commissioner in hopes of obtaining some little abatement on the whole demand. The picture drawn in the petition concocted for the occasion, of the tyranny of the Tahsildar's acts, and the hopelessness of their future prospects, when the Government demands shall have necessitated their disposing of the last articles of furniture, stock, &c., which have escaped former destraints of the same nature, is gloomy in the extreme, and altogether they conduct themselves like men in the last stage of destitution and despondency, when really in their hearts they know that the Government demand is far short of what it might rightfully be. You may imagine that it is quite hopeless to reason with men under such circumstances. The best way is to select five or six of the head men, keep them with you, dismiss the rest, and summon the Tahsildar and his officials connected with the affair with their books, khusras-papers, &c., and then go over the whole accounts with the parties confronted, and it will be generally found that, as I have said, the demand is under what it might have been, and the petitioners will change their request for justice to an insinuatingly preferred one for kindness and consideration, something to illustrate in their individual instance the generosity for which the British Government is so famed. I have just sketched a case of the kind to explain my meaning, when I say that in Murwut, where such attempts are made when the matter under dispute is fresh and easily dealt with, it will be a far more difficult task to dispose of complaints of over assessment under a settlement, the more especially as from the nature of the soil it does so happen in this elaquah, that where in one year 5,000 rupees worth of grain is produced, 500 rupees worth may not be forthcoming the next, so that, though the revenues of

the last four years show a nearly equal average for the whole elaquah, an examination into the accounts would prove that the produce of the various tuppahs has been most uncertain, and that frequently a great deficit in the value of one has been balanced by an equally large and unexpected increase in that of another. I have never seen any district to equal Murwut in this way: the productive part of it is a large mound of sand falling from the Shaikh Buddín range of hills to the Gúmbeyla river on one side, and to a ravine running from the Peyzú hills to the Gúmbeyla on the other. It is, as I have said, mere sand, (so destitute of water that the communities who live in the large villages situated on it have to fetch their drinking water daily either from Lukkí or the springs in the Peyzú pass,) and on this the seed is sown, with care enough, for it is the only operation that requires the least care or attention; once sown it depends entirely on the rains vouchsafed by Providence, whether in the spring the sand be hidden by a luxuriant crop of the finest wheat, barley, or grain to be found in the whole country, or whether it remain as barren and profitless as if it had never been touched. How this peculiarity is to be dealt with in a settlement, I do not know; the only plan I can propose as likely practically to meet the difficulty is that a triple scale of value per kinal should be fixed for each description of grain, with a corresponding value in money calculated according to the market price of the amount of grain that would fall to the share of Government from each kinal, and that the lands should then be measured, and the amount of first, second, or third rate kinals, for which a man was answerable, be entered in the khusrah; this would save some of the quarrelling and discussion which at present takes place at the time of measurement, while it would still enforce complaint being made while the crops are to the fore or never. This is the nearest approach to a fixed rate of assessment which I can fancy answering in Murwut without a great and needless sacrifice of revenue; at the same time I must say that I offer this as the opinion of a man of little or no experience in such matters, practically unacquainted with the working of the settlement system, and rather from having

only seen their operation in frontier districts opposed to settlements in any locality where the crops are not rendered almost infallible by certain irrigation.

I should have mentioned in another place, that Abúlsummund Khan, and in fact most of the Mulliks of Murwut, but especially Paenduh of Michen Kheyl, have considerable acquaintance with the Shinwa and Pukki Mulliks of the neighbouring hills, the cause being that the Khuttuks used formerly to make a trade of stealing the Murwut cattle, carrying it off to the hills, and then returning it to the owners on the payment of a certain amount per head; this system, which is well known in the country, is styled recovery of stolen cattle by the payment of búngah. The acquaintance thus originated between the men of the Khuttuk hills and the Murwuttís of the plain below went no further than mere occasional communication about stolen property, except in the cases of Abúlsummund Khan himself and Paenduh Michen Kheyl. The former is a great friend of Bungí Khan, Khuttuk of Pukki, and the latter, whether he be friend or no, is not to be trusted in matters affecting Bungí Khan, or any of the men of the Khuttuk villages in his neighbourhood, as either from fear or favor he will neither act nor speak against them. These are always useful points to be acquainted with. As regards the rest of the Murwuttís I believe there is little sympathy, and a good deal of distrust and dislike between them and the Khuttuks, and it is as well that it should be so.

The Músah Kheyl tuppah of Murwut, which, as I have said, was formerly so unruly, is now quiet enough. Among the Mulliks Akber of Gerzai is a stirring energetic fellow, whom you may find useful in many ways but must not trust too far. Akber was at the head of the men in the Músah Kheyl tuppah, that carried on buddí or feud with the Janí-Kheyl and Bukki Kheyl Wazírís, and the influence that he still has over the men of these tribes is a tolerable proof that he conducted matters with spirit and determination. Akber was opposed to us during the rebellion, and would always adhere to the side the success of which afforded him the best hope of independence and immunity from paying

revenue, &c., still he is not an ill-dispositioned man, and can and will make himself useful at times. Sáheb Khan, of Gundí, Zuffer Khan, of Mámá Kheyí, and Moultañ Khan, of Murwundí, are three influential men, formerly turbulent and evil-disposed characters, who were more or less concerned in all highway robberies committed on the road between Bunnú and Lukkí; they are now more respectable and orderly, but must still, to a certain extent, be held answerable for the safety of the road, one of the most unprotected portions of which is that which traverses the lands of their villages, while the extensive wastes in the neighbourhood are made use of as grazing grounds for the Government camels. Bukhmul, of Ahmedzai, the position of the Thannah, is a good man. The Thannah of Ahmedzai is in rather an exposed position in front of the Buttunnís and Wazírís, a part in fact of the defenceless state of the whole south-western side of the valley which I have previously spoken of. Nothing has yet occurred there, and we may go on for years with accident; but when on one occasion I received an express in red ink from the Thannahdar to say that he believed that the tuppah would be attacked that night by the Mahsúds and Buttunnís, I felt truly that the thing was most possible, and how ill-prepared we were in that quarter, and also how very difficult it must always be to send efficient aid to it from Bunnú with any hope of its being in time to prevent mischief. I recommend Sikunder Khan, Mahomed

Village of Drukkah.

Yar, and Wazír Khan, of Drukkah, to your favorable consideration; Drukkah was formerly a thoroughly Yaghí\* nest of villages, and constantly fought the Nawabs and the Derah Dewán's forces. The villages are strongly posted among deep ravines with a back ground of rugged hills. To sweep the ravines and villages of Drukkah and punish the inhabitants, backed as they would be by the hill-men, would not be done without loss; but the villages themselves would not be tenable under cannonade from the side of the plains. Ever since we have held the country these men have been thoroughly amenable, and I have always been much pleased with the respect-

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\* Rebellious.

able orderly conduct of the above three Mulliks. It was with them that Jaffir Khan, the Bunnúchí Mullik, took refuge when driven out of Bunnú by the Sikh rebels. Walí, near Drukkah, is even a wilder spot, situated in the midst of a perfect nest of ravines which make it wholly unapproachable from the Bunnú side. The only way to get at it with a force would be by a circuit through Drukkah and the ravine in its rear. I have travelled by both roads, and while infantry, horse, and zumbúrah's might undoubtedly be taken by the route I have mentioned to the back of Walí, it would, I think be madness to throw them into the ravines through which the direct line from Bunnú to Ahmedzai would lead. Tor Khan, Mullik of Walí is a very respectable well-behaved man, who has made himself useful on several occasions. Súltan Mahmúd Khan, Thannahdar, is well acquainted with him, and will give you his character and history when necessary. There is a freebooter on this part of the border known by the name of Ghuza Buttunní; he employs himself and his followers chiefly in cattle-stealing, generally restoring the property on the payment of búngah; his home is in the Gubbur hill at the back of Drukkah.

I forget at this moment whether the village of Mullezai belongs to the Músah Kheyl or Baram tuppah. Its isolated site on the south-western side of the ridge which divides the Bunnú and Tánk valleys is so anomalous that it affords no guide to my memory by its geographical position; however, mention of Mullezai is naturally connected with Drukkah and Súltan Mahmúd Khan. Mullezai is a large village belonging to Murwut, but situated strangely on the Tánk side of the hill, and not above fifteen miles from Tánk itself. Mullezai, like Drukkah, has always been reputed mutinous and unruly; it is a strong village as to population, but the natural position is not difficult, not to be compared to Drukkah or Walí: it is situated in the elbow of the hills made by the junction of the ridge that runs from the Peyzú pass to the Gubbur mountain in the main Wazírí range. There has always been more or less difficulty about collecting the revenue from this village, and that of the Wazírís and Buttunnís who descend from the neighbouring mountains and

cultivate the strips of Thull land under the hills. The Mullezais themselves have always paid their own revenue, but the collection of that of the hill-men has led to more than one skirmish. The Pathans of Mullezai are assessed like the Murwuttis at one-fourth the produce. The Waziris and Buttunnis cultivate the Thull at one-sixth like their brethren in Bunnú. Súltan Mahmúd Khan has always been employed to support the Tahsildar's arrangements on these occasions, and has always conducted matters with great judgment and determination. To watch over these proceedings, Súltan Mahmúd Khan had to be constantly passing between his thannah at Ahmedzai and the village of Mullezai, in which place he occasionally left a party of his men, intending to return to them immediately, for at first, regard being had to the former character of the village, it was not recognized as advisable to leave a detachment quartered in it; by degrees, however, the feeling wore off, small parties of men were left in the village for long periods without apparently provoking any ill-feeling on the part of the Mulliks and people, but still the arrangement was not sanctioned. I was aware of the state of affairs, and had got used to it, and did not think it worth while to interfere. About June 1851, a Mullezai Mullik absconded to the hills, leaving a portion of his revenue unpaid, and his property, stock, &c., was consequently confiscated; a short time after this the small party of horsemen in the village was attacked in the middle of the night, two men were killed and five wounded. This was no doubt the work of the fugitive Mullik, assisted by the hill-men; but there was also room for strong suspicion that the other Mulliks had aided and acquiesced in the attack, and had certainly not shown the interest and alacrity in assisting the attacked party that they might have done. I, therefore, seized the whole of the Mulliks of Mullezai but one, and after a careful investigation recommended that one who had failed to convey a call for assistance sent through him by the commander of the horsemen should be transported for seven years, two more for luke-warmness, indifferent conduct, for three years, and also that the village should be fined 400 rupees, which



decision was confirmed by the Board of Administration and carried into effect. The one Mullik who, as I have mentioned, was made an exception on the occasion, was one Bahadúr Khan, who from the first had given the horsemen good intelligence and assisted them when wounded and in trouble, and subsequently had lent every assistance in his power to the Thannahdar when endeavouring to obtain a clue to the actors and instigators of the affair. I think this Bahadúr Khan ought to receive some especial provision beyond his fellows as a mark of favor from Government, and shall be glad to hear of your having so far agreed with me as to recommend him for it; a small extra berat or Mullikánah allowance would be well bestowed on him, as, apart from what he has done, he may be very useful on future occasions, and there is no doubt but that he has incurred much enmity and dislike by the line he

The Bain or Mullezai has adopted. The Mullezai pass. you have seen. It is not a very formidable one, as the heights on either side can be crowned without much labour, and the position of men holding them could be turned; it is also a certain distance from the lofty hills, so that a large body of men would not be able to occupy it without some notice and leisure, and that, if possible, should never be afforded them when there is an intention to make use of the pass. This durrah would, however, never be safe for a permanent line of communication, nor should horsemen be sent backwards and forwards through it, as it exposes them to be waylaid and assassinated. If a message is to be sent through, the best plan is to forward it by a foot-runner from one of the villages on either side of the pass. These men know the locality and the men likely to infest it, and are known by them, and incur little or no risk. Súltan Mahmùd Khan has always been very anxious that I should order Lungur Khan, the Murwut Mullik, who himself resides at Pahar Kheyi, to establish a hamlet in the middle of the Bain or Mullezai pass, and make him responsible for the road; but I have always been rather averse to the plan. The spot is not a safe one for an open village; and, if a fort is to be built, it had better be

built and cared for by Government ; but the whole arrangement does not seem to me of sufficient importance at present. We do not want the road for traffic ; messengers between Ahmedzai and Aman Kheyl go by the Siggí pass ; and if a force is to be sent through it can make its own

Post at Aman Kheyl. arrangements without requiring the aid of a Mulik's gurri in the middle of the pass. We have at present a large police post at Aman Kheyl, about two miles from Mullezai. When I laid hands on the Mullezai Mulliks I was unable to leave the detachment (which I could not at the time arrange to support) in a wild disloyal village like that of Mullezai, with no entrenchment or protection ; so on the same day sent it with the wounded men to the neighbouring village of Aman Kheyl in the Tánk elaquah, and there it has been posted ever since, a mud enclosure and small tower or keep having been erected to keep the party from surprise. This is a very good position for the post to occupy till it be deemed expedient to place a regular frontier fort in the neighbourhood of Mullezai.

You will find a full account of the family of Mahomed Khan Raes, of Esá Kheyl, in the eighth chapter of Major Edwardes' "Year in the Punjab," and also a brief notice of his case in paragraph 23 of my list of deserving individuals before Mahomed Khan and alluded to. To the fact mentioned by Major Edwardes of Mahomed Khan's having lost his ablest son in the charge made by the Pathan horse on the rebel artillery at Kimerí, I have to add a brief notice of the actively loyal and meritorious conduct of himself and the rest of his family during the progress of the campaign. When the rebellion at Múltan first broke out, and I was under the necessity of detaching a large portion of the force occupying Bunnú, of which I was then in charge, to the assistance of Major Edwardes, partly to supply their place and partly with the object of increasing the number of Mahomedans in the force around me, I directed Mahomed Khan, of Esá Kheyl, to raise 500 men in his district and neighbourhood, and send

them to me under the command of his sons. This order was obeyed with great speed and alacrity by Mahomed Khan, and the body of men he raised were good efficient soldiers, fit for any work ; and when by an arrangement of Major Edwardes I quitted Bunnú for Dera Ismael Khan, and made over charge of the former elaquah to Futteh Khan Tewanah, this body of Mussulmans formed a strong and appropriate addition to his own body-guard of irregulars, and one calculated to be useful to him in emergency, as was indeed subsequently the case, though their presence was not sufficient to avert the final catastrophe that occurred.

When the Sikh troops in Bunnú broke out into sudden rebellion, murdered Colonel Holmes, and gained possession of the four light artillery guns which had been withdrawn from the bastions for the purpose of being despatched to Múltan, Futteh Khan Tewanah, taken by surprise by the extent and suddenness of the event, found himself in a very short time hemmed in in the inner enclosure of the fort of Dhullípgurh. With him among others was Mahomed Khan of Esá Kheyl. The second brother, Mahomed Ayaz Khan, was not able to join his brother at the commencement of the difficulty, and remained outside with the remainder of the family levies, with which he immediately joined himself to such individuals as he believed loyal and likely to assist Futteh Khan Tewanah to the utmost. Those were the Bunnú Mulliks before mentioned, namely, Jaffir Khan, Bazíd Khan, Dilassah Khan, &c., in company with whom and some Wazírí and Dour volunteers brought by Dilassah Khan and by Swahn Khan, Mahomed Ayaz Khan made several bold attempts to raise the siege of the inner fort in which Futteh Khan and his own brother were beset. The attacks made by this body of men, although quite undisciplined, íll-armed, and without cannon, were found to be anything but contemptible by the Sikh regulars, who for a considerable time suffered themselves to be driven to the defensive, and allowed the town of Dhullípgurh to be plundered and occupied under their very guns ; at length, however, they assumed the offensive, and the superiority of their force soon turned the scale. The Mussulman party

were worsted with considerable loss, and all hope of relieving Futteh Khan was at an end. After a gallant resistance of ten days, prolonged after the only supply of water in the inner fort formed by pools, collected for moistening the mud for building purposes, had failed (the present well which is 130 feet in depth had then, only with constant working, reached a depth of 60 of 70 feet), the besiegers gained possession of the fort, Futteh Khan and his lieutenant were killed, and Mahomed Alim Khan, of Esá Kheyl, was made prisoner, and remained as such in the Sikh camp till after the battle of Gúzerat. Mahomed Ayaz Khan, the other brother, seeing the game at an end, drew off to the hills for a time, and afterwards joined me when I arrived at Esá Kheyl from Múltan, and he and his brothers, Abdúllah Khan and Surfúraz Khan, were with me during the attack on Lukkí; altogether the whole family were distinguished as hearty thorough-going well-wishers of our cause during the whole movement, and I hope that this will always be remembered in their favor, as well as the fact that their zeal was in a great measure attributable to the effect of the politic and generous liberality with which they had previously been treated by our Government, coming, as it did, after years of harsh and careless treatment at the hands of our native predecessors. I may mention that Mahomed Alim Khan received a grant of 1,000 rupees from Government as compensation for his losses in horses, tents, &c., on the above-mentioned occasion. I would beg particularly to call your attention to the 23rd paragraph of my memorandum of deserving men in the district, in which the case of Mahomed Khan, of Esá Kheyl, is noticed, and to recommend that the sunnud therein mentioned be obtained for him.

Shere Khan, of Esa Kheyl, cousin of the other Khans,  
 Shere Khan. and their natural rival and enemy,  
 has been a loyal partizan of ours,  
 and has many useful qualities, not the least of which is decided bravery; he was also shut up with Futteh Khan Tewanah in the inner fort of Dhullípurh, and subsequently carried off as a prisoner by the Sikhs, and not released till after the battle of Gúzerat. Shere Khan received 800 rupees.

from Government as indemnification for his losses during the campaign. Shere Khan afterwards did good service when in command of the Luttumner out-post. At the time when it was necessary to supply the detachments in the Khuttuk country with grain, &c., from Bunnú, and by a road which passed for miles along an exposed frontier, an arrangement which caused constant anxiety and difficulty, Shere Khan was constantly in the field, and underwent most harassing and incessant duty, was frequently engaged with the Wazírís, and always conducted matters with great spirit and success; altogether he is a good useful man, a strict adherence to truth is not amongst his virtues, but he has many that may be made available despite that failing, which I fear is not confined to himself in Esá Kheyl. Shere Khan is the fifth man mentioned in my list of deserving characters before alluded to.

It is probable that ere this reaches you the settlement of Esá Kheyl will have been completed. An arrangement for the remission of half the irksome nuzzuranah cess was made before I left. You will find the matter explained in the 20th paragraph of my memorandum, to which also Sir Henry Lawrence's opinion on the subject is appended. The system of collection which had prevailed in Esá Kheyl for years was so complicated that I felt it difficult to meddle with it without going thoroughly into the matter; and that I never found time to do, hampered as I was by more pressing cases, accounts, &c. The state of the Esá Kheyl revenue was simply this, that while many of the villages were assessed nominally at rates far below what it is customary to take in other elaquahs, the full Government demand was in fact made up by extra cesses, bearing all sorts of arbitrary designations, the true origin and nature of which it was difficult to arrive at, but which it might always be dangerous to abolish without careful examination and inquiry. The plan I would willingly have adopted was to have assimilated the collections to those of Murwut, by demanding a clear one-fourth share from all parties and abolishing all extra cesses, and this as a preparatory measure to the introduction of a settlement; but whenever it was proposed I always found so

much alarm expressed by a large proportion of the community at the prospect of their rate being raised, perhaps from one-sixth to one-fourth, without apparently a countervailing feeling of satisfaction at the abolition of the extra cesses, that I was induced to abandon the idea of making this change, and to defer any alteration in the system till I could go thoroughly into the case in all its bearings. This I never found time to do; I hope you have been more successful. There can be no doubt but that the assessment of Esá Kheyl generally requires considerable lightening.

The alum pits at Kotkí, which village is situated at the lower extremity of the Chichalí pass, have lately been repaired and re-opened. Mahomed Khan exerted himself considerably in the matter; and, though of course it was for his own interest, I consider his energy and perseverance meritorious. By his old sunnuds he was entitled to a remission of one-third of the Government duty on the alum levied at the pits, and this has been continued to him, together with one-third of the zemindarí or actual profits of the pits. This decision of mine was confirmed as a temporary arrangement by the Board of Administration in their letter replying to a report of mine on the subject of the settlement of the affairs of Kala Bagh, which you will find in your office; it must bear date April 1852. I would recommend that no alteration be made in the plan I adopted. The amount thus granted by Government in accordance with the spirit of former privileges is a mere trifle. Mahomed Khan is a deserving man, and it is an object to Government to have the mines worked and the locality frequented.

I have before noticed the Chichalí pass which leads from Kotkí through the Khuttuk hills to the Chounterah plain. It is one of the wildest and stiffest defiles I have ever seen; one part of it is so narrow that it used in former times to be closed by iron bars, the sockets for which are yet visible. This pass is at present within our boundaries, and the Khuttuks about it are quiet and amenable; but, as I have before said, I strongly recommend that it should be used as little as

possible as a line of communication, and that merchants should not be encouraged to frequent it, the result of which would be that robberies would occur for which the tribes bordering on the pass must be made answerable. Their hills are very strong, and their coercion would involve more expense and trouble than the whole matter at issue would be worth. There are many places like this on an Afghan border. It just amounts to this, that during the whole time I have been in the district the pass has hardly been heard of, and the men about it have had no temptation to mischief, though when occasion required the road has been used by myself and others; but, were it adopted as a regular line of communication by merchants, I know well that in a very short time it would grow into considerable notoriety. At the same time the pass can always be made use of as a means of rapid communication between the Esá Kheyl valley and Chounterah and Nurri in cases of urgent necessity. The whole defile is about thirteen miles in length; the road from Kotki to Sirobe, a distance of nine miles, is up the bed of a water-course. Sirobe is a small village where grass forage can be procured; nothing else must be hoped for. From Sirobe to the Chounterah plain is about four miles, and on this part of the road there is a steep kothul to be surmounted, the road over which, however, is naturally good, and might be greatly improved by a few hours' labour.

I will mention here two matters connected with the management of the river, namely, the *mírbihrí* or ferry duties, and the gold washing. The former has given some trouble owing to the fact of the boatmen of the river having always in former times received a much higher rate of ferry toll than is common on other rivers. The stream of the Indus is so broad, strong, and dangerous in the hot weather, that they have always been able to exact very high pay for their duties during that season and the rains; and the consequence was that when the Board of Administration, by a circular letter recommended the assimilation of the ferry tolls on all the Punjab rivers, and the adoption of the scale laid down by His Honor the Lieutenant Governor of the North-Western Pro-

vinces for the Indian rivers, and I made arrangements with ferry the contractor accordingly, the conditions being that he was only to take the stipulated amount from travellers and give half to the boatmen, I soon found that the latter were sufferers to an extent that could not be considered fair, and that in fact they considered themselves ruined and were unwilling to continue their trade ; I was, therefore, obliged, eventually to revise the arrangement and double the amount levied on other rivers, giving half to the boatmen and half to the contractor, and this if anything is to be made for Government by the ferry fund, you will find it necessary to continue. The labour of working boats on the Indus in the hot weather and rains is so great that if only the rates laid down in the *Agra Government Gazette* are taken, they will not do more than barely remunerate the boatmen for their work, and leave no margin for the Government fund. I would advise the contracts of each ferry being given to separate individuals ; and, if possible, to the boatmen themselves. Hitherto they have rather shrunk from the risk, not being men of any substance ; but if they could see a clear prospect of fair profit in the matter, they would doubtless adopt the system of renting the ferries themselves. In all cases they must be bound down to keep a certain number of boats at work, as, owing to the great breadth of the Indus at one time of the year, the number of boats required is far greater than on other rivers.

Gold washing. The gold washing has always been farmed out. It is not very productive, and it is rather difficult to ascertain what it is really worth. The sale of the contract by auction affords the best and only test.

While speaking of the Esá Kheyl elaquah, I wish to notice a class of men whose cases in some instances deserve favorable consideration. These are the claimants of charitable grants by chúnghí. There are more of these in the Esá Kheyl elaquah than in any other ; but they exist also in Derah proper and Murwut. The original nature of these grants was this : the individual received a sunnud granting him so many measures out of the *hur do sirrah*, or full produce of the lands of a village or estate before division, but occasionally



specified as out of the Government share, or that of the ryots. In most cases these grants of grain were commuted at the time of harvest into money payments; and, where they have existed for many years, the claim for a continuance of the whole or a portion of the grant is, I think, worthy of some consideration. I have especially regard to the cases of two men, one Chiragh Shah Syud, and the other Kunniyah Lall Ghosain of Derah. I especially recommended both these men to your care before leaving the district. They are both very respectable men, much looked up to and respected by natives of all religions in the district, and it would be advisable to care well for them. They both enjoy other grants, but their chief income was formerly derived from these *chúngí* allowances, which are now in abeyance.

For a full account of the position, character, &c., of  
 Kala Bagh. Mullik Allyar Khan, of Kala  
 Bagh, and of the final arrangement  
 of his case, I must refer to my correspondence on the subject in your office, and especially to the letter of the Board of Administration received by me a short time before quitting the district, conveying the final decision of Government in the Mullik's case, and my reply, showing how that decision had been carried out; you will also find a Persian Rubukarí in the office, addressed to Allyar Khan, setting forth all the particulars of the Government orders in his case. Kala Bagh is rather an important spot, and must be watched and taken care of. The Bungí Kheyl tribe of Khuttuks, who inhabit

Bungí Kheyl. the hill district from Kala Bagh  
 to Shukurdurrah, are under Mullik  
 Allyar Khan, who takes revenue from them by an arbitrary money assessment styled *afrohí*, a name generally given to the proceeds of fines, confiscations, &c., but in this instance applied to an irregular money cess levied from those best able to pay; the whole amount taken is very small, and its payment sits lightly enough. Through the hills of the Bungí Kheyl runs the Shukurdurrah pass to Kohat, one that it is likely we may want to use frequently for the conveyance of stores, supplies &c., from Kala Bagh to Kohat. The Bungí Kheyl is not a strong tribe, but they were formerly great thieves

and highway robbers. Since we have ruled the country they have behaved admirably, and have given up their bad habits. Care should be taken to avoid any change in arrangements likely to stir them up to mischief again, that is, I should say so long as Allyar Khan manages them well and prevents them doing injury on the roads, &c., let him do so in his own way, and let him be supported; for, insignificant as the clan is, it would cost us money and a good many men to watch the road, and the result would very possibly not be as satisfactory as the present state of things.

Mozuffur Khan, Allyar Khan's eldest son, is a respectable well-behaved man. He was in the inner fort of Dhul-ípgurh with Futteh Khan Tewannah, but did not subsequently keep up his character for loyalty as well as the Esá Kheyl Khans; having made full submission and presented nuzzurs to the Sikhs, he was released and admitted into favor with them. Again, when I arrived from Múltan and became engaged in the Lukkí affair, both Mozuffur Khan and his father lent me active and efficient assistance in forwarding supplies, stores, ammunition, &c.; and such in a great measure is their character, anxious to keep well with all parties, and not bold enough to adopt one side for better for worse.

I have named the Peyzú pass and the Sanatarium on the Sheikh Buddín hill for notice.

Peyzú pass and Sheikh Buddín. All that I wish to say on the subject is that I hope that no interval of security and freedom from accident will lead to officers proceeding to Sheikh Buddín, and encamping there without efficient armed escort. The mountain is connected with the main range of hills by a long uninhabited ridge, down which thieves can pass in small gangs and entirely escape the observation of the country people. Among the classes inhabiting the portion of the main range alluded to are a number of ill-conditioned characters, long used to petty plundering expeditions, by which they formerly lived; these men are decidedly hostile to us, as the representatives of order, they are thoroughly acquainted with the whole locality of the Peyzú pass, which they were for years in the habit of infesting, and they have

several times suffered at the hands of the Government detachments at Peyzú, Kúndí, Amán Kheyl, &c., and on a late occasion a gang was severely handled by some Powinduh merchants who came across them, lying in wait in the spurs of the Sheikh Buddín hill. I know this class of men well, and how patiently they can bide their time to strike a revengeful blow; and I repeat that it will never be safe for officers to frequent Sheikh Buddín unescorted, though the system might be pursued through a long period without mishap. On a frontier continued care and caution is what I would advocate, and the result will be continued security, and an avoidance of what I consider so great an evil, namely, the temporary alarm and over-cautiousness which is apt to succeed an accident originally caused by a careless neglect of common sense precautions. With regard to Sheikh Buddín, I am of opinion that a fixed post of matchlock men in a defensive tower at the top of the mountain would afford the best security, and then with a slight escort for baggage and individuals passing to and fro there would be no risk of anything untoward occurring.

The tribes on the Tánk border are Wazírís, Buttunnís, and Meanís, the latter Border tribes of the elaquas south of the Peyzú pass. squatters from one of the Powinduh tribes. Tánk is immediately below the head quarters of the strongest of the Wazírí tribes, the Mahsúd, formerly mentioned in connection with Bunnú. The ninth chapter of the first volume of Major Edwardes' work will explain to you fully how the connection between the family of Shah Newaz Khan and the heads of the above tribe originated; it remains as strong as ever. Shah Newaz Khan, himself the son of a Wazírí woman, has lately taken a wife from the Allizai branch of the Mahsúd tribe, and has always been on friendly terms with them; this has hitherto produced nothing but advantage, as during my employment in the district the Wazírís have never given trouble or annoyance on the Tánk border. Were they inclined to be more active in this quarter, they might do much mischief, as they have proved on former occasions when assisting Alladad Khan, father of Shah Newaz Khan, to annoy

and injure the Múltaní Khans, to whom the Sikh Government had entrusted the care of the elaquah of Tánk.

Our present system of posts on the Tánk forntier would not be sufficient to resist the aggressions of the Wazírís in that quarter if they adopted active hostility. The posts of the Punjab Irregular Force run up to Dubbrah on one side, and the village of Amín Kheyl near Mullezai is held by a detachment of police, horse and foot, on the other ; a large space between being left uncared for. Under existing circumstances this does not signify. Shah Newaz Khan remains on good terms with the Wazírís and the elaquah is not molested. The occurrence of petty thefts and annoyances from other parties may, however, at any time render it necessary to increase the number of posts along this part of the border ; and, if possible, this should be done without at the same time setting aside Shah Newaz Khan's beneficial influence. Let Government, if it is thought desirable, establish its own posts, making use of Shah Newaz Khan's local knowledge and influence in all dealings with the Wazírís, &c. This would be, I believe, the best arrangement for Government. Should anything make it necessary for us to remove Shah Newaz Khan entirely, I am of opinion that we should quickly require a stronger disposition of posts and detachments to protect the elaquah from inroad from the hills than is at present necessary. With a prospect of possible difficulty at some future period of the above nature, I would not advise the demolition or dismantling of the old fort of Tánk ; the existence of a fort, though it be old and dilapidated, gives a feeling of security to the inhabitants of the town, and the place is regarded by the hill-men as less exposed to attack than they would believe it to be did they know that it possessed no stronghold of any kind. I am aware that I am arguing entirely on what I know to be the feelings of natives in such matters ; but where so great an extent of frontier has to be held and managed by as few troops as can perform the task, I conceive it to be both prudent and expedient to adopt every available means of economising them. Tánk without any stronghold would not (the present good feeling of the Wazírís removed) be safe from

an inroad such as that by which Derah Futteh Khan was attacked, the alternative would be to garrison it with troops, and that would cost men and money.

The Meanís and Buttunís have an old feud which has several times nearly led to an open rupture, an ultimate result which, though the battle ground would not probably be within our limits, we have always tried to avert by advice and warning. These cases are difficult to deal with from the fact of each party having lands, and large portions of the tribe actually residing within the hills. A short time before I left, both parties had assembled in strength with the object of open warfare. Shah Newaz Khan, as usual, endeavoured to mediate between them but failed, and eventually referred to me, mentioning his anxiety lest possibly the Government lands might be made the scene of the contest. To prevent any likelihood of this, I reinforced him with some police, horse and foot, and sent him papers to forward to the heads of each tribe, advising them to repair to his, Shah Newaz Khan's, presence and talk over the cause of quarrel, and this they eventually did, and after much discussion and recrimination finally came to an amicable understanding concerning their differences, and signed agreements binding themselves to forget former causes of quarrel, and abstain from originating others for the future, since which they have been quiet, and will, I hope, remain so. Copies of their written agreements will be found in your Persian office.

The Sheoranís, whose hills commence a short distance below the Gúmúl pass, are a numerous tribe, and have lately become important from their having adopted more active hostility towards us in the last two years than they had before displayed. I feel very confident, however, that the strong disposition of posts and detachments of the Punjab Irregular Force, that has lately been made, the efficient armament of the former, projected by the most Noble the Governor General, and the admirable frontier road constructed by Captain Fitzgerald, will render this portion of the border perfectly secure, and keep the Sheoranís in check. Slight alterations and

some additional posts may sometimes be found necessary, but the result will, I doubt not, be completely successful. To secure success, however, one thing is indispensably necessary, and that is a good system of intelligence, and on this subject I shall have a few words to say in a subsequent place.

You are aware that the chief Mullik of the Sheoraní tribe, Kutal Khan, was killed last year in an affray on the Drabun border. I trust that you will always keep an eye on the interests of the son of Gholam Alí Khan, the jemadar who behaved so gallantly, and after himself killing Kutal Khan lost his own life on the occasion. The boy's name is enrolled among the police horse, and a pension was granted to his family from Government. I hope that you will watch

Son of Gholam Alí Khan. over their interests. Gholam Alí, you are aware, was nephew of Tehr Khan of Kholachí; he had several times been engaged with the hill marauders before, and had always behaved most gallantly.

While on the subject of the Sheoraní border, I must mention the case of Shahzad Khan  
Shahzad Nassur. Nassur, a rather troublesome character, made notorious by the coercive measures which Major Edwardes was on one occasion obliged to adopt towards him, with the details of which you are, of course, well acquainted. Shahzad suffered considerable loss on the occasion, and was for a long time very cautious not to approach too near to the Government limits. In the spring of 1851, however, the Thannahdar of Chondhwan received information that some of Shahzad Khan's camels were grazing within the Government border line; he, therefore, with his police detachment, assisted by the Babur zemindars of Chondhwan, proceeded to the spot and seized the camels; the Nassurs turned out to defend them, and a skirmish ensued, in which several men on both sides were wounded. Shahzad on this joined himself to Kutal Khan Sheoraní, and for some time considerable hostile gatherings were reported in the hills, and there seemed a probability of a serious attempt at reprisal and revenge. Prompt arrangements

being, however, made for the protection of the border by Brigadier Hodgson, who was then in the district, the hill-men seemed to think better of the matter, and after a time Kutal Khan and Shahzad separated, and all chance of any serious attempt at an inroad being made was at an end. Shahzad Khan subsequently sued for the restoration of his camels, and his brother and son came to Derah to urge the petition; it was explained to them that the camels had been seized because they had been found on Government ground before Shahzad Khan had formally made his peace, but that Government had no wish of course to make money by seizing his camels, which would be released on his making due submission; eventually the camels were restored to the son and brother on their furnishing good security in the city of Derah for the sum of 460 rupees, being a redeeming fine of either five or ten rupees a head for 92 or 46 camels, I forget which, and the agreement was that when Shahzad was anxious to make peace with Government and return to his original position in the district, and should come in and give good security for the payment of his trinní, &c., the amount of fine should be remitted, the general arrangement and orderly conduct of all parties in the district being the only object. This was in the spring of 1851. Shahzad did not come down to the border in the winter of that year, but remained in Khorassan. The brother, Bazíd Khan, and son Hattí Khan, came with their kírís and were allowed to take up their old quarters in the district; they behaved well and kept their clansman in excellent order; they attended in camp and were introduced to you when we were marching along the border together. I have detailed the whole story here lest any difficulty or misconception should arise on the subject, and at the same time to recommend that if the men of the Nassur kírís have been behaving well, a part or the whole of the fine on the camels, which were originally detained chiefly to bring the parties to the satisfactory state I believe them to have arrived at, be remitted. Shahzad himself will probably not come down from Khorassan, or if he does will give no trouble while his relations are living within the Government border.

Sirmust Khan Nassur, rival and enemy of Shahzad, is a respectable quiet man, and has always conducted himself well.

Below the Sheoranís come the small tribe of Usteránahs ;  
 their two chief villages of Khúib-  
 Usteránahs. harah Pewar and Wuch-Khúib-  
 harah are situated in adjacent durrahs, and are not within our limits ; but the two chief Mulliks, Abdúllah Khan of the first named village, and Fútteh Khan of the second, hold lands within our border. Theselands are on the Thull under the hills, and in the neighbourhood of our post at Kúrwalí. The Usteránahs pay a low revenue on them in kind. This assessment, which was the same enforced by the Sikh Governors of the district, was confirmed to them by Major Edwardes. The Usteránahs are a very fine class of men, brave in fight, and quiet and well-disposed in peace ; and, as long as they behave well, I would advise the rate and mode of assessment laid down in Major Edwardes' purwannahs being strictly adhered to. Their possessions, either in our territories or out of it, are not extensive, and their means of livelihood are limited. As long, then, as they eschew the evil habits of their neighbours, the Sheoranís and Kusseranís, in the way of thefts and highway robbery, it should be our object to leave them as well provided as possible.

The Kusseranís lately brought themselves into notice by  
 their really daring attack on Derah  
 Kusseranís. Fútteh Khan. I had never known  
 much of the tribe. Like the Usteránahs they live chiefly in the hills, but hold lands on the plain, and the chief of the clan, Mitteh Khan Kusseraní, has always been under the command of the Deputy Commissioners of Derah Ghazí Khan. Usuf Khan, the principal man of the tribe that resided in my district, was a man of some note, but except on one occasion, when Lieut. Pearse, then my assistant at Derah, succeeded under my directions, with the aid of Foujdar Khan Alezai, in preventing a serious quarrel between him and Abdúllah Khan Usteránah, from ending in open warfare, his name was not brought under my notice, and I had no personal acquaintance with him, and little efficient knowledge of his tribesmen. This was chiefly owing to my having been so



much detained by other duties at Bunnú, just at the other end of the district. I think it possible, that, had it been otherwise, the rupture that afterwards occurred might have been prevented. I might, indeed, have acquired all the requisite information through my assistants, but it is one thing in a border district to visit places yourself, with every means about you for acquiring accurate intelligence, and with all the influence of your position and the power of weighing matters before you, and deciding on them at once, checking the first attempts at trickery, and compelling an immediate settlement of all points at issue ; and it is another to detach an assistant to the same spot, arrange for his safety, provide him with honest and safe advisers, and either trust implicitly to his judgment in all matters which cannot possibly always agree with your own, or trust to being able to come to a final decision on his reports of cases without personal communication with the parties. In the latter case, natives will always practise trickery to a great extent, making the subordinate write and propose questions and difficulties to his superior which they would not venture to broach in the presence of the responsible officer, but which, when they have to be answered and commented on through a third party, lead to dissension and dissatisfaction, which would not otherwise have occurred. Such considerations, added to an abundance of work at the sudder stations (I had the misfortune of having two in my district, Bunnú and Derah) prevented my detaching my assistants to the border, hoping, as I ever did, that the long-expected days of leisure would come at last, and the result was, as I have said, that I never acquired that intimate acquaintance with the classes on the lower part of my border that I had with those above ; and I mention the matter here as a futher argument to urge what I have before said in favour of sufficient leisure and means being ensured to the district officer to enable him to move freely about to all points requiring attention.

I hope that you may be able to solder up the difficulties with the Kusseraní, and recall those portions of the tribe that have fled to the hills in fear, to their lands in our district. Accidental outbreaks of the nature will occur ; but

With our main object of general pacification and civilization in view, we must never, if we can help it, allow a tribe which has at one time held lands in the plain and been acquainted with the more humanized classes dwelling on it, to be driven again into the hills and return to old mischievous habits, as injurious to their own dispositions as to the property of their more peaceable neighbours.

The Powindah merchants are the only other class of strangers requiring especial notice.

Powindah merchants. Since I have been resident in the district, this class of men have received a boon from Government, such as rarely falls to the lot of Afghans I imagine. They have, namely, been granted a total remission of the heavy duties imposed by the Sikh Government on all merchandise brought from the North-West, Kabul, Khorassan, Persia, &c. Nothing could exceed the joy with which they received the first intelligence of the liberal act of our Government, and it was a pleasure to have to communicate it to them; but I confess I was at the time apprehensive that the result might be that we might in a great measure lose the beneficial hold upon these men which the necessity imposed upon them of appearing at Derah with their property, having it weighed and examined, and then paying the duty or giving security for it, afforded to the Government officers. It is fair to say, however, that I have not hitherto observed any ill effects on their conduct from the change; and, considering their numbers and the trouble they might give, they are wonderfully orderly and well-conducted, and I hope they will always remain so; in fact the Mulliks of the chief tribes of Mían Kheyl, Neazai, Kharotí, &c., are men of great consideration, wealth, and stake, in the prosperity of their especial line of commerce, and so there is every hope that they will always see their own advantage in keeping the men of their kírís in order. The Powindus are, as you know, at deadly feud with the Wazírís. Care must be taken to prevent the former taking advantage of the Government neutral ground to revenge themselves on the latter for injuries they have suffered in the hills; and it is expedient to dis-

countenance expeditions on the part of the Powinduhls into the hills to avenge former injuries, recover property, &c., when the starting point is from their camps within our limits. It seems hard to interfere with any arrangements of the kind in the common course of feud, but the fact is that if they were allowed to carry on war with the hills when living among us they would keep the whole border in a ferment; and their own property and cattle being much more exposed than that of their enemies, they would in the end as a body suffer far more injury than they would ever succeed in inflicting; but of this no individual with revenge in view, and unrestrained by law, would think of for a moment. It is, as you know, common for a large portion of the men of a kirrí to go on into Hindústan with the camels and merchandize, and leave the breeding camels and women and children with a few men encamped on the plains of the Deraját; and it may be easily imagined how much they must be exposed to robbery and injury on those extensive unfrequented plains, and how difficult it must be for Government, under the most favourable circumstances, to ensure their efficient protection. The Powinduhls still pay a grazing tax for their camels, and this should be kept up in some form, though the present system requires modification. At present many of the chief camel-owners have to pay their trinní or camel-tax on both sides of the river, that is, they pay their regular fixed rate in the Derah district, and then crossing their camels over to the Leiah district where the grazing is better, they have again to pay a trinní tax into the Leiah treasury. Some arrangement should be made to remedy this; and, if possible to replace the present system of collection in the Derah district, which is made on settlements of old date, by an equal rate per camel. The necessity of ascertaining accurately the number of camels in each camp, which the arrangement I propose would entail, would cause no doubt a good deal of trouble and difficulty; but, for the same reason that I think it would be advisable that the trinní tax should be kept up, I should also be inclined to recommend the adoption of a system which would necessitate the yearly examination of the kirrís, and which would tend to

make the district subordinate officials acquainted with the characters of the Muliks, their people, camps, numbers, &c. I think it would also be fair to call upon the Muliks to declare how many of their camels they intended to graze upon the Derah district, and how many in Leiah, and only take tax from those that were to remain in the district or allow a certificate of duty paid in the Derah district to free them from toll in Leiah, and *vice versa*; with this object it would be well that the rates in the two districts should be assimilated. The whole amount of tax finally fixed per camel should be a low one, the object not being to realize revenue from this source, but to secure means of preserving a general surveillance and authority over these wild visitors, who otherwise, from being usually quiet and well-conducted, would be apt to escape observation during long periods; a result likely to beget an ignorance of their habits and proceedings, which, on the occasion of any unforeseen accident or offence, might be found inconvenient.

I do not intend to offer any lengthy remarks on the revenue settlements of the lower portion of the district; it is a subject on which I do not feel competent to speak in the least degree as an authority. I have before in writing of Murwut mentioned that my prejudices are in favor of an assessment calculated on an estimate of the actual existing crop in border districts, except in the case of lands the productiveness of which is rendered almost a certainty by unfailing irrigation. The slight experience afforded me by observing the working of the three year settlements of the Kholachí, Drabun, and Grangh elaquahs, has, I think, been the origin of my present opinions on the subject. Hill-men and Pathans generally are proverbially improvident, and the classes residing on the Damun-i-Koh or hill-skirt of the Súlimaní range are no exceptions to the rule; they consequently do not understand the necessity of reserving the superfluous profits of one harvest, to set against the losses of a less favourable one. The abundance of a good year, therefore, is squandered, and a dry season finds them unable to collect sufficient money to pay the Government revenue; time is requested, and perhaps granted; a second failure

comes, and the farmer in despair quits home and effects, crosses the border, and takes refuge in the hills—a result greatly to be deprecated by all parties, and one which would, I believe, never occur in a carefully-watched kham assessment,\* whatever its other faults might be. The whole system of administering a settlement is too hard and uncompromising to meet all the various and anomalous difficulties and accidents which only himself, an half-civilized squatter on an Afghan border, may have to encounter. His greatest enemy is undoubtedly drought, one which he might suffer from anywhere; but he may also on occasion have his crops cut or burnt by secret enemies or eaten by their cattle in the night, or some of his own property or cattle may be stolen, and he obliged to spend some considerable time at an important season in recovering them: and thus he may suffer numerous mishaps and difficulties which are never to be heard of in more civilized localities, and his case when represented must, under settlement, be dealt with in due course. His agreement is truly that he is to be the one to bide the risk of loss, not Government, and he must consequently either pay or be sold up; the real fact being in many cases that it is a great object to Government to have these border lands inhabited and cultivated by the men who have hereditary claims to them, and who from long use are reckless of the hardship of cultivating land in shot of hills peopled with declared enemies, and whose place and office it would often be difficult to supply when they have been driven by their own Government to throw up the arduous game they had hitherto played through life with varied success, but constant interest and spirit.

Ere this reaches you it is probable that the new settlements of Kholachí, Drában, and Graugh will have been completed, and I have no doubt that with careful watching they will work well and cause my remarks to appear ill-founded. I shall be well pleased that it should be so; but what I have written has always been strongly my opinion on the subject. Its expression may draw attention to the

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\* An assessment based on an estimate of the crop actually realized in the season.

necessity of great care in administering a settlement in a border district; I have, therefore, thought it worth while to give it distinctly. If no one of my successors ever sees reason to come round to my views on the subject, it will be because the new systems, with the working of which I confess that my experience is practically deficient, are found to answer all required purposes.

Before leaving the district, I strongly recommended that Shah Newaz Khan should be allowed a renewal of his lease of the Tánk elaquah. I do not think that it would be at all an object to us to assume direct management of the elaquah; and, if it is to be farmed out to any one, I feel certain that Shah Newaz Khan, with his inherited claims for consideration and obedience in the valley, will be found the best man to fill the place of yarahdar. I addressed you on this subject before I left Derah, recommending that before the lease be renewed the system of assessment and collection pursued by Shah Newaz Khan since he first received charge of the elaquah should be examined and weeded of any cesses likely to press unfairly on the ryots, in comparison with those under our direct management, who have received benefit from remission, and simplification of assessment, Shah Newaz Khan being allowed a proportionate reduction in the amount of his rent. If this be done, I believe that the Government officers will suffer no further anxiety or trouble concerning the revenue arrangements of the Tánk district.

Among the residents of the  
 Various classes in the district. Derah Ishmael Khan district, the following are the most remarkable grades and classes:—

1st. The Nawab, or former prince and owner of the province.

2nd. The Raíses, or hereditary Khans of elaquahs, or small sub-divisions of the district.

3rd. The class of Pathans of good family, not belonging to the soil, but who have been long resident in the district.

4th. The smaller land-owners or yeomen.

5th. The religious classes.

6th. The mercantile classes.

7th. The actual cultivators of the soil.

Nawab Shere Mahomed Khan, whose khital or honorary title is Shah Newaz Khan, is a grandson of Nawab Mahomed Khan, more commonly known by his honorary title of Sirbilund Khan, who first received the governorship of the districts of Kuchí, Derah Ishmael Khan, Blukkur, Mankerah, Kullúr, with the Damun-i-Koh from the Kabul Government. It appears that Mozuffer Khan, Nawab of Múltan, on some occasion when proceeding to pay his respects at the Court of Kabul, made Mahomed Khan, a vassal of his own, resident in the district, his *locum tenens* during his absence. Mahomed Khan acquitted himself so well in his task that all were loud in his praises when Mozuffer Khan returned: the latter took an opportunity of recommending him to the king, and eventually the elaquahs above named, which were all included under one general name of the Kuchí, were made over to Sirbilund Khan as a separate Government, and the title of Nawab with the honorary name of Sirbilund Khan was conferred upon him. The district of Derah Ghazí Khan was subsequently added to the original grant, and Sirbilund Khan seems always to have preserved the high character both at court and with the people which he had at first established. It is related of his justice that he put a cat in the stocks for killing a pigeon, and all the natives of the district still speak of him as a very fine fellow. Sirbilund Khan had an only daughter whom he eventually married to Hafiz Ahmed Khan, a man who acted as his naib or chief officer. The present Nawab Shere Mahomed Khan is second son of Hafiz Ahmed Khan (the first son having died). He succeeded his grand-father some thirty-one years ago, having been acknowledged as his heir during the lifetime of the latter. A short time after the death of Sirbilund Khan, Ranjít Singh, who had several times exacted large sums of money from the Nawab by marching an army into the neighbourhood and threatening active hostilities unless a heavy fine was paid, at length invaded the new Nawab's country, marched into and took possession of the Derah

district, and from thence crossed and attacked the young Nawab and his father in the fort of Mankerah. The besieged held out for fifteen days, and another five days were expended in negotiations, when Hadiz Ahmed Khan and the young Nawab yielded. Ranjit Singh made over the whole of the Trans-Indus tract down to Sungurh to the latter, and absorbed the Cis-Indus country himself, and from that time for a period of fifteen years the Nawab held the Derah country, kept up a considerable irregular force, and appears on the whole to have been liked and respected by the people of the country, till a period arrived when his expenses had so far exceeded his income that the pay of his troops had fallen into arrears to a hopeless extent, and Nou Nehal Singh having formed the intention of marching on Derah, the Nawab voluntarily submitted to him, only stipulating for a fair provision for himself and family, the payment of the arrears due to his soldiery, &c. The Derah district then came under the Sikh Government, and Konwr Nou Nehal Singh took up his own abode for a time in the district. The fort of Akálgurh was built, and the prince himself was succeeded by the race of Kardars or Lieutenants, the last of whom was by an arrangement of ours replaced by General Cortlandt. The Nawab received a handsome jagír and retired into private life. The jagír was fixed at two lakhs, with the necessity of occasional personal attendance on the Maharajah with a quota of horsemen. The Nawab gave up 40,000 rupees yearly to avoid this stipulation, and the prince consented to waive it, leaving the Nawab in undisturbed enjoyment of the remaining 160,000 rupees. For many years he has lived the life of a complete recluse. You are, of course, familiar with the story of his reported mysterious illness, a fever of heat, which is said to consume him incessantly even in the coldest weather, which is mentioned by Major Edwardes, and also currently related in the country. I have always thought it very possible that the whole thing was got up to obviate the necessity of his proceeding in person to pay his respects to the official in charge of the district, a ceremony which in the time of the Sikh kardars would have been, of course, very distasteful to



him ; but I have always considered that if he chose for such an object to condemn himself to live like a prisoner for life, it would be useless and unwise to make a difficulty about the matter, and, in the face of the solemn belief of a large portion of the community, insist on dragging him out as a sound man to pay an empty compliment, which would also entitle him to come forward more prominently in affairs connected with the district, and thereby render him a more troublesome denizen of it than he had hitherto been. This was my opinion as far as I was myself concerned. The case became, of course, very different when the Governor General was approaching the district. I, therefore, on that occasion, insisted on the Nawab either accompanying me with the other head men of the district to pay his respects to the ruler of the land, or submitting to medical examination by an English surgeon. Thus close pressed, he chose the former course, a pretty clear proof that his illness had been in a great measure feigned ; as it was, he arrived late at the Durbar, so that he had all the trouble and expense of moving, and yet lost his interview, a disappointment which will make him quicker in his movements in future.

The Nawab has four sons, Surfuraz Khan, Mahomed Newaz Khan, Rubnewaz Khan, and Dost Mahomed Khan. The first-named is now about thirty years of age ; the second is about twenty-six ; the two younger ones are quite boys. Both Surfuraz Khan and Mahomed Newaz Khan are rather dissipated characters, but their conduct has improved latterly ; they are both married and have families.

The Nawab's estates are ill-managed. He does not pay proper attention to them himself, and the men he employs are not particularly good agents, though the task they are expected to perform, like that of most men in similar positions, is a difficult one, being, namely, to take as much as possible from the ryots to supply means for an expenditure too lavish to be ever fairly covered by the available income. Akúnd Fuzul Alí is the oldest, best, and most honest of the Nawab's advisers, and one who has his good name and true interests at heart. The Nawab of Derah is much respected in the district on account of his former position,

and the connecting link he forms with a past state of things, to the memory of which the Barbers of the district still cling with much affection. I would therefore beg you always to treat him and his officials, unworthy though the latter may be, with forbearance and consideration. You will never find any difficulty in getting your wishes performed by speaking determinately and decidedly to the officials in private. In public darbar I would always show them consideration as the servants of the former owner of the country.

The chief Raíses of the district are Shah Newaz Khan of Tápk, grand-son of Surwur Khan, who was the man who originally founded the prosperity and importance of the elaquah. I have before noticed Shah Newaz Khan's case, and you will find full details of Surwur Khan's life, and of the mode in which the grand-son was placed in charge of the elaquah by our Government, in the ninth chapter of the first volume of Major Edwardes' work; I shall only, therefore, say that I have always had a good opinion of Shah Newaz Khan, and think him a loyal, well-disposed man, and considerate master to his ryots.

Alí Khan, Raís of Tukwarrah, is a man that has always borne the highest character with us, and his son Kalú Khan was severely wounded in Major Edwardes' affair with the Nassar Powindus, and afterwards did excellent service at Múltan.

Gúldad Khan, of Kholachí, nephew of Alí Khan, is well-disposed and respectable, but rather obstinate and wanting in acuteness. He was entrusted by Major Edwardes with the farm of the Kholachí settlement, but quarrelled so continually with the Túmundars, and showed such a total want of tact, temper in conducting the collections, &c., that I was obliged to set him aside and deal directly with the Túmundars; he is, however, an estimable character in many ways, kind to his people and relations, honest and plain dealing with the Government officials, and, therefore, to be depended on in all matters save and except any in which his particular enemies, the Túmundars, are concerned.

Of Mahomed Khan of Esá Kheyl and Allyar Khan of Kala Bagh, I have spoken elsewhere. The Khyssore family is, therefore, the last that I shall include among the Raíses of the district. Abdúlsummund Khan Khyssore is the son of one Futteh Khan Khyssore, who was formerly a known and noted character in the Deraját, and who held responsible charges under the Sikh Government. The manner of his death, which he met in action at Múltan under Major Edwardes, and the fact of the family having so long occupied their present position in the district, entitles the son and present representative of the family, Abdúlsummund Khan, to our especial care. The latter himself served at Múltan, and subsequently at Lukkí and in Bunnú, and was always a zealous and useful man in command of his duffah of horse. Mahomed Khan, brother of Futteh Khan, deceased, and, therefore, uncle to Abdúlsummund Khan, also lives at Khyssore, and owns a portion of the family possessions ; he is not very well disposed towards his nephew, as is usual in such cases, and his two sons will probably be rivals of Abdúlsummund Khan after the uncle's death. In such case I only wish the fact of Futteh Khan's death in our service, and the active assistance of the son during a troubled time, to be borne in mind.

There is a large class styled in the Deraját Múltaní Pathans, from the fact of their having formerly been adherents of the Nawab of Múltan ; after whose death and the annexation of the province to the Sikh dominions, the present representatives or their fathers retired to the Deraját, and have since resided there.

The most remarkable individual of this clan is undoubtedly Foujdar Khan Alízai, the man who so ably and gallantly assisted Major Edwardes in his effort to check the Múltan rebellion, and with whose story and character you are well acquainted. Next to him I should rank the men usually styled the Tánk Khans, namely, Gholam Hossein Khan, Alízai ; Hayat Ullah Khan, Suddozai ; Hafiz Sum-mundur Khan, and Furrukh Shere Khan. The letters addressed to me by the Board of Administration on the subject of the services rendered by these four individuals

during the last campaign, copies of which will be found in your English office, fully detail the nature of their employment, and the useful and spirited nature of the assistance which they rendered us. Beyond this, I need only here repeat what I believe I have often said to you verbally, namely, that I have the best opinion of all four, but particularly of Gholam Hossein Khan and Hayat Ullah Khan, who are two very fine fellows in every way, but especially will they be found useful when the horizon is clouded, treachery rife, and a prospect of hard blows distinct and evident, and that of peace, quiet, and advantage to be gained distant and problematical. I have once benefitted by the hearty assistance of these men under such circumstances; and though not by any means inclined to place implicit reliance on the good faith of Asiatics in general, I would thoroughly trust the fidelity of these two men in the worst strait, were it distinctly pledged or only implied by the ordinary rules of honor; and whatever may happen, and however much their own wayward fancies and dislike to the only species of service and employment which we have to offer them may give trouble in quiet times and shut them out from favor and emolument, I would recommend my Government and its officials to retain, by kind and considerate treatment, a right to call on these men, and all like them, when an hour of perplexity and difficulty arrives. I should mention that on their services and claims being represented to the Most Noble the Governor General after the campaign, he was pleased to acknowledge them most fully, and at the same time to grant them suitable provision in jagirs, money allowances, honorary titles, &c., the nature of which you will find fully set forth in correspondence on the subject in your office. I hope that you will be careful to see the various instructions on the subject fully carried out; and that, in case of any doubt or uncertainty as to the amount or nature of the grants, you will kindly sue for the adoption of a construction favorably to my Pathan friends, in consideration of the high opinion you know me to entertain of their good services and good qualities generally.

I forward with this paper a memorandum of the chief

natives in the district who were presented to the Most Noble the Governor General on the occasion of his visit to Kala Bagh. This list giving, as it does, the value and description of muzzurs presented and khilluts received by the various individuals, will give you a fair idea of the comparative rank and estimation of each man in the district, and serve as a guide on a future and similar occasion. It would occupy too much space to name all the men among the yeomen and Pathans who did good service in the late campaign ; and, as I was careful to give every man among them a certificate of good conduct before I left, I do not consider it necessary to go over the list again here ; I can only say for the whole clan in a great measure what I have said for their chiefs, namely, that I think them the most well-disposed, true and honest class of natives that I have ever had to deal with, and they have proved themselves brave and efficient soldiers when more than an ordinary exertion of soldierly qualities was needed. In peaceful times I acknowledge them to be indolent, slovenly, difficult to be schooled and disciplined, and too fond of ease and their own habits ever to make smart soldiers ; but I would advise you never to let these drawbacks incline you to despise and slight these men, whom you may find really useful and safe reeds to lean on when smarter and hardier soldiers, which I allow the Dúraní, Peshawar Pathans, and Rohillahs to be, have, as the Afghan expression is, got the wind into their heads, and are debating about the probabilities of final success on your side or otherwise. I shall never forget that the only men who deserted from my camp, when the Dost's son came down into Bunnú within thirty miles of me, were some Rohillahs ; and I confess that I do not regard with entire satisfaction the high favor in which they and the other Pathan classes I have mentioned are held by our officers in the newly-raised regiments, a favor which I allow that the class fairly and intelligibly earn by their superior vigour of body, energy, soldierly hardihood, and *rough and readiness*, if I may use the expression, qualities which naturally ensure them the good opinion of those commanding them, and throw all others round them into the shade. This high opinion numbers

would doubtless retain under most trying circumstances, and I do not wish to say more than is right to say of you or my superiors against a body of men that may contain many good and gallant soldiers; but I may fairly give my opinion *valent quatenus* that the Afghans as a race are in the first place very hostile to us, and further, have less of that good and honorable principle of attachment and good faith towards those whose salt they have eaten and whose service they have adopted than any other natives that we have hitherto come in contact with. It is this prime virtue in a mercenary, as many would be inclined to call it, but which is really in itself a fine feeling, that has always formed the strength of that useful and efficient native army, the solid qualities of which have so materially assisted to march us up to our present boundary Trans-Indus. and which has never been disgraced by desertion to the enemy in the field, and less by desertion to the rear, than occurs in most armies fighting within reach of the homes of its soldiers, and my own opinion is that it will be an evil day when we suffer the more brilliant and soldierly qualifications of classes that we have lately come in contact with, but the men of which are not imbued with the above-mentioned honest feeling, to supplant to a dangerous extent the old loyal and brave, but not perhaps equally vigorous and efficient soldiers of our own provinces. These remarks would apply to a certain extent to the Sikhs as well as to the Afghans, and I do think that the former have been raised in too troubled a school to make them safe servants in times of uncertainty; but I believe they would only move for the Khalsah or Hindú supremacy, and to the former they have been true as the steel they wear in reverence to the behests of its founder, and so there is some fine feeling to work upon in them; but an Afghan, be he Amír or villager, can fight as long as he likes and run away when the aspect of affairs does not satisfy him, without the slightest loss of credit among his fellows; he can sigh like a martyr over the irresistible pressure of circumstances which has on some occasions obliged him to break through the most solemn oaths and engagements; he can wade through murder to an inheritance

and be admired in his own country as a stirring decided character, fit to cope with the world's difficulties, or serve a master for a time, rob him, and return to his village with no further shadow on his respectability than might hang over the position of a successful adventurer from the diggings. You will recognize the case I allude to in the last instance; and, knowing the Afghans as you do, will not, I think, deem my strictures on the general qualities of the race too severe. All I say is that these are not the men (their homes in many instances being, as they are, beyond our border) who should be admitted too freely into the ranks of our regiments.

Before leaving the subject, I must notice one or two of the particularly fine class of yeomen in the Deraját, and among them Tehr Khan, Kholachí, who, on the occasion of the Múltan outbreak, and on the receipt of a summons from Major Edwardes through Foujdar Khan, immediately quitted his home and joined the former with as many followers as he was directed to bring, who distinguished himself on several occasions, and who, directly the war closed, was only anxious to get back to his homestead. I know you will like this old man, and I recommend him to your especial care. His son and nephew have both done good service; the latter, Gholam Alí, having lost his life last year in most gallant and forward performance of his duty, as before described; he had on a former occasion received five sabre wounds in an affair with some Wazírí marauders. Nourung Khan Gundapore, and Shere Alí Kúndí, were also among the yeomen who took part in the war; having at the same time enough land to keep themselves in comfort at home, had they preferred making excuses and difficulties to at once answering the call to what there was every prospect of proving a warm entertainment in every way during the summer months at Múltan.

Among the religious classes I recommend Syud, usually called the Sáhebzádah of Belote, a great Mahomedan oracle of the district, and a highly respectable man, to your care; also Ghosain Kunhyah Lall and his brothers of Derah, the head of the Hindú faith, who is, however, also

much looked up to and consulted by the Mussulmans of the district. Kunhyah Lall Ghosain is a particularly well-disposed respectable man, and one with whom you may with advantage converse on any subject connected with the treatment of the Hindús of the district in any matter touching their religious prejudices. I had an opportunity of introducing him to you before I left, and of engaging your good offices for him in the affair of his two wells, for which he is entitled to compensation ; one of these wells has been included in the cantonments, and another in an officer's compound. The papers in the first case had been forwarded to the Board of Administration, and had not when I left been returned. In the latter case Lieutenant Younghusband, the Captain of Police, the officer in question, had expressed to me his willingness to pay a fair compensation, but the amount and nature had not been fixed. I would recommend a fixed yearly rent covering the estimated produce of the well as the only kind of compensation calculated to make amends to a man for the loss of a patch of cultivation, trees, &c., on the sterile mud plain on which the well in question is situated.

On the mercantile classes of Derah and the neighbouring towns I can say but little, never having resided long enough at Derah itself to have leisure to enquire into their means of life, hopes, resources, &c. Their chief dealings have hitherto been with the Powinduhs, for whom they act in a great measure as bankers and agents, and they have always been extremely well-conducted as a class, well-to-do in the world, but not perceptibly very wealthy ; their sources of profit being, as I have said, chiefly from acting as warehousemen and agents for others, or forwarding goods to distant markets on their own account, instead of carrying on a local trade by the activity of which their prosperity and position might be estimated.

The cultivators of the soil in the elaquahs below the Peyzú pass are chiefly Pathans and Juts. They are generally (as compared with the men in the same class in Bunnú and Murwut) well-disposed, fair dealing, and industrious. The difficulties of the Government officials are with the owners



of the land and middlemen, and not the actual tillers of the soil. Hundreds of the latter class quitted their ploughs in the late campaign to follow various Khans to the field, and on many occasions of attack from the hills, they have shown alacrity and spirit in assisting the Government police or soldiers in repelling it; in fact I merely wish to notice them here as a loyal well-disposed body of men, who, if comfortable in their homes, will never be disposed to join in any opposition to a Government, which I doubt not in talking the matter over by their fire-sides, they represent to their children that they were greatly instrumental in assisting to gain possession of the country.

The arrangements necessary for ensuring early and correct intelligence of all important movements in the hills require some care and attention. The duty should be mainly performed by the civil officers, but they should be careful to carry the military officers along with them in the matter, and whenever the latter are detached to the frontier the civil officer should direct all subordinate officials concerned in the task of procuring intelligence to convey it in the first instance to the military officer on the spot; and in the second place, or if possible, simultaneously, to the district officer at the sudder station, or wherever he may be. Any spy or messenger recommended by the officer on the spot as intelligent and likely to be useful, should (if there be nothing against him) be at once employed, and any sums which the military officer may find it necessary to expend in procuring good intelligence should be refunded to him from the treasury, and the amount be submitted in the district accounts with the military officer's receipt appended as a voucher, and I would recommend this arrangement being extended even to native officers when in independent command of a detached post, so that nothing be ever risked for want of good intelligence; and my experience goes to prove that fair liberal payment is all that is necessary to ensure excellent information even on the most emergent occasions. A little misplaced economy in such a matter may cost lives, property, and the peace of the bor-

der; and in the whole game prevention is everything, remedy is seldom attainable.

My meaning in the arrangement I advocate is, that it is advisable that the civil officer who, as far as the treatment of the tribes is concerned, is also the local political officer, should be thoroughly conversant with the frontier news of the day, and thereby be able to watch the conduct of tribes, individuals, &c., and be ready to interpose in matters, where, as is frequently the case, a little management, or precaution, or change of some existing system or plan, is all that is necessary for allaying a growing ferment; and also that he may be able to forewarn the military authority, and if necessary the Board of Administration officially, of threatened mischief; while at the same time, from the fact of most of the attacks made being of a comparatively trivial nature, hastily arranged and rapidly executed, it is most important that the military officer on the spot, who is responsible for the line of villages entrusted to him, be he native or European, should be the person first to receive the intelligence, and be in fact locally head of the department. In most instances the spies themselves will not be men who can write or forward the intelligence themselves to the district officer. The police thanahdar, if there be one on the spot, should be entrusted with the duty; where no such official is at hand, the district officer should be empowered to place a writer on the spot to pass on statements of intelligence received. I am confident that the arrangement I propose, if carried out with cordial good understanding between the civil and military officers, will be found the best in every way. The military officer being for a time in a manner the actual employer of the spies, will have confidence in their communications which he never would have in those of men entertained and paid by a person not present on the spot, the civil officer will always have the best opportunities of knowing all that is occurring; and both parties being in possession of the whole amount of intelligence will be able to communicate freely on all subjects connected with it. Where the civil officer is himself present, he should manage the intelligence, spies, &c., himself, and can have no

difficulty in keeping the military commandant fully informed of the nature of passing events.

I have cited the police force, horse and foot, as one of the heads to be noticed by me, but in truth I have little to

add to the matter contained in my numerous letters to the Board of Administration on the subject

(copies of which will be found in the office), all expressing an anxious hope that, despite all difficulties and drawbacks, the main body of the Pathan irregular levies that had done such efficient service during the late campaign might still be retained in our pay in some form or another; that, in fact, they might not be forced to relinquish the service by an useless attempt to make them, as full grown soldiers, and many of them men of great rank and consideration, conform to our systems of dress, drill, &c.

A short time before I left the district, it was notified to me that the Most Noble the Governor General had been pleased to agree to several important modifications in the organization of the police fund, with the view of enabling all who had worked for us to continue in the service without being frightened away by the requirement of a too exact discipline. I hope that in the case of the horsemen the result has been satisfactory, as I consider it a most important matter, and one nearly concerning our good name that the well-known "*Kushadah fouj*,"\* which fought so well under Major Edwardes, should not entirely disappear, and that the relations of men who died in our service, and others who fought and were wounded, should still be found on the rolls, and should suck a permanent advantage from their spirit and hearty assistance in unfavorable times. I say this with regard to the horse; for, I am sorry to say that, as far as the old foot levies were concerned, the question was well nigh settled before I left the district. Lieutenant Younghusband Captain of Police, had, by the exertion of the greatest tact, patience, and forbearance, induced a considerable number of the old Pathan levies to volunteer for the new police battalion; the majority had accepted the gratuity of three

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\* irregular force.

months' pay kindly granted them by Government, and retired to their homes. The process of re-organization was still in progress when I left. I cannot speak too gratefully of the anxiety displayed by Lieutenant Younghusband to make the required change as easy and unalarming to these men as possible, because he knew such to be the wish of the Government, and of the officers that had lately commanded them. As a smart officer himself, interested in raising a smart and efficient regiment in as short a time as possible, his natural wish would have been to take younger, more promising, and more tractable materials to work upon.

With regard to the number of police required for the district, after well considering the subject, and supposing that the police horse are to take the out-post duties in Bunnú (the cavalry regiment remaining entirely in reserve), and the internal duties of the Derah district, I cannot see how the work is to be performed with less than 600 men; *i. e.* 400 in the Bunnú division of the district, and 200 in Derah. In fact, as long as the police hold the Peyzú and Amán Kheyí posts it will be difficult for the police officer to provide for all the duties required of him in the Derah portion of the district with 200 men.

Before leaving I gave every officer of the irregular force, horse and foot, a separate certificate of character, services, &c.; should any be subsequently dismissed, I trust you will do the same. The men are worthy of every consideration from us, and the possession of such a certificate will be of service to them as long as the events in which they bore a creditable part are remembered.

The following is the amount and disposition of force that I would recommend for the Bunnú and Derah divisions of the district respectively. I hope I shall be acquitted of presumption in recording an opinion on the subject. The actual amount of force to be employed will be decided by more competent judges; but individual opinions are always of use in arriving at a judgment in a case of this kind. I may mention that, since commencing this memorandum, I have heard with much satisfaction of the well-planned and successful expeditions against the Wazírís and Sheo

ranís, the effect of which will, I have no doubt, be most beneficial on the whole family; at the same time I must say, that, as far as I am able to judge, the amount of force I am about to name would not furnish means for a system of offensive operations in the hills, though a careful combination of movement might be made occasionally (as appears to have been so well accomplished in the present instance) to furnish a sufficient force for a rapid dash at a particular spot.

#### FORCE FOR BUNNU.

Where the out-posts are to be taken by the police.  
 For out-posts, { 1 Battalion Police Infantry,  
 jail, town, &c. { 400 Police Horse.  
 Reserve. { 1 Regiment Punjab Infantry,  
                   Wing ditto, Cavalry,  
                   1 Light field battery.

In Derah, where the out-posts are to be taken by<sup>t</sup><sub>e</sub> the Punjab Irregular Force,

1 Regiment of Punjab Cavâlry,  
 1 Ditto ditto Infantry,  
 4 Field guns,  
 ½ Battalion Police Infantry,  
 200 Police Horse.

Should the south-western border of Bunnú become disturbed and troublesome, an increase of force will be found absolutely necessary. The villages of the Mírí tuppahs are too distant from Dhullípgurh to render it feasible to support them thence; it would, therefore, be found necessary to place a strong detachment capable of moving out to fight, at the head of the Tochí, and also to place a post between the present Tochí post and the Ahmedzai thannah, where there is at present a long interval of country wholly uncared for; and these arrangements would, of course, absorb more men. A frontier must, I believe, always be an expensive matter in this way, unless, as I have said, the dwellers on it are left to play their own game. It is not that the men by whom the plains are threatened are very formidable; on the contrary, the most costly arrangements proposed are only

calculated to oppose one man to six that they are able to bring against us, but where there is hostility an attack may be expected on villages lying close under hills, mere space, bare rocks and hills, without an inhabitant, require posts to watch them as if they were teeming with men-at-arms; because, if the precaution be neglected, the line may be broken by this desolate space being the route selected for an attack, and then the steed having been stolen and experience acquired, it becomes necessary to shut the stable door by putting a post at the spot where the mischief has been done, which timely prevention might possibly have averted. I believe it, therefore, wise to incur any outlay in the first instance in protecting the country well; when this is done liberally and effectually, annoyance will gradually subside, other pursuits than robbery and violence will be adopted, intercourse with the plains will increase, and matters assume the generally tranquil aspect which they in a great measure already wear on our Scinde border.

REYNELL G. TAYLOR,

*Late Deputy Commissioner.*

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## APPENDIX.

List of the Native Gentry of the Derah Ishmael Khan district presented to the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie at Kala Bagh, in February 1851, with the amount of nuzzurs each were permitted to present, and likewise of the khilluts received by each from the Government Tosheh Khanah.

| NAMES.                                                | NUZZURS.                       | KHILLUTS.                                                                                                                                                                           |
|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1.—Nawab Shah Newaz Khan, of Derah,                   | 21 gold mohurs and two horses, | { 1 pair of long shawls, 1 square shawl, 1 goshwarrah, 1 nūn-astīn. Jewels: 1 tur-<br>pech or tiara, 1 dug-<br>hah or brooch. Arms: 1<br>pearl necklace. Arms:<br>Sword and shield. |
| 2.—Nawab Mahomed Zurfuraz Khan, son of the above, ... | 11 gold mohurs and one horse,  | { 1 pair of long shawls, 1 square ditto, 1 goshwarrah, 1 nūn-astīn. Jewels: 1 tiara, 1 brooch.                                                                                      |
| 3.—Foujdar Khan Alízai, Khan Bahadúr, ...             | Ditto ditto,                   | { The same as No. 2, with the addition of a sword and shield.                                                                                                                       |
| 4.—Gholam Hussun Khan Alízai, ...                     | 11 búdkís and one horse,       | { 1 pair long shawls, 1 goshwarrah. Jewels: 1 tiara, 1 brooch. Arms: Sword and shield.                                                                                              |
| 5.—Hayat Ullah Khan Suddúzai, ...                     | Ditto ditto.                   | { The same as Gholam Hussun Khan.                                                                                                                                                   |
| 6.—Shah Newaz Khan of Tánk, ...                       | Ditto ditto.                   | Ditto ditto.                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 7.—Hafiz Samundur Khan Khoajikzai,                    | Ditto ditto,                   | Ditto ditto.                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 8.—Mahomed Khan, of Esá Kheyli, ...                   | 9 búdkís and one horse,        | Ditto ditto.                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 9.—Gholam Surwur Khan Khagwaní,                       | Ditto ditto,                   | Ditto ditto.                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 10.—Mihmúd Khan Khudukkah, ...                        | Ditto ditto,                   | { The same khillut as Gholam Hussun Khan, without the sword and shield.                                                                                                             |

| NAMES.                               | NUZZURS.                   | KHILLUTS.                     |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 11.—Furruk Shere Khan, ...           | 9 búdkís and one horse,    | { The same khillut as No. 1.  |
| 12.—Bukhtear Khan Suddúzai, ...      | 9 búdkís,                  | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 13.—Gúldad Khan Gundapore, ...       | 9 búdkís and one horse,    | { The same khillut as No. 10. |
| 14.—Gholam Kasim Khan Allízai, ...   | Ditto ditto,               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 15.—Gholam Surwur Khan Suddúzai, ... | Ditto ditto,               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 16.—Mullik Allyar Khan, of Kala Bagh | Ditto ditto,               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 17.—Khan Bahadúr Khan Suddúzai, ...  | 9 búdkís,                  | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 18.—Alí Khan Gundapore, ...          | The same nuzzur as No. 17, | { Ditto ditto.                |
| 19.—Alim Khan, of Esá Kheyl, ...     | Ditto ditto,               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 20.—Mahomed Ayaz Khan, of Esá Kheyl, | 7 búdkís,                  | Khillut of 3 pieces.          |
| 21.—Mahomed Khan Khagwaní,           | The same as No. 20,        | The same as No. 20.           |
| 22.—Kalú Khan Gundapore, ...         | Ditto ditto.               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 23.—Shere Khan Esá Kheyl, ...        | Ditto ditto.               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 24.—Mozuffer Khan of Kala Bagh, ..   | Ditto ditto.               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 25.—Abdúlsommund Khan Khyssore, ...  | Ditto ditto.               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 26.—Shah Newaz Khan Khyssore, .      | Ditto ditto.               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 27.—Sirbilund Khan Kuttí Kheyl, ...  | Ditto ditto.               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 28.—Shah Jehan Khan Kutí Kheyl,      | Ditto ditto.               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 29.—Mahomed Khan Khyssore, ...       | Ditto ditto,               | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 30.—Nourung Khan Gundapore, ...      | 5 búdkís,                  | Ditto ditto.                  |
| 31.—Rai Tehil Ram,                   | Ditto ditto,               | Ditto ditto.                  |

It is often extremely difficult to fix the comparative rank and claims to consideration of natives of good family in a district; the above list cost care and trouble in preparation, and may be found useful as a guide on future occasions.

R. G. T.



## POSTSCRIPT.

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It has caused me so much regret since printing this memorandum, to find that I had omitted to mention gratefully the assistance I received in the performance of my duties from several individuals, that I have at length determined to add these few lines, not from any idea that my expressed gratitude will be likely to benefit the men themselves, but because the omission of it where others less prominent have been mentioned, might lead to an erroneous idea of the nature of my real feelings towards those whom I have not named.

In writing this memorandum I was not penning the dispatch of a victorious commander, or the minute of a successful governor, but merely complying with the injunctions of my superior, Sir H. Lawrence; it never, therefore, occurred to me to make mention of the officers who had worked with me as assistants. Their characters, I was well aware, were well known and in no need of a good word from me. Still, on perusal, my report appears to myself cold and bald without some slight notice of Lieutenant Pearse's occasionally eccentric but still vigorous zeal, assiduity and energy; Mr. Simson's knowledge of detail and talents of administration much superior to my own; and Lieutenant Coxe's equal qualifications, with the fact of his having by thorough knowledge of the details of treasury management rescued the accounts of the district from fatal confusion.

Lieutenant Pollock only joined the district a short time before I left: he is well known, and I need only say that without consulting him I mentioned him to the President of the Board of Administration, as the man of all others that I should wish to see put in charge of Bunnú.

I had the best assistants in the country; if the work was not perfectly done the fault did not lie in the tools I had to work with, but in my not making full use of their capabilities.

In the following cases I must be allowed the liberty of a more full notice.

Mr. W. MacMahon was with me from January 1849, till I left the district, in the capacity of Extra Assistant, and on very many occasions during that period his assistance, which was always heartily given, was of great use to me and to the public service.

In December 1849, the Omerzai Wazírís adopted decided hostility to Government, and in January 1849, an attack made by them on the tuppahs from the Gúmmutí pass was repelled before any injury had been done, by a detachment under Mr. MacMahon, who showed great spirit and decision on the occasion. Mr. MacMahon's party lost two men killed and several wounded, and he himself received a ball in his helmet. As the hostility of the Wazírís at this time seemed likely to make Bunnú the most important part of the district, I was directed by the Board of Administration to remove my head quarters from Derah, where they had been fixed, to the former place; and, for a long period after this, we were in a manner at open war with the Omerzais and sections of other tribes which joined and assisted them in night attacks, cattle forays, &c., on the Government lands, a state of things which required unremitting watchfulness, harassing labor in patrolling, &c., and prompt action when the marauders were known to be a-foot. At this time Mr. MacMahon was my only European companion and assistant, and I hope he has as pleasant a recollection of our association on the occasion as I have. We could seldom then count on a full night's rest, and many was the starry night or less pleasant one that having laid ourselves down to rest at gun-fire, we have finished in stumbling about the hill side in full harness and a strong atmosphere of burning *fulitahs*;\* and many a long day's march have we had together under a hot sun over the Thull, or away into nooks of the hills to seize some refractory delinquent, or cut the crops of some revenue defaulter. The game we had to play was a petty one no doubt, but locally it was of great importance; and with rough materials to work with, coupled with the difficulty of encountering for the first time the advantages possessed by the hill-men, to which I have alluded in the memorandum, and that before we had simplified the defence of the district by the construction of roads, posts, &c., we found the task troublesome enough at times.

Mr. MacMahon rendered excellent service by systematically patrolling the border, and was also most useful in superintending the formation of roads and out-posts; he always gave so much attention to any work entrusted to him that much expense was saved to Government whenever he had charge of the works.

I know Mr. MacMahon to be a man of great bravery and energy, and as he worked hard in the Government service under my

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\* The slow match used in a matchlock.

eye, I hope this notice of his conduct will not be deemed out of place.

Rae Tehil Ram, Tahsildar of Bunnú, rendered me most valuable assistance during the attack on Lukki: he was then Gholam Hussun Khan's right hand man, and being possessed of great energy and ability, he frequently both planned and was chiefly instrumental in carrying out arrangements on which the efficiency of the irregular force assembled mainly depended. Tehil Ram's whole case is fully set forth in my letters on the affairs of the Tank Khans, as well as in certificates which I put into his own hands on leaving; I hope that you will always regard him as a loyal well-disposed man who did excellent service during the rebellion, such as no other man on the spot could have performed as well.

Commandant Fuzl Ali I had known for five years when I left, and I thoroughly liked and respected him; he proved himself a most efficient artillery officer at Multan, and always worked hard and heartily at any task entrusted to him. Major Edwardes has made particular mention of this old and most respectable native officer in his book; I need not add any thing to his appreciation.

Colonel Sulhan Khan is a fine old officer; he went to Kabul with General Pollock's army in 1842, in command of his own regiment, part of the Sikh Contingent Force, for which service he received Ranjit Singh's star of the Punjab. He was subsequently present at Kineri, Suddosam, and Multan under Major Edwardes, who had a very high opinion of him, and on several occasions in little border matters he showed a good soldierly alacrity and spirit when under my orders.

Colonel Budrinath of the Kutarmukhi regiments went through all the Multan campaign with credit to himself, and always gave me satisfaction and assistance when occasion offered.

I should say the same of Commandant Hafiz Buksh, of the artillery, and generally, of all the junior officers of the Sulhan Khan and Kutarmukhi regiments, and the artillery detachments which were so long on duty in the district under my orders.

All these men have now passed under other masters, but I hope I may be excused after our long association for saying a few words for them if it be merely to prevent a possibility of my silence being misinterpreted to their disadvantage.

Should the son of Colonel John Holmes, of the old Khalsah army, who was murdered by the Sikh soldiery at Bunnú, apply to

you for assistance in procuring him employment under our Government, I hope that you will kindly advocate his cause. His father died in our service, having especially incurred the enmity of the Sikhs by his own adherence to our interests, in consequence of which he was the first person against whom their efforts were directed. It was always their custom in commencing a mutiny to cut off the head individual of the party opposed to their views, either by assassination or open violence, thereby destroying the hopes of the subordinate portion of their opponents, and inducing their secret friends to declare openly and decidedly in favor of the contemplated revolution.

At Bunnú Futteh Khan Tewannah and Colonel Holmes were known to be thoroughly in our interests, and consequently, when rebellion had been decided upon, the latter was first murdered to surprise, and the former only saved himself for a time by throwing himself into the inner fort of Dhullipgurh.

Colonel Holmes' widow and family have received a pension from the Government, but his son, when old enough, will have a strong claim for employment: he is now about sixteen I think.

R. G. T.







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